Analysis of marine bivalve shellfish from the fish market in Santos city, Sao Paulo state, Brazil, for Toxoplasma gondii

The aim of this study was to determine if Toxoplasma gondii are present in oysters (Crassostrea rhizophorae) and mussels (Mytella guyanensis) under natural conditions using a bioassay in mice and molecular detection methods. We first compared two standard protocols for DNA extraction, phenol-chloroform (PC) and guanidine-thiocyanate (GT), for both molluscs. A total of 300 oysters and 300 mussels were then acquired from the fish market in Santos city, Sao Paulo state, Brazil, between March and August of 2008 and divided into 60 groups of 5 oysters and 20 groups of 15 mussels. To isolate the parasite, five mice were orally inoculated with sieved tissue homogenates from each group of oysters or mussels. For molecular detection of T. gondii, DNA from mussels was extracted using the PC method and DNA from oysters was extracted using the GT method. A nested-PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) based on the amplification of a 155 bp fragment from the B1 gene of T. gondii was then performed. Eleven PCR-RFLP (Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism) markers, SAG1, SAG2, SAG3, BTUB, GRA6, c22-8, c29-2, L358, PK1, CS3 and Apico, were used to genotype positive samples. There was no isolation of the parasite by bioassay in mice. T. gondii was not detected in any of the groups of mussels by nested-PCR. DNA of T. gondii was apparently detected by nested-PCR in 2 groups of oysters (3.3%). Genotyping of these two positive samples was not successful. The results suggest that oysters of the species C. rhizophorae, the most common species from the coast of Sao Paulo, can filter and retain T. gondii oocysts from the marine environment. Ingestion of raw oysters as a potential transmission source of T. gondii to humans and marine mammals should be further investigated. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Notes on market failure and the Paretian (Kaldor-Hicks) relevance and irrelevance of unfavourable externalities

The following are notes that have been distributed by me over the last few years to students in Environmental Economics at The University of Queensland. They give particular attention to whether externalities are Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks relevant from a policy point of view. Externalities are Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto irrelevant if no change is possible for which gainers could compensate losers. Both absolute and marginal externalities may be Kaldor-Hicks relevant. Infra-marginal negative externalities are often, but not always, Kaldor-Hicks irrelevant. There are at least two cases where such externalities can be relevant. First, the absolute impact of the negative externality may be so great that the source of the externality should be eliminated. Secondly, if the externality arises from production, its nature may depend on the type of production technique adopted. Although for the technique adopted, an infra-marginal negative externality occurs. That is Paretian irrelevant given that choice of this technique is the only available possibility, alternative techniques may actually be available in practice. Some of these may generate even smaller total external effects and be socially preferable. Both cases are outlined and illustrated in these notes. The analysis reveals the dangers of relying on marginalism for deciding on environmental policy. Total (external) effects are often of great social and economic importance and appropriate social choices cannot be made on the basis of marginalism alone.

Testing for Market Power in Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output Industries: The Australian Grains and Oilseeds Industries

Recent empirical studies have found significant evidence of departures from competition in the input side of the Australian bread, breakfast cereal and margarine end-product markets. For example, Griffith (2000) found that firms in some parts of the processing and marketing sector exerted market power when purchasing grains and oilseeds from farmers. As noted at the time, this result accorded well with the views of previous regulatory authorities (p.358). In the mid-1990s, the Prices Surveillence Authority (PSA 1994) determined that the markets for products contained in the Breakfast Cereals and Cooking Oils and Fats indexes were "not effectively competitive" (p.14). The PSA consequently maintained price surveillence on the major firms in this product group. The Griffith result is also consistent with the large number of legal judgements against firms in this sector over the past decade for price fixing or other types of non-competitive behaviour. For example, bread manufacturer George Weston was fined twice during 2000 for non-competitive conduct and the ACCC has also recently pursued and won cases against retailer Safeway in grains and oilseeds product lines.