Letter from the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means to the Secretary of the Treasurer on the subject of a system of revenue to revive and maintain unimpaired the public credit, with the answer of the Secretary thereto. (1814)

October 18, 1814. Read, and committed to the Committee of the whole House on the report of the Committee of Ways and Means on so much of the President's message as relates to the finances of the United States.

The Cool Climate, Oenology and Viticulture Institute at Brock University

A program from Brock University which includes an overview of the plan for CCOVI, a list of the courses for each year of the undergraduate program, notes from the advisory committee, budget information, industry funding requests, and a five year financial chart for spending. The program includes photographs of individuals involved with CCOVI, including two photographs featuring Donald Ziraldo. A direct quote from Mr. Ziraldo is also included: "Education and research will build on each other when they come together in the Institute. The 'cool climate' focus will be unique and attract people world-wide".

Letter to Mr. Lee who was clerk of the Heir Devisee Committee in Toronto from Samuel D. Woodruff

Letter to Mr. Lee who was clerk of the Heir Devisee Committee in Toronto from Samuel D. Woodruff. [The Heir and Devisee Committee was formed to clarify the titles to land of heirs of people who had been assigned Crown lands before 1795. Many of the original grantees had not taken out patents to confirm their legal right to the land.] This letter confirms that steps have been taken to issue the patent, July 19, 1847.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff regarding a resolution passed on May 17, 1856 by the Board of Directors of the Port Robinson and Thorold Macadamized Road Committee

Letter to S.D. Woodruff regarding a resolution passed on May 17, 1856 by the Board of Directors of the Port Robinson and Thorold Macadamized Road Committee This is signed by Duncan McFarland, president, May 27, 1856.

Letter from S.D. Woodruff to the president and directors of the Port Robinson and Thorold Macadamized Road Committee regarding extra work done

Letter from S.D. Woodruff to the president and directors of the Port Robinson and Thorold Macadamized Road Committee regarding extra work done (3 pages, handwritten), Aug. 6, 1857.

Meeting of the special committee on new arrangements

Meeting of the special committee on new arrangements (3 copies of 1 page, printed). This has John I. Mackenzie listed on the bottom of the page. Copies 2 and 3 are torn at the bottom. This affects the text slightly, Aug. 23, 1881.

Copy of a report of a Committee of the Honorable and Executive Council dated May 6, 1859 approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council

Copy of a report of a Committee of the Honorable and Executive Council dated May 6, 1859 approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council. This is in regard to charges made by Joshua Manly of Port Colborne against Mr. Woodruff, the superintendent and other persons connected with the Welland Canal. The accusations have been substantiated by the committee. This is accompanied by a petition accusing Mr. Woodruff of gross corruption and jobbery [the practice of using a public office or position of trust for one's own advantage]. This was signed by a number of petitioners on July 2, 1858 (2 pages, handwritten), 1859.

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.

Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?

This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under three different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where super-majority is required for a policy change; an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; and a simple majority model, where policy is determined by the median member. These protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks. The models are estimated by Maximum Likehood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. For all central banks, results indicate that the consensus model is statically superior to the alternative models. This suggests that despite institutionnal differences, committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions.

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).

Liberation from Below : the Caribbean Conference Committee of Montreal and the global new left

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal