The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

Some optimization and decision problems in proportional reinsurance

Reinsurance is one of the tools that an insurer can use to mitigate the underwriting risk and then to control its solvency. In this paper, we focus on the proportional reinsurance arrangements and we examine several optimization and decision problems of the insurer with respect to the reinsurance strategy. To this end, we use as decision tools not only the probability of ruin but also the random variable deficit at ruin if ruin occurs. The discounted penalty function (Gerber & Shiu, 1998) is employed to calculate as particular cases the probability of ruin and the moments and the distribution function of the deficit at ruin if ruin occurs.

Empirical study of correlated survival times for recurrent events with proportional hazards margins and the effect of correlation and censoring.

Background: In longitudinal studies where subjects experience recurrent incidents over a period of time, such as respiratory infections, fever or diarrhea, statistical methods are required to take into account the within-subject correlation. Methods: For repeated events data with censored failure, the independent increment (AG), marginal (WLW) and conditional (PWP) models are three multiple failure models that generalize Cox"s proportional hazard model. In this paper, we revise the efficiency, accuracy and robustness of all three models under simulated scenarios with varying degrees of within-subject correlation, censoring levels, maximum number of possible recurrences and sample size. We also study the methods performance on a real dataset from a cohort study with bronchial obstruction. Results: We find substantial differences between methods and there is not an optimal method. AG and PWP seem to be preferable to WLW for low correlation levels but the situation reverts for high correlations. Conclusions: All methods are stable in front of censoring, worsen with increasing recurrence levels and share a bias problem which, among other consequences, makes asymptotic normal confidence intervals not fully reliable, although they are well developed theoretically.

Proportionality and Party Success in Europe

This thesis consists of four articles and an introductory section. The main research questions in all the articles are about proportionality and party success in Europe, at European, national or district levels. Proportionality in this thesis denotes the proximity of seat shares parties receive compared to their respective vote shares, after the electoral system’s allocation process. This proportionality can be measured through numerous indices that illustrate either the overall proportionality of an electoral system or a particular election. The correspondence of a single party’s seat shares to its vote shares can also be measured. The overall proportionality is essential in three of the articles (1, 2 and 4), where the system’s performance is studied by means of plots. In article 3, minority party success is measured by advantage-ratios that reveal single party’s winnings or losses in the votes to seat allocation process. The first article asks how proportional are the European parliamentary (EP) electoral systems, how do they compare with results gained from earlier studies and how do the EP electoral systems treat different sized parties. The reasons for different outcomes are looked for in explanations given by traditional electoral studies i.e. electoral system variables. The countries studied (EU15) apply electoral systems that vary in many important aspects, even though a certain amount of uniformity has been aspired to for decades. Since the electoral systems of the EP elections closely resemble the national elections, the same kinds of profiles emerge as in the national elections. The electoral systems indeed treat the parties differentially and six different profile types can be found. The counting method seems to somewhat determine the profile group, but the strongest variables determining the shape of a countries’ profile appears to be the average district magnitude and number of seats allocated to each country. The second article also focuses on overall proportionality performance of an electoral system, but here the focus is on the impact of electoral system changes. I have developed a new method of visualizing some previously used indices and some new indices for this purpose. The aim is to draw a comparable picture of these electoral systems’ changes and their effects. The cases, which illustrate this method, are four elections systems, where a change has occurred in one of the system variables, while the rest remained unchanged. The studied cases include the French, Greek and British European parliamentary systems and the Swedish national parliamentary system. The changed variables are electoral type (plurality changed to PR in the UK), magnitude (France splitting the nationwide district into eight smaller districts), legal threshold (Greece introducing a three percent threshold) and counting method (d’Hondt was changed to modified Sainte-Laguë in Sweden). The radar plots from elections after and before the changes are drawn for all country cases. When quantifying the change, the change in the plots area that is created has also been calculated. Using these radar plots we can observe that the change in electoral system type, magnitude, and also to some extent legal threshold had an effect on overall proportionality and accessibility for small parties, while the change between the two highest averages counting method had none. The third article studies the success minority parties have had in nine electoral systems in European heterogeneous countries. This article aims to add more motivation as to why we should care how different sized parties are treated by the electoral systems. Since many of the parties that aspire to represent minorities in European countries are small, the possibilities for small parties are highlighted. The theory of consociational (or power-sharing) democracy suggests that, in heterogeneous societies, a proportional electoral system will provide the fairest treatment of minority parties. The OSCE Lund Recommendations propose a number of electoral system features, which would improve minority representation. In this article some party variables, namely the unity of the minority parties and the geographical concentration of the minorities were included among possible explanations. The conclusions are that the central points affecting minority success were indeed these non-electoral system variables rather than the electoral system itself. Moreover, the size of the party was a major factor governing success in all the systems investigated; large parties benefited in all the studied electoral systems. In the fourth article the proportionality profiles are again applied, but this time to district level results in Finnish parliamentary elections. The level of proportionality distortion is also studied by way of indices. The average magnitudes during the studied periodrange from 7.5 to 26.2 in the Finnish electoral districts and this opens up unequal opportunities for parties in different districts and affects the shape of the profiles. The intra-country case allows the focus to be placed on the effect of district magnitude, since all other electoral systems are kept constant in an intra-country study. The time span in the study is from 1962 to 2007, i.e. the time that the districts have largely been the same geographically. The plots and indices tell the same story, district magnitude and electoral alliances matter. The district magnitude is connected to the overall proportionality of the electoral districts according to both indices, and the profiles are, as expected, also closer to perfect proportionality in large districts. Alliances have helped some small parties to gain a much higher seat share than their respective vote share and these successes affect some of the profiles. The profiles also show a consistent pattern of benefits for the small parties who ally with the larger parties.

