Germán Colmenares: un historiador visto en fragmentos (Debates)

Este artículo analiza el aporte historiográfico de Germán Colmenares. Se abordan, especialmente, los alcances del proyecto historiográfico denominado Historia Regional, los contextos en los que Colmenares desarrolló sus reflexiones teóricas, concretamente su preocupación por el desarrollo de la historiografía colombiana a partir de modelos flexibles de interpretación para el estudio de escenarios “marginales”, y sus indagaciones en relación a la historia económica y social colonial, en el estudio de las regiones fronterizas como veta de análisis de las relaciones sociales y culturales.

Por una historia de la desigualdad en el largo plazo. Fuentes y métodos para medir la inequidad en épocas pre-estadísticas (Estudios)

Este texto se propone evaluar los alcances y limitaciones de algunas fuentes que se pueden utilizar para medir la desigualdad económica en períodos pre-estadísticos, en especial los inventarios post-mortem y algunos censos económicos efectuados por motivos fiscales de pretensión más universal. Ambos han sido usados por los historiadores desde hace tiempo y presentan diversos problemas. En el caso de los censos se ha señalado sobre todo la subvaluación de los capitales y en el de los inventarios el fuerte sesgo social y etario. Sin embargo, ambos tienen una potencialidad irreemplazable ante la falta de alternativas, pero requieren de recaudos y estrategias metodológicas para corregir dichos defectos.

Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: A Feasible Policy for Counter-Terrorism?

This article analyses the counter-terrorist operations carried out by Captain (later Major General) Orde Wingate in Palestine in 1938, and considers whether these might inform current operations. Wingate's Special Night Squads were formed from British soldiers and Jewish police specifically to counter terrorist and sabotage attacks. Their approach escalated from interdicting terrorist gangs to pre-emptive attacks on suspected terrorist sanctuaries to reprisal attacks after terrorist atrocities. They continued the British practice of using irregular units in counter-insurgency, which was sustained into the postwar era and contributed to the evolution of British Special Forces. Wingate's methods proved effective in pacifying terrorist-infested areas and could be applied again, but only in the face of 'friction' arising from changes in cultural attitudes since the 1930s, and from the political-strategic context of post-2001 counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist operations. In some cases, however, public opinion might not preclude the use of some of Wingate's techniques.

Orde Wingate, the Iron Wall and Counter-terrorism in Palestine, 1936-1939

A pamphlet published by the British Army's Strategic and Combat Studies Institute on the then Captain Orde Wingate's formation and command of the Anglo-Jewish Special Night Squads in the Palestine Arab revolt of 1936-1939, with a discussion of their long-term strategic and political implications.

Orde Wingate, 'Guerrilla' Warfare and Long-Range Penetration, 1940-44

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long-range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate's own official writings on this subject reveals that long-range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situations regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins' doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.