The equity and efficiency of the Australian share market with respect to director trading

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of directors breaching the reporting requirements of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Corporations Act in Australia. Further, it seeks to assess whether directors in Australia achieve abnormal returns from trades in their own companies. Design/methodology/approach – Using an event study approach on an Australian sample, abnormal returns for a range of situations were estimated. Findings – A total of 13 (seven) per cent of own‐company directors trades do not meet the ASX (Corporations Act) requirement of reporting within five (14) business days. Directors do achieve abnormal returns through trading in shares of their own companies. Ignoring transaction costs, outsiders can achieve abnormal returns by imitating directors' trades. Analysis of returns to directors after they trade but before they announce the trade to the market shows that directors are making small but statistically significant returns that are not available to the market. Analysis of returns to directors subsequent to the ASX reporting requirement up to the day the trade is reported shows that directors are making small but statistically significant returns that should be available to the market. Research limitations/implications – Future research should investigate the linkages between late reporting by directors and disadvantages to outside shareholders and the implementation of internal policies implemented to mitigate insider trading. Practical implications – Market participants should remain vigilant regarding the potential for late/non‐reporting of directors' trades. Originality/value – Uncovering breaches of reporting regulations are particularly important given that directors tend to purchase (sell) shares when the price is low (high), thereby achieving abnormal returns.

Get ready for a fruit fight: the fallout from Coles' price war on produce

Amid tough trading conditions and intense competition, Coles has fired the latest salvo in its ongoing supermarket war with Woolworths, announcing it will reduce the price of some fruit and vegetables by 50%. The move is the latest in a battle between the supermarket giants to wrest market share and follows previous cuts to staples such as milk and bread, beer and chicken. However, Australia’s peak industry body of vegetable growers, Ausveg, is concerned about the impact the price decision will have on growers' livelihoods.

Can the change in the composition of the US GDP explain the Great Moderation? A test via oil price shocks

The paper investigates whether the growing GDP share of the services sector can contribute to explain the great moderation in the US. We identify and analyze three oil price shocks and use a SVAR analysis to measure their economic impact on the US economy at both the aggregate and the sectoral level. We find mixed support for the explanation of the great moderation in terms of shrinking oil shock volatilities and observe that increases (decreases) in oil shock volatilities are contrasted by a weakening (strengthening) in their transmission mechanism. Across sectors, services are the least affected by any oil shock. As the contribution of services to the GDP volatility increases over time, we conclude that a composition effect contributed to moderate the conditional volatility to oil shocks of the US GDP.

Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand

This paper presents new results on the welfare e¤ects of third-degree price discrimination under constant elasticity demand. We show that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity di¤erence between markets are high enough,then price discrimination not only can increase social welfare but also consumer surplus.

Price Discrimination in Quantity Setting Oligopoly

We analyze a two-stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the first stage firms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium the firms focus more on the high-valuation customers. When the capacities in the first stage are endogenous, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in one-stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity-weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to established results in the literature for one-stage games.

Letter to Isabel from someone whose last name is Price [the first name is illegible]

Letter to Isabel from someone whose last name is Price [the first name is illegible] in which the writer says that the row with Phil regarding the bonds is settled (1 ½ pages). This person does not anticipate any more trouble with Phil. They are sending the personal effects to Isabel as well as a cheque for $3000 as her share of the estate, and more next month, July 15, 1901.

Time varying price discovery

We show how multivariate GARCH models can be used to generate a time-varying “information share” (Hasbrouck, 1995) to represent the changing patterns of price discovery in closely related securities. We find that time-varying information shares can improve credit spread predictions.

Non-tradable share reform, liquidity, and stock returns in China

This article studies the influence of the non-tradable share reform in the cross-section of stock returns in China. Prior research has generally neglected this important development in the Chinese stock market. We find that the firm-specific illiquidity measures that reflect direct transaction costs, price impact and difficulties in trading immediacy, exhibit a positive and significant relationship with stock returns. These effects are particularly pronounced after the non-tradable share reform. Furthermore, in the post-reform era, portfolios with high illiquidity (i.e. high relative bid-ask spread, high Amihud illiquidity, low Amivest liquidity ratio) significantly outperform portfolios with low illiquidity, controlling for size, and book-to-market effects.

Price discovery using a regime-sensitive cointegration approach

This work proposes a method to examine variations in the cointegration relation between preferred and common stocks in the Brazilian stock market via Markovian regime switches. It aims on contributing for future works in "pairs trading" and, more specifically, to price discovery, given that, conditional on the state, the system is assumed stationary. This implies there exists a (conditional) moving average representation from which measures of "information share" (IS) could be extracted. For identification purposes, the Markov error correction model is estimated within a Bayesian MCMC framework. Inference and capability of detecting regime changes are shown using a Montecarlo experiment. I also highlight the necessity of modeling financial effects of high frequency data for reliable inference.

