The political economy of war,

pt. 1. Policy and economics of war.--pt. 2. On war debts.--pt. 3. On the great war of 1914-15.

Political economy /

Prologue.--book I. Production and consumption.--book II. Exchange.--book III. Distribution.--book IV. Public finance.--Epilogue: pt. I Scope and method of economic science. pt. II. History of economic science.--Appendix.--Index.

American political economy;

Mode of access: Internet.

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.

Essays in economic growth, political economy and institutions

This dissertation analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on economic development and growth.^ The first essay develops an overlapping-generations political economy model to analyze the incentives of various social groups to finance human capital accumulation through public education expenditures. The contribution of this study to the literature is that it helps explain the observed differences in the economic growth performance of natural resource-abundant countries. The results suggest that the preferred tax rates of the manufacturers on one hand and the political coalition of manufacturers and landowners, on the other hand, are equal to the socially optimal tax rate. However, we show that owners of natural resources prefer an excessively high tax rate, which suppresses aggregate output to a suboptimal level.^ The second essay examines the relationship between the political influence of different social classes and public education spending in panel data estimation. The novel contribution of this paper to the literature is that I proxy the political power and influence of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners with macroeconomic indicators. The motivation behind this modeling choice is to substantiate the definition of the political power of social classes with economic fundamentals. I use different governance indicators in the estimations to find out how different institutions mediate the overall impact of the political influence of various social classes on public education spending. The results suggest that political stability and absence of violence and rule of law are the important governance indicators.^ The third essay develops a counter argument to Acemoglu et al. (2010) where the thesis is that French institutions and economic reforms fostered economic progress in those German regions invaded by the Napoleonic armies. By providing historical data on urbanization rates used as proxies for economic growth, I demonstrate that similar different rates of economic growth were observed in the regions of France in the post-Napoleonic period as well. The existence of different economic growth rates makes it hard to argue that the differences in economic performance in the German regions that were invaded by the French and those that were spared a similar fate follow from regional differences in economic institutions.^

The distinctive politics of campaign finance reform

This article presents a unified theory explaining several conflicting empirical observations in the politics of campaign finance. It identifies those circumstances that foster or frustrate the enactment of financing laws that increase the competitiveness of elections. I argue that the competitiveness of financing laws is a result of three strong incentives when they operate in differently structured party systems. First, lawmakers have an incentive to make laws to protect their incumbency from competitors. This incentive generally overwhelms the (weaker) incentive to enact popular, competition-enhancing reforms. Secondly, lawmakers, when they act through political parties, have an incentive to cooperate with rivals to reduce the costs of political defeats. Thirdly, lawmakers seek to enact reforms that are consistent with their normative goals. These incentives combine with several party system variables to determine when campaign finance reform is likely to occur and how it will impact on the competitiveness of elections.

The implications of family control and political connections: evidence from China

This thesis investigates the implications of family control and political connections. The empirical results indicate that in emerging markets with an undeveloped legal system, controlling families have incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. It also reveals the importance of political connections in the M&A market in China.