Utility of a novel risk score for prediction of ventricular tachycardia and cardiac death in chronic Chagas disease - the SEARCH-RIO study

The SEARCH-RIO study prospectively investigated electrocardiogram (ECG)-derived variables in chronic Chagas disease (CCD) as predictors of cardiac death and new onset ventricular tachycardia (VT). Cardiac arrhythmia is a major cause of death in CCD, and electrical markers may play a significant role in risk stratification. One hundred clinically stable outpatients with CCD were enrolled in this study. They initially underwent a 12-lead resting ECG, signal-averaged ECG, and 24-h ambulatory ECG. Abnormal Q-waves, filtered QRS duration, intraventricular electrical transients (IVET), 24-h standard deviation of normal RR intervals (SDNN), and VT were assessed. Echocardiograms assessed left ventricular ejection fraction. Predictors of cardiac death and new onset VT were identified in a Cox proportional hazard model. During a mean follow-up of 95.3 months, 36 patients had adverse events: 22 new onset VT (mean±SD, 18.4±4‰/year) and 20 deaths (26.4±1.8‰/year). In multivariate analysis, only Q-wave (hazard ratio, HR=6.7; P<0.001), VT (HR=5.3; P<0.001), SDNN<100 ms (HR=4.0; P=0.006), and IVET+ (HR=3.0; P=0.04) were independent predictors of the composite endpoint of cardiac death and new onset VT. A prognostic score was developed by weighting points proportional to beta coefficients and summing-up: Q-wave=2; VT=2; SDNN<100 ms=1; IVET+=1. Receiver operating characteristic curve analysis optimized the cutoff value at >1. In 10,000 bootstraps, the C-statistic of this novel score was non-inferior to a previously validated (Rassi) score (0.89±0.03 and 0.80±0.05, respectively; test for non-inferiority: P<0.001). In CCD, surface ECG-derived variables are predictors of cardiac death and new onset VT.

Toward a rational-choice foundation of non-additive theories

A classical argument of de Finetti holds that Rationality implies Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). In contrast, the Knightian distinction between Risk and Ambiguity suggests that a rational decision maker would obey the SEU paradigm when the information available is in some sense good, and would depart from it when the information available is not good. Unlike de Finetti's, however, this view does not rely on a formal argument. In this paper, we study the set of all information structures that might be availabe to a decision maker, and show that they are of two types: those compatible with SEU theory and those for which SEU theory must fail. We also show that the former correspond to "good" information, while the latter correspond to information that is not good. Thus, our results provide a formalization of the distinction between Risk and Ambiguity. As a consequence of our main theorem (Theorem 2, Section 8), behavior not-conforming to SEU theory is bound to emerge in the presence of Ambiguity. We give two examples of situations of Ambiguity. One concerns the uncertainty on the class of measure zero events, the other is a variation on Ellberg's three-color urn experiment. We also briefly link our results to two other strands of literature: the study of ambiguous events and the problem of unforeseen contingencies. We conclude the paper by re-considering de Finetti's argument in light of our findings.

Conditional Expected Utility

Let 'epsilon' be a class of event. Conditionally Expected Utility decision makers are decision makers whose conditional preferences ≿E, E є 'epsilon', satisfy the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU). We extend the notion of unconditional preference that is conditionally EU to unconditional preferences that are not necessarily SEU. We give a representation theorem for a class of such preferences, and show that they are Invariant Bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato et al.[7]. Then, we consider the special case where the unconditional preference is itself SEU, and compare our results with those of Fishburn [6].

Non-Consequentialist Utilitarianism

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Should a non-rival public good always be provided centrally?

This paper discusses the problem of optimal design of a jurisdiction structure from the view point of a utilitarian social planner when individuals with identical utility functions for a non-rival public good and private consumption have private information about their contributive capacities. It shows that the superiority of a centralized provision of a non-rival public good over a federal one does not always hold. Specifically, when differences in individuals’ contributive capacities are large, it is better to provide the public good in several distinct jurisdictions rather than to pool these jurisdictions into a single one. In the specific situation where individuals have logarithmic utilities, the paper provides a complete characterization of the optimal jurisdiction structure in the two-type case.

Spatial Inequalities and Social Utility: Mobility Efforts and Accessibility in Greater Santiago

Emergent phenomena such as urban sprawl, travel intensification and loss of cohesion in contemporary metropolises, impose stronger constraints on its inhabitants. Among them, travel and location capabilities become a fundamental factor of social integration and a multiplier of income inequalities. The simultaneous analysis of housing-travel efforts and accessibility to urban opportunities in Greater Santiago shows that these dimensions are closely related and exert an important influence on spatial mobility and inequalities among its inhabitants. Furthermore, a theoretical model of displacements, considering income and location, confirms the importance of proximity and non-motorized transport in order to optimize daily mobility strategies of households. Overall, the empirical and theoretical results presented show the need to implement coordinated planning strategies between the housing and transport sectors, addressing not only travel acceleration, but mainly the consistency between accommodation and opportu  ties location. The creation of such planning tools could be a more sustainable alternative than current growth trends in Greater Santiago.

