The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

China’s foreign direct investments within the ‘16+1’ cooperation formula: strategy, institutions, results. OSW Commentary Number 191|27.11.2015

The ‘16+1’ formula of cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and China was launched in 2012. One of its priorities involved increasing the inflow of China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) to the region. China has been interested in carrying out investments which are likely to help Chinese companies gain competitive advantage in areas such as advanced technologies, recognizable brands and distribution channels. The following sectors were identified as areas of priority importance in CEE: construction and modernisation of transport infrastructure, including motorways; development of the network of railways, airports and sea ports; energy, in particular renewable sources of energy and nuclear energy; companies trading in commodities; the food production sector. China’s strategy mainly involves purchasing existing companies, preceded by cherry picking the most favourable candidates for investment, rather than making large greenfield investments.

Germany’s engagement in the resolution of the Syrian conflict. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 194/25.01.2016

German Tornado Recce aircraft have been engaged in reconnaissance operations over Syria since January 2016. In December 2015 the German government and parliament decided that up to 1,200 Bundeswehr soldiers would take part in the international coalition fighting Islamic State in Syria. This decision marks a new chapter in Germany’s activity in the Middle East. The increasing destabilisation of the southern neighbourhood and the consequences this has for the EU and Germany have forced the German government to increase its level of engagement in the region. Even though Germany is a third-rate player in the Middle Eastern game, it is nonetheless ever more engaged politically and wants to be viewed as a neutral mediator between the competing actors in the region. It has also allocated more funds on regional development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Germany, whose attention has been directed towards Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, is currently turning its attention to the South. The Middle East (and Africa) is taking on increasing significance in German foreign and security policy. This may affect NATO’s eastern flank and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since part of Germany’s instruments and funds may be redirected to the South.

Tajikistan: a chronic stagnation. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 200/15.03.2016

Since gaining its independence Tajikistan has faced severe political, economic and social problems. The last several months has seen a clear increase in their intensity. This is in part caused by the deteriorating economic situation in Russia and the significant fall of remittances from the Tajik labour migrants in Russia, as well as by President Emomali Rahmon’s rising authoritarianism. Despite this intensification, qualitatively speaking Tajikistan’s problems have been unchanged for years. Besides the state’s structural weakness, the main cause is the ongoing neo-colonial dependence on Russia, which effectively limits Dushanbe’s room for political manoeuvre and keep Tajikistan in Russia’s sphere of control. This dependence on the one hand protects the country from collapsing, but on the other it precludes the development of the state, resulting in Tajikistan’s enduring stagnation. Similar processes also take place in other countries of post-Soviet Central Asia. However, in the case of Tajikistan the dependence and stagnation it causes are the strongest and their mechanisms most easily observed.

Interim manual for clinical practice guideline development /

"May 1991."

Effectiveness of alternative skid reduction measures. Volume I: evaluation of accident rate-skid number relationships. Final report.

Federal Highway Administration, Office of Research and Development, Washington, D.C.

Energy and water development appropriations for 2012 : hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session /

Shipping list number: 2011-0290-P (pt. 1), 2011-0295-P (pt. 2), 2011-0289-P (pt. 3), 2011-0325-P (pt. 4), 2012-0066-P (pt. 5), 2012-0308-P (pt. 6), 2012-0320-P (pt. 7), 2012-0014-P (pt. 8), 2011-0356-P (pt. 9).

Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and related agencies appropriations for 2012 : hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session /

Shipping list number: 2011-0276-P (pt. 1A), 2011-0274-P (pt. 1B), 2011-0283-P (pt. 1C), 2011-0318-P (pt. 2), 2011-0339-P (pt. 4), 2011-0366-P (pt. 5), 2011-0375-P (pt. 6), 2011-0367-P (pt. 7), 2011-0372-P (pt. 8), 2012-0014-P (pt. 9).

Report number series used by the Division of Technical Information in cataloging reports /

Published in 1948 under the title: Identification of atomic energy project research and development reports; 1970, Report number codes used by the USAEC.

Development of alloys having good high temperature properties through powder metallurgy techniques

"Materials Laboratory, Contract number AF 61(514)-1144, Project no. 7351."

Development of community welfare centres in Italy.

"United Nations publications. Sales number: 1953.IV.13"--P. 2 of cover

Annual report on the development of natural gas markets in Illinois.

This fulfills the statutory requirement in Section 19-130, Commission Study and Report, of Article 19 (220 ILCS 5/19) of the Illinois Public Utilities Act ("Act"). Section 19-130 requires the Illinois Commerce Commission ("Commission") to prepare an annual report analyzing the status and development of the retail natural gas market in the State of Illinois, including data on volumes of natural gas sold to retail customers and the number of customers served by alternative gas suppliers and gas utilities. The required data is included in tables and attached as an appendix.

Development of native American culture and art, Part 3 : hearing before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, on S. 792 ...

THIS IS PART 3; PARTS 1-2 HAVE CALL NUMBER: J60.I39 96th v.1

Customized training for new and expanding industry : a vocational education role in state and local economic development /

Stamped on t.p.: ED226205.