An Exploration Based Cognitive Bias Test for Mice: Effects of Handling Method and Stereotypic Behaviour

Behavioural tests to assess affective states are widely used in human research and have recently been extended to animals. These tests assume that affective state influences cognitive processing, and that animals in a negative affective state interpret ambiguous information as expecting a negative outcome (displaying a negative cognitive bias). Most of these tests however, require long discrimination training. The aim of the study was to validate an exploration based cognitive bias test, using two different handling methods, as previous studies have shown that standard tail handling of mice increases physiological and behavioural measures of anxiety compared to cupped handling. Therefore, we hypothesised that tail handled mice would display a negative cognitive bias. We handled 28 female CD-1 mice for 16 weeks using either tail handling or cupped handling. The mice were then trained in an eight arm radial maze, where two adjacent arms predicted a positive outcome (darkness and food), while the two opposite arms predicted a negative outcome (no food, white noise and light). After six days of training, the mice were also given access to the four previously unavailable intermediate ambiguous arms of the radial maze and tested for cognitive bias. We were unable to validate this test, as mice from both handling groups displayed a similar pattern of exploration. Furthermore, we examined whether maze exploration is affected by the expression of stereotypic behaviour in the home cage. Mice with higher levels of stereotypic behaviour spent more time in positive arms and avoided ambiguous arms, displaying a negative cognitive bias. While this test needs further validation, our results indicate that it may allow the assessment of affective state in mice with minimal training— a major confound in current cognitive bias paradigms.

Examining the relationship among genes, attention bias to emotion, and depression in youth

The investigation of biologically initiated pathways to psychological disorder is critical to advance our understanding of mental illness. Research has suggested that attention bias to emotion may be an intermediate trait for depression associated with biologically plausible candidate genes, such as the serotonin transporter (5-HTTLPR) and catechol-o-methyl-transferase (COMT) genes, yet there have been mixed findings in regards to the precise direction of effects. The experience of recent stressful life events (SLEs) may be an important, yet currently unstudied, moderator of the relationship between genes and attention bias as SLEs have been associated with both gene expression and attention to emotion. Additionally, although attention biases to emotion have been studied as a possible intermediate trait associated with depression, no study has examined whether attention biases within the context of measured genetic risk lead to increased risk for clinical depressive episodes over time. Therefore, this research investigated both whether SLEs moderate the link between genetic risk (5-HTTLPR and COMT) and attention bias to emotion and whether 5-HTTLPR and COMT moderated the relationship between attention biases to emotional faces and clinical depression onset prospectively across 18 months within a large community sample of youth (n= 467). Analyses revealed a differential effect of gene. Youth who were homozygous for the low expressing allele of 5-HTTLPR (S/S) and had experienced more recent SLEs within the last three months demonstrated preferential attention toward negative emotional faces (angry and sad). However, youth who were homozygous for the high expressing COMT genotype (Val/Val) and had experienced more recent SLEs showed attentional avoidance of positive facial expressions (happy). Additionally, youth who avoided negative emotion (i.e., anger) and were homozygous for the S allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene were at greater risk for prospective depressive episode onset. Increased risk for depression onset was specific to the 5-HTTLPR gene and was not found when examining moderation by COMT. These findings highlight the importance of examining risk for depression across multiple levels of analysis, such as combined genetic, environmental, and cognitive risk, and is the first study to demonstrate clear evidence of attention biases to emotion functioning as an intermediate trait predicting depression.

Linking superiority bias in the interpersonal and intergroup domains

The author conducted 2 studies to explore the link between superiority bias in the interpersonal and intergroup domains. Australian university students evaluated the extent to which various personality traits were more or less applicable to themselves than to other Australian university students in general. They then evaluated the extent to which the same traits were more or less applicable to Australians than to people from other countries in general. As expected, the more participants evaluated themselves as superior to other university students, the more they evaluated Australians as a whole as superior to people from other countries. This link between interpersonal and intergroup superiority biases explained 22.1% of variance in Study 1 and 33.6% of variance in Study 2. The author interprets the results of the 2 studies as support for fundamental principles of social identity theory: (a) that self-concept consists of not only one's personal self but also the social groups to which one belongs and (b) that people are motivated to view both levels of self in a relatively positive fashion.

