Improving the analysis of road pricing acceptability surveys by using hybrid models

Several international studies have analyzed the acceptability of road pricing schemes by means of an attitude survey in combination with the results of a stated choice experiment using both a descriptive analysis and a discrete-choice model with binary choice (?accept? or ?not accept? the toll). However, the use of hybrid discrete choice models constitutes an innovative alternative for integrating subjective attitudes and perceptions deriving from the survey of attitudes with the more objective variables from the stated choice experiment. This paper analyzes the results of applying these models to measure the acceptability of interurban road pricing among different groups of stakeholders (road freight and passenger operators, highway concessionaires, and associations of private car users) with qualitatively significant opinions on road pricing measures. Our results show that hybrid models are better suited to explaining the acceptability of a road pricing scheme by different groups of stakeholders than a separate analysis of the survey of attitudes and a discrete-choice model applied on a stated choice experiment. A particular finding was that the strong psycho-social latent variable of the perception of fairness explains the rejection or acceptance of a toll scheme by road stakeholders.

Integration of congestion pricing and intertemporal preference rate in social welfare function

Assessing social benefits in transport policy implementation has been studied by many researchers using theoretical or empirical measures. However, few of them measure social benefit using different discount rates including the inter-temporal preferences rate of users, the private investment discount rate and the inter-temporal preferences rate of the government. In general, the social discount rate used is the same for all social actors. Therefore, this paper aims to assess a new method by integrating different types of discount rate belonging to different social actors in order to measure the real benefits of each actor in the short, medium and long term. A dynamic simulation is provided by a strategic Land-Use and Transport Interaction (LUTI) model. The method is tested by optimizing a cordon toll scheme in Madrid considering socio- economic efficiency and environmental criteria. Based on the modified social welfare function (WF), the effects on the measure of social benefits are estimated and compared with the classical WF results as well. The results of this research could be a key issue to understanding the relationship between transport system policies and social actors' benefits distribution in a metropolitan context. The results show that the use of more suitable discount rates for each social actor had an effect on the selection and definition of optimal strategy of congestion pricing. The usefulness of the measure of congestion toll declines more quickly overtime.

Integration of congestion pricing and intertemporal preferences rate integration in social welfare function

Many researchers have used theoretical or empirical measures to assess social benefits in transport policy implementation. However, few have measured social benefits by using discount rates, including the intertemporal preference rate of users, the private investment discount rate, and the intertemporal preference rate of the government. In general, the social discount rate used is the same for all social actors. This paper aims to assess a new method by integrating different types of discount rates belonging to different social actors to measure the real benefits of each actor in the short term, medium term, and long term. A dynamic simulation is provided by a strategic land use and transport interaction model. The method was tested by optimizing a cordon toll scheme in Madrid, Spain. Socioeconomic efficiency and environmental criteria were considered. On the basis of the modified social welfare function, the effects on the measure of social benefits were estimated and compared with the classical welfare function measures. The results show that the use of more suitable discount rates for each social actor had an effect on the selection and definition of optimal strategy of congestion pricing. The usefulness of the measure of congestion toll declines more quickly over time. This result could be the key to understanding the relationship between transport system policies and the distribution of social actors? benefits in a metropolitan context.

Evaluating the equity effects of road-pricing in the European urban context - The Madrid Metropolitan Area

The paper identifies the potential spatial and social impacts of a proposed road-pricing scheme for different social groups in the Madrid Metropolitan Area (MMA). We appraise the accessibility of different districts within the MMA in terms of the actual and perceived cost of using the road infrastructure ‘before’ and ‘after’ implementation of the scheme. The appraisal framework was developed using quantitative survey data and qualitative focus group discussions with residents. We then simulated user behaviours (mode and route choice) based on the empirical evidence from a travel demand model for the MMA. The results from our simulation model demonstrated that implementation of the toll on the orbital metropolitan motorways (M40, M30, for example) decreases accessibility mostly in the districts where there are no viable public transport alternatives. Our specific study finding is that the economic burden of the road-pricing scheme particularly affects unskilled and lower income individuals living in the south of the MMA. The focus groups confirmed that low income drivers in the south part of the MMA would reduce their use of tolled roads and have to find new arrangements for these trips: i.e. switch to public transport, spend double the time travelling or stay at home. More generally, our research finds that European transport planners are still a long way from recognising the social equity implications of their policy decisions and that more thorough social appraisals are needed to avoid the social exclusion of low income populations when road tolling is proposed.

Exploitative Abuses: Which Competition Policy, Which Public Policy? Research Papers in Law, 2/2007

As the final session of the day, my aim in this paper is to briefly outline the nature of exploitative abuses before turning to the question of the relationship between competition law and intellectual property law in the context of what Teubner calls the regulatory trilemma and from that draw a two-fold conclusion. First, the demands on law from the social phenomenon of markets are more acute when those demands raise issues across the different law domains of IP and competition. Second, where IP law and competition meet, the aim should be for both domains to internalise the values of the other. This however can only happen to the extent but only to the extent that there can be what Collins1 calls productive disintegration. Finally, in the specific context of exploitative abuses the overlap between IP law and competition law arises primarily in relation to claims of excessive pricing in licensing arrangements. Such claims could form the basis of a private action2 or can be made in the context of compulsory dealing decisions such as Microsoft.3 The involvement of competition agencies in pricing decisions goes to the heart of concerns about the nature of competition law and the role of competition agencies and highlights the need for the law to indirectly control rather than inappropriately attempt to directly control markets.

