Welfare characterization of monetary-applied models and three implications

This paper demonstrates that the applied monetary models - the Sidrauski-type models and the cash-in-advance models, augmented with a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services - imply trajectories which are Pareto-Optimum restricted to a given path of the real quantity of money. As a consequence, three results follow: First, Bailey’s formula to evaluate the welfare cost of inflation is indeed accurate, if the longrun capital stock does not depend on the inflation rate and if the compensate demand is considered. Second, the relevant money demand concept for this issue - the impact of inflation on welfare - is the monetary base. Third, if the long-run capital stock depends on the inflation rate, this dependence has a second-order impact on welfare, and, conceptually, it is not a distortion from the social point of view. These three implications moderate some evaluations of the welfare cost of the perfect predicted inflation.

Tendência sócio-cultural da alimentação saudável no Brasil e sua re-significação a partir da publicidade: um estudo de caso da campanha Maxi-goiabinha da Bauduco

Tendências sócio-culturais costumam ser incorporadas no mercado de consumo na forma de produtos e campanhas publicitárias. Para isto, as empresas tendem a resignificar as tendências para que se tornem argumentos de venda de seus novos produtos. Este estudo toma como objeto um produto lançado no mercado, no caso a Maxi-Goiabinha da Bauducco, e discute através de referências bibliográficas e outros exemplos de mercado como se dá a re-significação deste produto em específico. O objetivo desta dissertação é identificar de que maneira as tendências de alimentação saudável foram simplificadas, transformadas em ícones e exemplificadas através de um estilo de vida pela publicidade do produto Maxi-Goiabinha. O estudo busca os elementos que serviram como influência da campanha, a razão da utilização destes elementos e quais os potenciais impactos do produto no mercado em que está inserido. A escolha do produto Maxi-Goiabinha é interessante por ser um produto de uma marca notoriamente indulgente, a Bauducco, que procura se inserir num mercado com argumentos saudáveis que não faz parte do posicionamento original da marca. A relação mostra a fragilidade da marca para manter a sua identidade ao ser confrontada com a oportunidade de maior faturamento ao se aproveitar de uma tendência de mercado. Conclui-se que a publicidade provê os consumidores de informação e a partir desta, eles passam a procurar por características mais saudáveis no mercado de consumo, o que gera uma transformação potencialmente positiva no mercado. No entanto, ao se utilizar como ícones de seus comerciais pessoas que mostram um balanço perfeito entre saúde, vida pessoal e vida profissional, pode-se gerar um aumento da ansiedade no consumidor médio para se tornarem tão bem sucedidos quanto este homem ou mulher ideal. Discute-se se as escolhas disponibilizadas pela indústria no atual contexto de consumo oprimem ou libertam o consumidor, pois ao mesmo tempo em que lhe é dado o poder de escolha, também lhe é cobrado, através dos ícones das publicidades, ser feliz e bem sucedido em dezenas de facetas e papéis que acompanham a multiplicidade da vida contemporânea.

O que e o método científico: uma reflexão crítica sobre o método científico como subsídio para o ensino das ciências naturais

Ensinar ciência e, acima de tudo, ensinar o método científico e desenvolver a atitude crítica do estudante. Isto significa substituir a visão da ciência como uma coleção de fatos e teorias definitivamente estabelecidos, pela visão da ciência como um conhecimento racional - Porque crítico -, conjectural, provisório, sempre capaz de ser questionado e corrigido. Significa também opor à visão da ciência como uma representação completa e perfeita de fenômenos diretamente observáveis, a visão da ciência como uma reconstrução idealizada e parcial da realidade, que explica o visível pelo invisível. Nessa linha de raciocínio, devemos opor à idéia de uma observação pura e imparcial dos fatos, a ideia da observação guiada por hipóteses e teorias. Ensinar o meto do cientifico é questionar a ideia de que descobrimos e verificamos hipóteses através de procedimentos indutivos, substituindo-a pela ideia de que inventamos conjecturas ousadas, surgidas de nossa imaginação. Essas conjecturas, contudo, deverão ser testadas o mais severamente possível, através de tentativas de refutação que façam uso de experimentos controlados. No lugar da ilusória busca de teorias verificáveis, verdadeiras -ou pelo menos cada vez mais prováveis devemos buscar teorias de maior refutabilidade, cada vez mais amplas, precisas, profundas, de maior grau de corroboração e, talvez, mais próximas da verdade. Finalmente, ensinar o método científico significa também criticar cada uma das visões alternativas de ciência, propondo novos critérios para avaliar hipóteses e teorias científicas. É desnecessário dizer que estes critérios, por sua vez, devem também ser criticados, visto que a ausência de discussão crítica e a aceitação passiva e dogmática de um conjunto de ideias ou teorias e a não ciência, a pseudociência, enfim, a negação do espírito crítico e da racionalidade do homem.

