The Characterization of Friction Stir Welding Process Effects on Stiffened Panel Buckling Performance

The introduction of advanced welding methods as an alternative joining process to riveting in the manufacture of primary aircraft structure has the potential to realize reductions in both manufacturing costs and structural weight. However, welding processes can introduce undesirable residual stresses and distortions in the final fabricated components, as well as localized loss of mechanical properties at the weld joints. The aim of this research is to determine and characterize the key process effects of advanced welding assembly methods on stiffened panel static strength performance. This in-depth understanding of the relationships between welding process effects and buckling and collapse strength is required to achieve manufacturing cost reductions without introducing structural analysis uncertainties and hence conservative over designed welded panels. This current work is focused at the sub-component level and examines the static strength of friction stir welded multi stiffener panels. The undertaken experimental and computational studies have demonstrated that local skin buckling is predominantly influenced by the magnitude of welding induced residual stresses and associated geometric distortions, whereas panel collapse behavior is sensitive to the lateral width of the physically joined skin and stiffener flange material, the strength of material in the Heat Affected Zone as well as the magnitude of the welding induced residual stresses. Copyright © 2006 by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. All rights reserved.


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A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.