Counter-stereotypes reduce emotional intergroup bias by eliciting surprise in the face of unexpected category combinations

In three experiments we investigated the impact that exposure to counter-stereotypes has on emotional reactions to outgroups. In Experiment 1, thinking about gender counter-stereotypes attenuated stereotyped emotions toward females and males. In Experiment 2, an immigrant counterstereotype attenuated stereotyped emotions toward this outgroup and reduced dehumanization tendencies. Experiment 3 replicated these results using an alternative measure of humanization. In both Experiments 2 and 3 sequential meditational analysis revealed that counter-stereotypes produced feelings of surprise which, in turn, elicited a cognitive process of expectancy violation which resulted in attenuated stereotyped emotions and an enhanced use of uniquely human characteristics to describe the outgroup. The findings extend research supporting the usefulness of counter-stereotype exposure for reducing prejudice and highlight its positive impact on intergroup emotions.

Examining moderators of the hindsight bias in the context of civil legal decision -making: Counterfactuals, causal proximity, and self -referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. ^ In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. ^ Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.^

Examining Moderators of the Hindsight Bias in the Context of Civil Legal Decision-Making: Counterfactuals, Causal Proximity, and Self-Referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.

Correcting for bias when estimating the cost of hospital-acquired infection : an analysis of lower respiratory tract infections in non-surgical patients

Hospital acquired infections (HAI) are costly but many are avoidable. Evaluating prevention programmes requires data on their costs and benefits. Estimating the actual costs of HAI (a measure of the cost savings due to prevention) is difficult as HAI changes cost by extending patient length of stay, yet, length of stay is a major risk factor for HAI. This endogeneity bias can confound attempts to measure accurately the cost of HAI. We propose a two-stage instrumental variables estimation strategy that explicitly controls for the endogeneity between risk of HAI and length of stay. We find that a 10% reduction in ex ante risk of HAI results in an expected savings of £693 ($US 984).

Extreme sports as a facilitator of ecocentricity and positive life changes

Extreme sports and extreme sports participants have been most commonly explored from a negative perspective, for example the 'need to take unnecessary risks'. This study reports on findings that indicate a more positive experience. A phenomenological method was used via unstructured interviews with 15 extreme sports participants and other first hand accounts. The extreme sports included B.A.S.E. jumping, big wave surfing, extreme skiing, waterfall kayaking, extreme mountaineering and solo rope-free climbing. Results indicate that participating in activities that involve a real chance of death, fear and the realisation that nature in its extreme is far greater and more powerful than humanity triggers positive life changes, and an eco-centric standpoint.

Extreme Sports: A positive transformation in courage and humility

Extreme sports and extreme sports participants have been most commonly explored from a negative perspective, for example the “need to take unnecessary risks.” This study explored what can be learned from extreme sports about courage and humility - two positive psychology constructs. A phenomenological method was used via unstructured interviews with 15 extreme sports participants and other first hand accounts. The extreme sports included B.A.S.E. jumping, big wave surfing, extreme skiing, waterfall kayaking, extreme mountaineering and solo rope-free climbing. Results indicate that humility and courage can be deliberately sought out by participating in activities that involve a real chance of death, fear and the realisation that nature in its extreme is far greater and more powerful than humanity.

Positive development

net sustainability. At best they reduce relative resource consumption. They still consume vast quantities of materials, energy, water and ecosystems during construction. Moreover, green buildings replace land and ecosystems with structures that, at the very best, only 'mimic' ecosystems<'). Mimicking nature is little compensation when we have lost a third of species that are integral parts of our life support system. Already, development has exceeded the Earth's ecological carrying capacity, so even 'restorative' design is not enough. Urban areas must be retrofitted to increase net bioregional carrying capacity - just to support existing or reduced population levels in cities. The eco-retrofitting of our built environment is therefore an essential precondition of achieving a sustainable society. But we need to eco-retrofit cities in ways that increase net sustainability, not just relative efficiency.