Price elasticity of Central American agricultural exports

Includes bibliography

Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.

Agent-orientated auction mechanism and strategy design

Agent-based technology is playing an increasingly important role in today’s economy. Usually a multi-agent system is needed to model an economic system such as a market system, in which heterogeneous trading agents interact with each other autonomously. Two questions often need to be answered regarding such systems: 1) How to design an interacting mechanism that facilitates efficient resource allocation among usually self-interested trading agents? 2) How to design an effective strategy in some specific market mechanisms for an agent to maximise its economic returns? For automated market systems, auction is the most popular mechanism to solve resource allocation problems among their participants. However, auction comes in hundreds of different formats, in which some are better than others in terms of not only the allocative efficiency but also other properties e.g., whether it generates high revenue for the auctioneer, whether it induces stable behaviour of the bidders. In addition, different strategies result in very different performance under the same auction rules. With this background, we are inevitably intrigued to investigate auction mechanism and strategy designs for agent-based economics. The international Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Ad Auction (AA) competition provides a very useful platform to develop and test agent strategies in Generalised Second Price auction (GSP). AstonTAC, the runner-up of TAC AA 2009, is a successful advertiser agent designed for GSP-based keyword auction. In particular, AstonTAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and selects a set of keyword queries with highest expected profit to bid on to maximise its expected profit under the limit of conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. The TAC CAT tournament provides an environment for investigating the optimal design of mechanisms for double auction markets. AstonCAT-Plus is the post-tournament version of the specialist developed for CAT 2010. In our experiments, AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms most specialist agents designed by other institutions but also achieves high allocative efficiencies, transaction success rates and average trader profits. Moreover, we reveal some insights of the CAT: 1) successful markets should maintain a stable and high market share of intra-marginal traders; 2) a specialist’s performance is dependent on the distribution of trading strategies. However, typical double auction models assume trading agents have a fixed trading direction of either buy or sell. With this limitation they cannot directly reflect the fact that traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) decide their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Experiments are conducted under both dynamic and static settings of the continuous BDA market. We find that the allocative efficiency of a continuous BDA market mainly comes from rational selection of trading directions. Furthermore, we introduce a high-performance Kernel trading strategy in the BDA market which uses kernel probability density estimator built on historical transaction data to decide optimal order prices. Kernel trading strategy outperforms some popular intelligent double auction trading strategies including ZIP, GD and RE in the continuous BDA market by making the highest profit in static games and obtaining the best wealth in dynamic games.

Price discovery for Chinese shares cross-listed in multiple markets

In this article we study the relationship between security returns cross-listed on the A share market of China and the H share market at the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). Most of these securities are also cross-listed on other markets. An important feature of this article is that we focus on the multilateral relationships between all cross-listed markets rather than concentrating only on the bi-lateral relationship between A and Hong Kong H shares. Using the impulse response functions and the variance decompositions from a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) process we show that the returns to the A share market are almost exclusively determined by domestic factors. In contrast, we find that the H share market is influenced by both the A share market within China and foreign stock markets elsewhere in the world. Impulse response functions suggest that innovations to the A share market and the Hong Kong H share market are partly transmitted to each other and to stock markets outside China. We show that liquidity has an important role to play in determining the impact that the home market has on cross-listed variance decompositions. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

Optimising market share and profit margin:SMDP-based tariff pricing under the smart grid paradigm

Smart grid technologies have given rise to a liberalised and decentralised electricity market, enabling energy providers and retailers to have a better understanding of the demand side and its response to pricing signals. This paper puts forward a reinforcement-learning-powered tool aiding an electricity retailer to define the tariff prices it offers, in a bid to optimise its retail strategy. In a competitive market, an energy retailer aims to simultaneously increase the number of contracted customers and its profit margin. We have abstracted the problem of deciding on a tariff price as faced by a retailer, as a semi-Markov decision problem (SMDP). A hierarchical reinforcement learning approach, MaxQ value function decomposition, is applied to solve the SMDP through interactions with the market. To evaluate our trading strategy, we developed a retailer agent (termed AstonTAC) that uses the proposed SMDP framework to act in an open multi-agent simulation environment, the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC). An evaluation and analysis of the 2013 Power TAC finals show that AstonTAC successfully selects sell prices that attract as many customers as necessary to maximise the profit margin. Moreover, during the competition, AstonTAC was the only retailer agent performing well across all retail market settings.