Desempenho do professor das classes de alfabetização funcional: influência da percepção

o presente estudo objetiva levantar, a partir da anãlise das atitudes dos alfabetizadores, a possibilidade de inferências acerca de um certo estilo perceptivo do alfabetizador frente ao MOBRAL e ate que ponto esse estilo afeta o desempenho docente. Pretende,tambem, caracterizar o al fabetizador, apontando a relação entre algumas de suas caracteristicas e suas percepçoes. Trata-se de um estudo de campo, realizado no Municipio do Rio de Janeiro, que apresentaI como amostra, 33,46% da população de professo - res das classes de alfabetização funcional, originadas dos convênios firma dos pelo MOBRAL, no segundo semestre de 1977. Como instrumentos de coleta de dados utilizaram-se formulãrios que foram respondidos pelos 91 sujeitos da pesquisa e seus respectivos supervisores. A avaliação do alfabetizador apresenta-se sob dois enfoques: o do superviior e o dos resultados dos alunos, obtidos nos testes de Leitura, Escrita e Cãlculo. A hipótese substantiva que orienta o estudo - a percepçao do professor das classes de alfabetização funcional afeta o seu desempenho - foi confirmada quanto à avaliação realizada pelo supervisor (correlação li near = 0,43) e infirmada quanto aos resultados dos alunos (correlação li near = 0,10). No que diz respeito às caracteristicas dos alfabetizadores, observa- se que os professores mais novos e os de nivel de escolaridade mais alto foram os que receberam melhores notas do supervisor e apresentaram m~ nor rendimento quanto aos resultados dos alunos. A pesquisa ainda apresenta informações dos professores em relaçao a diferentes aspectos do MOBRAL, destacando-se: o efetivo oferecimento de classes, o perfeito entrosamento entre alfabetizadores e alunos, a falta de discussão do conceito de alfabetização funcional e a necessidade de melhorar o desempenho dos alfabetizadores em relação ã exploração do cartaz gerador e ã utilização do trabalho de grupo. Tudo faz crer que, apesar da diferença de nível de escolaridade (grande incidência dos alfabetizadores com 2Q grau - habilitação magist~ rio) entre professores e alunos, observa-se que ambos se aproximam, apresentando tambem o professor, uma passividade, um conformismo que o faz aceitar a realidade a sua volta, entusiasmar-se e a ela dedicar-se sem, porem, problematizá-la.

Three essays on local demand for public services

Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro

A reação da autoridade bancária frente a uma crise é de fundamental importância para a sua contenção. No Brasil, durante a crise do subprime, em 2008, observou-se a ocorrência de uma crise de liquidez em alguns bancos que levou o Banco Central a autorizar uma linha especial de captação de depósitos com limite muito superior ao habitual, denominado Depósito a Prazo com Garantia Especial (DPGE). Estes fatos propiciaram uma oportunidade de observar a reação dos depositantes frente a um choque exógeno ao sistema financeiro nacional para, em seguida, explorar a captação exógena de recursos devido à ampliação nos limites dos depósitos assegurados, com cobertura do Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (FGC). Além disso, analisou-se o efeito do DPGE sobre o crédito, considerando que depósitos assegurados e não-assegurados não são substitutos perfeitos e um aumento na oferta de depósitos assegurados deveria aumentar a oferta de crédito do mercado, como um todo. A estratégia empírica utilizada permitiu reconhecer os bancos emissores de DPGE, separando-os por outros fatores relacionados aos fundamentos bancários (tamanho, liquidez, qualidade dos ativos e retorno) e analisar os efeitos do DPGE nas taxas de juros praticadas na captação de depósitos a prazo, em geral. A base de dados utilizada também permitiu observar o comportamento desses bancos e a estratégia por eles utilizada na origem e destinação de tais recursos. Tomados em conjunto, os resultados encontrados são consistentes com a ideia de que depositantes migram seus recursos para a segurança durante a crise, na chamada “fuga para a qualidade” e retornam quando lhes dão a garantia necessária. Também é coerente com a teoria que diz que a substituição imperfeita entre depósitos assegurados e depósitos não-assegurados afeta a restrição de financiamentos dos bancos. O resultado deste estudo revela a importância da atuação da autoridade reguladora frente a situações críticas, bem como os efeitos no mercado causados pela permanência de um produto desenhado para uma situação específica.

Preços de commodities agrícolas e o comportamento de mercado invertido (backwardation): o caso da soja

A relação entre preços do mercado spot e do mercado futuro e a evidência de Mercado Invertido (backwardation) na estrutura a termo de commodities têm tido ênfase na literatura de economia e de finanças. O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar as principais causas responsáveis pelo comportamento de Mercado Invertido e identificar as propriedades que caracterizam o equilíbrio de preços em commodities agrícolas. Seja pela existência de prêmio de risco ou do benefício de conveniência, o entendimento dos efeitos sobre a replicação do preço futuro e sobre a estrutura a termo de preços ainda permanece em aberto. A premissa de perfeita replicação de portfólios e a ausência de fricções de mercado implicam, por outro lado, que o entendimento do comportamento de Mercado Invertido advém da compreensão do processo estocástico do próprio ativo subjacente. O apreçamento neutro ao risco, amparado pelos sinais de reversão de preços, permite a modelagem de preços conforme o proposto em Schwartz e Smith (2000), cuja calibração e os resultados serão apresentados para a soja.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'

Extinction, pollution, and the sustainable use of exhaustible and renewable resources

Single ownership of natural resources is conunon in many developing countries and socialist economies. The sole owner is usually the .state or society at large, and governments are responsible for either distributing exploitation rights or engaging in exploitation through their own corporations. • Under this circumstance, the notion of externality may not fully explain pollution problems existent in these nations. This paper studies the case where a single agent owns both exhaustible and renewable resources, and attempts to maximize its welfare. The resources are either perfect or imperfect substitutes. Initially, exhaustible resource extraction does not affect the renewable resource, and sustainable growth is attainable. A lactor of pollution flowing from the extraction of the nc.nrenewable resource into the growth of the renewable resource is introduced. The continuous exploitation of the exhaustible resource leads to the " optimal " extinction of the renewable resource, and sustainable growth is no longer reached. Regulation from a supra governmental agency such as an multinational institution may prove to be of utmost importance, if sustainability is to be achieved. The paper is divided into five sections. Section two provides a brief survey of the relevant literature. Section three presents the model without pollution. This factor is introduced in section four. The final section discusses some possible approaches for attaining sustainable growth, and contains the concluding remarks .

Bertrand, Cournot and monopolistically competitive equilibria

Using an example, we study the analogs, for the differentiated product case, of the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. These equilibria can be shown to exist and be uni que if we impose a sim pie and natural restriction on the elasticities of the demand functions for the differentiated products. Our characterizations of these equilibria make it possible to compare them and to determine how they are affected by the size of the market and the number of firms. We are also able to prove the existence of Cournot free-entry equilibria in which the number of firms is determined endogenously. In addition, we are able to prove that, in a large market, the Cournot free-entry equilibria approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive equilibria. The free-entry equilibrium concept we study is an analog of the one studied by Novshek for the case of firms selling products that are perfect substitutes. Our results are extensions of Novshek's. While we were unable to establish a general existence result for Bertrand free-entry equilibria, we were able to prove that, when these equilibria exist, they are unique and that in large markets they also approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz equilibria.

Demand-pull stagflation

This paper explores the possibility of stagflation emanating exc1usively from monetaJy sbocks, without concurrent supply shocks or shifts in potential output. This arises in connection with a tight money paradox. in the context of a fiscal theory of the price leveI. The paper exhibits perfect foresight equilibria with output and inflation fluctuating in opposite direetions as a consequence of small monetary shocks, and also following changes in monetaJy policy regime that launch the economy into hyperinflation or that produce dramatic stabilization of already high inflation. For that purpose, an analytically convenient dynamic general equilibrium macro model is deve10ped wbere nominal rigidities are represented by a cross between staggered two-period contracts and state dependent price adjustment in the presence of menu costs.

Welfare characterization of monetary-applied models and three implications

This paper demonstrates that the applied monetary mo deIs - the Sidrauski-type models and the cash-in-advance models, augmented with a banking sector that supplies money substitutes services - imply trajectories which are P8,reto-Optimum restricted to a given path of the real quantity of money. As a consequence, three results follow: First, Bailey's formula to evaluate the wclfare cost of inflation is indeed accurate, if the long-run capital stock does not depend on the inflation rate and if the compensate demand is considered. Second, the relevant money demand concept for this issue - the impact of inflation on welfare - is the monetary base, Third, if the long-run capital stock depends on the inflation rate, this dependence has a second-order impact ou wclfare, and, conceptually, it is not a distortion from tite social point of vicw. These three implications moderatc some evaluations of the wclfare cost of the perfect predicted inflation.

Valuation and performance of firms in complex ownership structures : an application to Korean chaebols

We propose several new metrics to describe the complex ownership structure of business groups, and provide simple formulas and algorithms to compute these metrics. We use these measures to describe in detail the ownership structure of Korean chaebols in the period of 2003 to 2004. In addition, we validate the usefulness of our new metrics by showing empirically that they are important for understanding the valuation and performance of group firms. In particular, we show evidence that firms that are central to the control structure of the chaebol (central firms), firms in cross-shareholdings, and firms that are placed at the bottom of the group (i.e., with lower ultimate ownership) have lower profitability than other group firms. The valuation results suggest that central firms and firms in cross-shareholding loops have lower valuations than other public Chaebol firms. The lower valuation of these firms is not explained by variation in measures of ownership concentration and separation between ownership and control.

Generalists versus specialists in organizations

In this paper, we discuss the trade-o¤ between specialization and coordination in an organizational design problem. Most papers on the assignment of heterogeneous managers to di¤erent hierarchic levels emphasize the role of talent: better managers should be on top of hierarchies. However, this requires talent to be measured on an one-dimensional scale. In this paper, we explore the implications of allowing talent to have two dimensions: breadth and depth. Specialists have deep knowledge of few areas while generalists have narrow knowledge of many areas. When perfect communication is impossible, hierarchies arise in which generalists are at the top and specialists are at the bottom. We propose a model of imperfect communication and discuss its implications for organizational design, the optimal degree of centralization and the depth of hierarchies. We show that our model also implies plausible organizational structures, like balanced hierarchies and pyramidal structures.