A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.

Discourse and Text

This article discusses tense and aspect in the context of attested forms of discourse and text. The emphasis is on the semantic, pragmatic, textual, and stylistic functions of tense in context, taking into account linguistic features in the surrounding discourse, as well as the importance of factors such as medium (spoken or written), register (degree of formality), text type (literary vs. journalistic vs. conversational etc.), and discourse mode (narrative vs. report vs. description, etc.). Thus, tense and aspect are analyzed not purely as part of a linguistic “system” as such, but in the context of particular texts or forms of discourse. The article also explores the concept of “markedness” through two case studies: the narrative present and the narrative imperfect. Finally, it assesses the roles played by tenses in conveying particular points of view in texts, including shifts and/or ambiguities in point of view; Segmented Discourse Representation Theory; internal focalization and the French imperfective past tense; and textual polyphony.