The Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in the European Union. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 80/2015

This paper offers an academic examination of the legal regimes surrounding the criminalisation of irregular migrants in the EU and of acts of solidarity with irregular migrants, such as assisting irregular migrants to enter or remain in the EU, and other behaviour that is motivated by humanitarian instincts. The research analyses EU law and its relationship with national provisions regarding the criminalisation of irregular migration and of acts of solidarity vis-á-vis irregular migrants. A comparative analysis was made of the laws of the UK, France and Italy, supplemented by an analysis of the laws of Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. By considering the role of public trust in fostering compliance with the law, the paper explores the impact of criminalisation measures on institutions’ authority to compel individuals to comply with the law (institutional legitimacy). The study finds that certain indicators question institutional legitimacy and reveals the varied nature and extent of penalties imposed by different member states. The paper concludes that there is an important role for public trust in immigration law compliance, not just in measures directed towards irregular migrants but also towards those acting in solidarity with irregular migrants.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy Responses to the Attacks in Paris: Towards an EU Security and Liberty Agenda. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 81/February 2015

This paper examines the main EU-level initiatives that have been put forward in the weeks following the attacks in Paris in January 2015, which will be discussed in the informal European Council meeting of 12 February 2015. It argues that a majority of these proposals predated the Paris shootings and had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. The paper finds that EU counterterrorism responses raise two fundamental challenges: A first challenge is posed to the freedom of movement, Schengen and EU citizenship. Priority is being given to the expanded use of large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring of all travellers including EU citizens, which stands in contravention of Schengen and the free movement principle. A second challenge concerns EU democratic rule of law. Current pressures calling for the adoption of measures such as the EU Passenger Name Record challenge the scrutiny roles held by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU on counterterrorism measures in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. The paper proposes that the EU adopts a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty based on an EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model that is firmly anchored in current EU legal principles and rule of law standards. This model would call for ‘less is more’ concerning the use, processing and retention of data by police and intelligence communities. Instead, it would pursue better and more accurate use of data meeting the quality standards of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings.

Geen leger, is onbetaalbaar = No Belgian armed forces is unaffordable. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 61, February 2015

In this Security Policy Brief Jo Coelmont examines the challenges Belgium is facing at present. On the one hand there is the declared political objective to henceforth provide its defence forces with the means of achieving all of its tasks and, furthermore, to develop a new Strategic Plan, while taking decisions on replacing its current fleet of F16 fighter aircraft and determine strategic orientations on the replacement of frigates, mine hunter vessels and other major equipment programmes. On the other hand, the already taken austerity measures impose severe structural cuts on its defence budget for the upcoming five years. In this context the author is proposing some « dos and don’ts«.

The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks. Liberty and Security in Europe No. 84, 27 November 2015

This paper examines the EU’s counter-terrorism policies responding to the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015. It argues that these events call for a re-think of the current information-sharing and preventive-justice model guiding the EU’s counter-terrorism tools, along with security agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Priority should be given to independently evaluating ‘what has worked’ and ‘what has not’ when it comes to police and criminal justice cooperation in the Union. Current EU counter-terrorism policies face two challenges: one is related to their efficiency and other concerns their legality. ‘More data’ without the necessary human resources, more effective cross-border operational cooperation and more trust between the law enforcement authorities of EU member states is not an efficient policy response. Large-scale surveillance and preventive justice techniques are also incompatible with the legal and judicial standards developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The EU can bring further added value first, by boosting traditional policing and criminal justice cooperation to fight terrorism; second, by re-directing EU agencies’ competences towards more coordination and support in cross-border operational cooperation and joint investigations, subject to greater accountability checks (Europol and Eurojust +); and third, by improving the use of policy measures following a criminal justice-led cooperation model focused on improving cross-border joint investigations and the use of information that meets the quality standards of ‘evidence’ in criminal judicial proceedings. Any EU and national counter-terrorism policies must not undermine democratic rule of law, fundamental rights or the EU’s founding constitutional principles, such as the free movement of persons and the Schengen system. Otherwise, these policies will defeat their purpose by generating more insecurity, instability, mistrust and legal uncertainty for all.

Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces. OSW COMMENTARY 190/23.11.2015

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

How can we enhance our security without damaging our liberty? For a Progressive and European Rehabilitation of Sovereignty. European Policy Brief No. 41, January 2016

How can we reinforce internal security without destroying basic freedoms? This dilemma will become increasingly topical in the context of rising terrorist threats and in view of some of the responses already put in place at the national level. Many observers have pointed out the threat that these measures pose to individual freedom. But few have highlighted their relative inefficiency. Indeed, if the right to security is one of the founding reasons for political government and one of its main sources of legitimacy, can states still guarantee this basic right? This article examines this dilemma and focuses more specifically on its implications for the notion and practice of sovereignty. It also sketches a strong, but nuanced, rescue of sovereignty at the European level in order to assure individual security while, at the same time, protecting our freedoms.

E-commerce in Europe: parcel delivery prices in a digital single market. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/09 May 2016

Highlights • In its Digital Single Market strategy, the European Commission has rightly noted the importance of reducing the price paid for basic cross-border parcel delivery by consumers and by small and medium size retail senders. • The payment flows for cross-border parcel delivery are strikingly similar to those for telecommunications. Comparisons with roaming can be instructive. As with roaming, it is clear that the links between wholesale payments between the national postal operators and retail prices need to be properly understood in order to craft good policy. Another useful lesson is that national postal regulatory authorities are unlikely to address cross-border problems because of limitations in their respective mandates and because they have no incentive to take measures to benefit residents of other countries. • There are also significant differences between roaming and parcel delivery.While high wholesale charges were a major driver of high retail prices for international mobile roaming, the wholesale payments for cross-border parcel delivery appear to be below cost.This implies that it is the ‘spread’ between retail price and thewholesale payment that is inflated, at least for small retail senders and for consumers. • Comprehensive statistics gathering, coordinated at European level, is indispensable.

La contribution des dynamiques internationales formelles au renforcement de la cybersécurité canadienne.

La cybersécurité représente un enjeu important pour les services en charge de la sécurité canadienne à l’ère de l’expansion des Menaces Persistantes Avancées (MSP ou cybercrimes de type 1). Ces crimes se déroulent essentiellement dans le cyberespace, ce qui implique l’adoption de mesures spécifiques adéquates à l’environnement numérique, notamment à l’épreuve de son ubiquité. Le gouvernement canadien a pour sa part publié certaines mesures de défense passive et active dont la plus connue est la stratégie canadienne de cybersécurité. Puisque le cyberespace n’est pas limité territorialement, l’autorité canadienne a conclu plusieurs partenariats internationaux d’où ressortent des mesures bilatérales et multilatérales de protection et de renforcement de la cybersécurité. Toutefois, ces diverses mesures nationales et internationales ne tracent pas de cadre légal précisant la nature et le régime juridique des MSP; précisions sans lesquelles l’adoption de règles au plan national serait improductive. Considérant que l’espace numérique est international, il appelle la mise en place de mesures applicables à l’échelle universelle. Or, au plan international, il n’existe aucun texte à valeur légale spécifique à l’espèce. Ainsi, à la question de savoir, quels textes légaux pourraient s’appliquer, il s’est avéré que le jus ad bellum et la Convention européenne contre le cybercrime (Convention de Budapest) apportaient d’incontournables éléments de réponse. D’une part, le jus ad bellum permet de définir la catégorie d’acte dans laquelle peuvent être rangées les MSP, et d’autre part, la Convention de Budapest permet de définir les infractions informatiques commises par les différents acteurs en cause, les procédures d’investigation appropriées et les mécanismes utiles à la coopération internationale. Bien que les éléments ressortis de ces ententes internationales soient utiles à l’adoption d’un corps de règles internationales uniformes, les intérêts étatiques divergents constituent des obstacles de taille.

La légalité de l'intervention militaire française au Mali : contribution à l’étude du cadre juridique de la lutte armée contre le terrorisme international.

Mémoire récipiendaire de la mention "Excellent", avec les félicitations du jury.

Air commerce bulletin.

Title from caption

Contractor requirements for the control and security of TSCA confidential business information : security manual.

Mode of access: Internet.

Legislative efforts to combat spam : joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection and the Subcommittee Telecommunications and the Internet of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, July 9, 2003.

"Serial no. 108-35."

National security assessment of the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry / prepared by Stephen Baker ... [et al.].

"May 2001."

Workshop on Methodology for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Transit Crime Reduction Measures in Automated Guideway Transit Systems. Proceedings. Final report.

Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Washington, D.C.

Comprehensive security in data processing systems : the state of the art /

"UIUCDCS-R-75-725"