A Proper Yield Curve for Greece to Kick-Start Financial Intermediation. ECMI Policy Brief No. 21, 10 December 2013

At present, the market is severely mispricing Greece’s sovereign risk relative to the country’s fundamentals. As a result of the mispricing, financial intermediation in Greece has become dysfunctional and the privatisation of state-owned assets has stalled. This mispricing is partially due to an illiquid and fragmented government yield curve. A well-designed public liability management exercise can lead to a more efficient pricing of Greece’s government bonds and thereby help restore stable and affordable financing for the country’s private sector, which is imperative in order to overcome Greece’s deep recession. This paper proposes three measures to enhance the functioning of the Greek government debt market: i) Greece should issue a new five-year bond, ii) it should consolidate the 20 individual series of government bonds into four liquid securities and iii) it should offer investors a swap of these newly created bonds into dollar-denominated securities. Each of these measures would be beneficial to the Hellenic Republic, since the government would be able to reduce the face value and the net present value of its debt stock. Furthermore, this exercise would facilitate the resumption of market access, which is a necessary condition for continuous multilateral disbursements to Greece.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

Making low-carbon technology support smarter. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/02, 18 August 2015

This Policy Brief describes the interaction between three approaches that are effective in driving innovation in low-carbon technologies. Based on that, the author provides four recommendations for making low-carbon technology support smarter. THE ISSUE Combating climate change on the global level will be much easier when abundant low-carbon technologies that are competitive in their cost and capabilities are available. But private companies underinvest in low-carbon innovation because they cannot capture the climate benefits. There are three policies to address this issue: pricing carbon, supporting deployment of as-yet uncompetitive technologies and supporting research and development.

Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance. CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 3 December 2015

It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. So far, however, agreement has been reached in the EU on only the first two of these functions. The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is an innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function.

Reducing traffic congestion : using market prices to enhance mobility : [the high cost of idling : report to congress on the progress and accomplishments of the Congestion Pricing Pilot Program].

"August 1998"--P. [4] of cover.

The pricing of local telephone service /

Mode of access: Internet.

Essays on International Asset Allocation and Pricing

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

The risk premium for equity: implications for resource allocation, welfare and policy

Analysis of the equity premium puzzle has focused on private sector capital markets. The object of this paper is to consider the welfare and policy implications of each of the broad classes of explanations of the equity premium puzzle. As would be expected, the greater the deviation from the first-best outcome implied by a given explanation of the equity premium puzzle, the more interventionist are the implied policy conclusions. Nevertheless, even explanations of the equity premium puzzle consistent with a general consumption-based asset pricing model have important welfare and policy implications.

Cost-based pricing in the NHS internal market : accounting choices and the achievement of economic efficiency

Since 1988, quasi-markets have been introduced into many areas of social policy in the UK, the NHS internal market is one example. Markets operate by price signals. The NHS Internal Market, if it is to operate efficiently, requires purchasers and providers to respond to price signals. The research hypothesis is - cost accounting methods can be developed to enable healthcare contracts to be priced on a cost-basis in a manner which will facilitate the achievement of economic efficiency in the NHS internal market. Surveys of hospitals in 1991 and 1994 established the cost methods adopted in deriving the prices for healthcare contracts in the first year of the market and three years on. An in-depth view of the costing for pricing process was gained through case studies. Hospitals had inadequate cost information on which to price healthcare contracts at the inception of the internal market: prices did not reflect the relative performance of healthcare providers sufficiently closely to enable the market's espoused efficiency aims to be achieved. Price variations were often due to differing costing approaches rather than efficiency. Furthermore, price comparisons were often meaningless because of inadequate definition of the services (products). In April 1993, the NHS Executive issued guidance on costing for contracting to all NHS providers in an attempt to improve the validity of price comparisons between alternative providers. The case studies and the 1994 survey show that although price comparison has improved, considerable problems remain. Consistency is not assured, and the problem of adequate product definition is still to be solved. Moreover, the case studies clearly highlight the mismatch of rigid, full-cost pricing rules with both the financial management considerations at local level and the emerging internal market(s). Incentives exist to cost-shift, and healthcare prices can easily be manipulated. In the search for a new health policy paradigm to replace traditional bureaucratic provision, cost-based pricing cannot be used to ensure a more efficient allocation of healthcare resources.

An empirical investigation of audit pricing in the public sector:the case of Greek LGOs

This paper investigates the associations between audit pricing and multidimensional characteristics of local governments by using a sample of Greek municipalities. The Greek institutional setting is interesting because it is politically pluralistic. Moreover, independent auditors appointed through a bid process exclusively perform the audits. Our results suggest a considerable variation on audit fees which is mainly driven by politically related factors indicating the importance of relevant theoretical anticipations in audit pricing in the public sector. Agency costs appear strong enough to explain audit pricing. We also confirm prior findings on the significance of audit complexity and size. Results also suggest that audit fees are reduced when an internal team dedicated to accrual accounting is appointed. Therefore, our conclusions offer practical implications for policy setters and regulators in the public sector in relation to audit quality.