Gender and public attitude toward corruption and tax evasion

The topics of corruption and tax evasion have attracted significant attention in the literature in recent years. We build on that literature by investigating empirically: (1) whether attitudes toward corruption and tax evasion vary systematically with gender and (2) whether gender differences decline as men and women face similar opportunities for illicit behavior. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. The results reveal significantly greater aversion to corruption and tax evasion among women. This holds across countries and time, and across numerous empirical specifications. (JEL H260, D730, J160, Z130)

The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on the shadow economy

This paper uses a multivariate analysis to examine how countries‘ tax morale and institutional quality affect the shadow economy. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors in understanding the level of and changes in the shadow economy. Newly available data sources offer the unique opportunity to further illuminate a topic that has received increased attention. After controlling for a variety of potential factors, we find strong support that a higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality lead to a smaller shadow economy.

Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).

Serious tax non compliance : motivation and guardianship

This article reviews what international evidence exists on the impact of civil and criminal sanctions upon serious tax noncompliance by individuals. This construct lacks sharp definitional boundaries but includes large tax fraud and large-scale evasion that are not dealt with as fraud. Although substantial research and theory have been developed on general tax evasion and compliance, their conclusions might not apply to large-scale intentional fraudsters. No scientifically defensible studies directly compared civil and criminal sanctions for tax fraud, although one U.S. study reported that significantly enhanced criminal sanctions have more effects than enhanced audit levels. Prosecution is public, whereas administrative penalties are confidential, and this fact encourages those caught to pay heavy penalties to avoid publicity, a criminal record, and imprisonment.

On inequality tax evasion and progressive taxes

This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) construct and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. We study an overlapping generations framework i n which agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically reduced the extent of evasion in the economy. This outcome is the result of an anomaly intrinsic to the basic Allingham and Sandmo version of the model, which makes the evade-or-not extension a more suitable approach to modelling the issue. We also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade-or-not’ choice have strikingly different political economy implications, , which suggest fruitful avenues of empirical research.

Assignment of reversion on put option contained in a lease : what is the effect?

Justice Mullins of the Queensland Supreme Court recently considered the status of a put option contained in a registered lease in circumstances where there was an assignment of the reversion. The matter arose for determination in Denham Bros Ltd v W Freestone Leasing Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 307. The decision is of interest as a lease containing a put option, exercisable by a landlord, is perhaps less commonly encountered than a lease containing a call option, exercisable by a tenant.

An examination of tax-deductible donations made by individual Australian taxpayers in 2008-09, ACPNS Working Paper 54

Each year, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies (CPNS) at Queensland University of Technology (QUT) collects and analyses statistics on the amount and extent of tax-deductible donations made and claimed by Australians in their individual income tax returns to deductible gift recipients (DGRs). The information presented below is based on the amount and type of tax-deductible donations made and claimed by Australian individual taxpayers to DGRs for the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009. This information has been extracted mainly from the Australian Taxation Office's (ATO) publication Taxation Statistics 2008-09. The 2008-09 report is the latest report that has been made publicly available. It represents information in tax returns for the 2008-09 year processed by the ATO as at 31 October 2010.

Classification with a reject option using a hinge loss

We consider the problem of binary classification where the classifier can, for a particular cost, choose not to classify an observation. Just as in the conventional classification problem, minimization of the sample average of the cost is a difficult optimization problem. As an alternative, we propose the optimization of a certain convex loss function φ, analogous to the hinge loss used in support vector machines (SVMs). Its convexity ensures that the sample average of this surrogate loss can be efficiently minimized. We study its statistical properties. We show that minimizing the expected surrogate loss—the φ-risk—also minimizes the risk. We also study the rate at which the φ-risk approaches its minimum value. We show that fast rates are possible when the conditional probability P(Y=1|X) is unlikely to be close to certain critical values.