Prevalência de hipertensão arterial em Adventistas do Sétimo Dia da capital e do interior paulista

FUNDAMENTO: Sabe-se que hábitos de vida inadequados favorecem a hipertensão, e os adventistas preconizam hábitos saudáveis. OBJETIVO: Avaliar a prevalência da hipertensão nos adventistas do sétimo dia na capital e no interior paulistas. MÉTODOS: Foram estudados 264 adventistas (41,17 ± 15,27 anos, 59,8% mulheres, com alto nível de religiosidade avaliada pela escala Duke-DUREL). A medida da pressão arterial foi realizada com aparelho automático validado. Nível de significância adotado foi p < 0,05. Resultados: A prevalência total de hipertensão foi 22,7%, (27,4% no interior e 15% na capital). Os adventistas da capital diferiram dos do interior (p < 0,05), respectivamente, quanto: escolaridade superior (62% vs 36,6%); ter vínculo empregatício (44%) vs autônomos (40,9%); renda familiar (8,39 ± 6,20 vs 4,59 ± 4,75 salários mínimos) e renda individual (4,54 ± 5,34 vs 6,35 ± 48 salários mínimos); casal responsável pela renda familiar (35% vs 39,6%); vegetarianismo (11% vs 3%); pressão arterial (115,38 ± 16,52/68,74 ± 8,94 vs 123,66 ± 19,62/74,88 ± 11,85 mmHg); etnia branca (65% vs 81,1%); casados (53% vs 68,9%); menor apoio social no domínio material (15,7 ± 5,41 vs 16,9 ± 4,32) e lembrar da última vez que mediu a pressão arterial (65% vs 48,8%). A análise multivariada associou hipertensão com: 1) vegetarianismo (OR 0,051, IC95% 0,004-0,681), 2) escolaridade (OR 5,317, IC95% 1,674-16,893), 3) lembrar quando mediu a pressão (OR 2,725, IC95% 1,275-5,821), 4) aposentado (OR 8,846, IC95% 1,406-55,668), 5) responsável pela renda familiar (OR 0,422, IC95% 0,189-0,942). CONCLUSÃO: A prevalência de hipertensão dos adventistas foi menor se comparada com estudos nacionais, sendo menor na capital em relação ao interior possivelmente por melhores condições socioeconômicas e hábitos de vida.

Four essays on capital regulation of banks

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013

La Solvencia financiera del asegurador de vida y su relación con el coste de capital

Esta investigación relaciona el margen de solvencia que normativamente deben acreditar los aseguradores de vida con los recursos propios que cualquier empresa debe poseer para poder ejercer su actividad. Analizaremos la incidencia que la remuneración de esos recursos tiene en la propia actividad de comercialización de los seguros demostrando su relación inversa con el tipo de interés garantizado en los contratos. Analizaremos asimismo la incidencia que los eventuales cambios en los tipos de interés pueden tener en la remuneración que puede ofrecerse a esos recursos y propondremos una ecuación que incorpore todos estos aspectos, comprobando que las relaciones que actualmente ofrece la disciplina académica son casos particulares de la ecuación general, casos que demostraremos que incorporan unas hipótesis implícitas bastante restrictivas.

Opción de responsabilidad limitada y opción de abandonar: una integración para el análisis del coste de capital

El objetivo de este documento es formalizar el valor de las acciones de una empresa endeudada, la responsabilidad limitada de los accionistas de una sociedad anónima y la rentabilidad exigida en un horizonte perpetuo, aplicando la teoría de opciones. El modelo que se elabora parte del establecido por Fisher Black y Myron Scholes en 1973 sobre el valor de las acciones de una empresa endeudada en un horizonte monoperiódico. En este modelo se encuentra un problema: la limitación del horizonte a un solo período. El modelo que se desarrolla en este documento, se basa en que el horizonte de la empresa es, en principio, ilimitado, y es frecuente que se mantenga un determinado grado de endeudamiento a lo largo de su vida. Es decir, se considera el endeudamiento de la empresa de horizonte perpetuo. Como consecuencia, los accionistas pueden declarar la quiebra en cualquier momento independientemente del vencimiento de la deuda, dejando la empresa en manos de los acreedores. Basándose en este modelo de horizonte perpetuo, se introduce la opción de abandonar. Se utiliza el valor de venta que tiene el activo de la empresa en el mercado, los accionistas lo comparan con el valor de las deudas, y deciden si es más rentable seguir con la empresa o vender los elementos del activo en el mercado. Para la valoración, se utiliza la fórmula deducida por Merton (1990) de la opción de venta americana perpetua. También se utiliza las opciones de barrera. Una vez valorada la responsabilidad limitada de los accionistas en un horizonte perpetuo, se puede calcular el interés efectivo en condiciones de riesgo.

Endogenous integration and welfare in complementary goods markets

This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products. Integration entails bundling pricing. We find out that integration is privately profitable for a high enough degree of product differentiation, that profits of the non-integrated firms decrease, and that consumer surplus need not necessarily increase when firms integrate despite the fact that prices diminish. Thus, integration of a system is welfare-improving for a high enough degree of product differentiation combined with a minimum demand advantage relative to the competing system. Overall, and from a number of extensions undertaken, we conclude that bundling need not be anti-competitive and that integration should be permitted only under some circumstances.

Collusion in growing and shrinking markets: empirical evidence from experimental duopolies

We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.

Human capital as a factor of growth and employment at the regional level. The case of Spain

We use statistical techniques to quantify the effects of school attainment on individual wages, participation rates and employment probabilities in Spain, and to measure the contribution of education to labour productivity at the regional level. These estimates are then combined with data on private and public expenditure on education and with information on taxes and social benefits to construct measures of the private and social returns to schooling, to explore the effects of public policies on private incentives to invest in human capital, and to analyse the long-term effects of schooling on public finances. The results are used, together with estimates of the returns to alternative assets, to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the adequacy of the aggregate investment patterns observed in the regions of Spain, and to identify changes in the design of national and EU cohesion and growth policies that may help enhance their effectiveness.

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Marx's analysis of the falling rate of profit on the first version of volume III of capital

The paper provides a description and analysis of the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value and the general law section of the first version of Volume III of Capital. It then considers Part III of Volume III, the evolution of Marx's thought and various interpretations of his theory in the light of this analysis. It is suggested that Marx thought that the rate of profit must fall and even in the 1870s hoped to be able to provide a demonstration of this. However the main conclusions are: 1. Marx's major attempt to show that the rate of profit must fall occurred in the general law section. 2. Part III does not contain a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall. 3. Marx was never able to demonstrate that the rate of profit must fall and he was aware of this.

Social capital and government in the production of public goods

As a response to the rapidly growing empirical literature on social capital and the evidence of its correlation with government performance, we build a theoretical framework to study the interactions between social capital and government's action. This paper presents a model of homogeneous agents in an overlapping generations framework incorporating social capital as the values transmitted from parent to child. The government's role is to provide public goods. First, government expenditure is exogenously given. Then, it will be chosen at the preferred level of the representative agent. For both setups the equilibrium outcomes are characterized and the resulting dynamics studied. Briefly we include an analysis of the effect of productivity growth on the evolution of social capital. The results obtained caution caution against both the crowding out effect of the welfare state and the impact of sustained economic growth on social capital.

Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economy. Part 2. Asssessment at the EU country level.

This report is an extension and partial update of de la Fuente and Ciccone (2002). It constructs estimates of the private and social rates of return on schooling for fourteen EU countries using microeconometric estimates of Mincerian wage equations, the results of cross-country growth regressions and OECD data on educational expenditures, tax rates and social benefits. The results are used to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the optimality of observed investment patterns and educational subsidy levels.

Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economy

This document is a report prepared for the DG for Employment and Social Affairs of the European Commission. It surveys the available evidence on the contribution of investment in human capital to aggregate productivity growth and on its impact on wages and other labour outcomes at the individual level. It also draws some tentative policy conclusions for an average European country.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.