Stated attribute non-attendance in successive choice experiments

Attribute non-attendance in choice experiments affects WTP estimates and therefore the validity of the method. A recent strand of literature uses attenuated estimates of marginal utilities of ignored attributes. Following this approach, we propose a generalisation of the mixed logit model whereby the distribution of marginal utility coefficients of a stated non-attender has a potentially lower mean and lower variance than those of a stated attender. Model comparison shows that our shrinkage approach fits the data better and produces more reliable WTP estimates. We further find that while reliability of stated attribute non-attendance increases in successive choice experiments, it does not increase when respondents report having ignored the same attribute twice.

Joint use of attribute importance rankings and non-attendance data in choice experiments

The joint and alternative uses of attribute non-attendance and importance ranking data within discrete choice experiments are investigated using data from Lebanon examining consumers’ preferences for safety certification in food. We find that both types of information; attribute non-attendance and importance rankings, improve estimates of respondent utility. We introduce a method of integrating both types of information simultaneously and find that this outperforms models where either importance ranking or non-attendance data are used alone. As in previous studies, stated non-attendance of attributes was not found to be consistent with respondents having zero marginal utility for those attributes

A Trotter-Kato product formula for a class of non-autonomous evolution equations

In this article dedicated to Professor V. Lakshmikantham on the occasion of the celebration of his 84th birthday, we announce new results concerning the existence and various properties of an evolution system UA+B(t, s)(0 <= s <= t <= T) generated by the sum -(A(t)+B(t)) of two linear, time-dependent and generally unbounded operators defined on time-dependent domains in a complex and separable Banach space B. In particular, writing G(B) for the algebra of all linear bounded operators on B, we can express UA+B(t, s)(0 <= s <= t <= T) as the strong limit in L(B) of a product of the holomorphic contraction semigroups generated by -A(t) and -B(t), thereby getting a product formula of the Trotter-Kato type under very general conditions which allow the domain D(A(t)+B(t)) to evolve with time provided there exists a fixed set D subset of boolean AND D-t epsilon[0,D-T](A(t)+B(t)) everywhere dense in B. We then mention several possible applications of our product formula to various classes of non-autonomous parabolic initial-boundary value problems, as well as to evolution problems of Schrodinger type related to the theory of time-dependent singular perturbations of self-adjoint operators in quantum mechanics. We defer all the proofs and all the details of the applications to a separate publication. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining

If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.

On the optimality of the Friedman Rule with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxation

We study the optimal “inflation tax” in an environment with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxes. We first derive the general conditions needed for the optimality of the Friedman rule in this setup. These general conditions are distinct in nature and more easily interpretable than those obtained in the literature with a representative agent and linear taxation. We then study two standard monetary specifications and derive their implications for the optimality of the Friedman rule. For the shopping-time model the Friedman rule is optimal with essentially no restrictions on preferences or transaction technologies. For the cash-credit model the Friedman rule is optimal if preferences are separable between the consumption goods and leisure, or if leisure shifts consumption towards the credit good. We also study a generalized model which nests both models as special cases.

Collateral or utility penalties ?

In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways to enforce the honor of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. Firstly, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized (rewarded) in his utility if his delivery rate is lower (greater) than the payment rate of the financial market. Secondly, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.

Universal scaling in Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer superconductivity in two dimensions in non-s waves

The solutions of a renormalized BCS model are studied in two space dimensions for s, p and d waves for finite-range separable potentials. The gap parameter, the critical temperature T-c, the coherence length xi and the jump in specific heat at T-c as a function of the zero-temperature condensation energy exhibit universal scalings. In the weak-coupling limit, the present model yields a small xi and large T-c, appropriate for high-T-c cuprates. The specific heat, penetration depth and thermal conductivity as functions of temperature show universal scaling for p and d waves.

Universal scaling in BCS superconductivity in three dimensions in non-s waves

The solutions of a renormalized BCS equation are studied in three space dimensions in s, p and d waves for finite-range separable potentials in the weak to medium coupling region. In the weak-coupling limit, the present BCS model yields a small coherence length ξ and a large critical temperature, T c, appropriate for some high-T c materials. The BCS gap, T c, ξ and specific heat C s(T c) as a function of zero-temperature condensation energy are found to exhibit potential-independent universal scalings. The entropy, specific heat, spin susceptibility and penetration depth as a function of temperature exhibit universal scaling below T c in p and d waves.

Investigation of the relationship between load and loss factors for a Brazilian electric utility

With the considerable increase of the losses in electric utilities of developing countries, such as Brazil, there is an investigation for loss calculation methodologies, considering both technical (inherent of the system) and non-technical (usually associated to the electricity theft) losses. In general, all distribution networks know the load factor, obtained by measuring parameters directly from the network. However, the loss factor, important for the energy loss cost calculation, can only be obtained in a laborious way. Consequently, several formulas have been developed for obtaining the loss factor. Generally, it is used the expression that relates both factors, through the use of a coefficient k. Last reviews introduce a range of factor k within 0.04 - 0.30. In this work, an analysis with real life load curves is presented, determining new values for the coefficient k in a Brazilian electric utility. © 2006 IEEE.