Mind the Gap. Do Proportional Electoral Systems Foster a More Equal Representation of Women and Men, Poor and Rich ?

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: 1) Are parties ideologically biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens? 2) Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of underrepresentation of women and poor citizens in the party system? A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of underrepresentation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

Voting advice applications : impact on voting decisions in the 2011 Swiss national elections

In most democracies voting Advice Applications (VAAs) advising citizens which candidate or party they should vote for become more and more popular. It is therefore crucial to know more about the functioning and the effects of such tools. After some general remarks about the spread of these tools and their possible effects gathered so far in various studies, this paper presents the latest results from a research conducted in the course of the 2011 Swiss national elections. They confirm that VAAs can lead to better informed voters and are likely to have a positive impact on electoral turnout. Additionally it can be shown that the Swiss VAA smartvote made voters change their voting intention and that they voted for a different party. This was particularly advantageous for the Green Liberal Party. At the moment, only a minority of voters rely on the voting recommendation by smartvote. This might change dramatically with the introduction of e-voting. Once people can vote electronically, there are hardly any possibilities to prevent voters from transferring their selection of candidates based on the recommendation given by a VAA into the official electronic ballot paper. If this is possible, e-voting will become more popular than postal voting.

Forecasting with social media – Using Facebook likes to predict the results of the 2015 Finnish Parliamentary elections

Already one-third of the human population uses social media on a daily basis. The biggest social networking site Facebook has over billion monthly users. As a result, social media services are now recording unprecedented amount of data on human behavior. The phenomenon has certainly caught the attention of scholars, businesses and governments alike. Organizations around the globe are trying to explore new ways to benefit from the massive databases. One emerging field of research is the use of social media in forecasting. The goal is to use data gathered from online services to predict offline phenomena. Predicting the results of elections is a prominent example of forecasting with social media, but regardless of the numerous attempts, no reliable technique has been established. The objective of the research is to analyze how accurately the results of parliament elections can be forecasted using social media. The research examines whether Facebook “likes” can be effectively used for predicting the outcome of the Finnish parliament elections that took place in April 2015. First a tool for gathering data from Facebook was created. Then the data was used to create an electoral forecast. Finally, the forecast was compared with the official results of the elections. The data used in the research was gathered from the Facebook walls of all the candidates that were running for the parliament elections and had a valid Facebook page. The final sample represents 1131 candidates and over 750000 Facebook “likes”. The results indicate that creating a forecast solely based on Facebook “likes” is not accurate. The forecast model predicted very dramatic changes to the Finnish political landscape while the official results of the elections were rather moderate. However, a clear statistical relationship between “likes” and votes was discovered. In conclusion, it is apparent that citizens and other key actors of the society are using social media in an increasing rate. However, the volume of the data does not directly increase the quality of the forecast. In addition, the study faced several other limitations that should be addressed in future research. Nonetheless, discovering the positive correlation between “likes” and votes is valuable information that can be used in future studies. Finally, it is evident that Facebook “likes” are not accurate enough and a meaningful forecast would require additional parameters.