Payone : incentive for epidemic protocol-based anonymity system

Anonymity systems maintain the anonymity of communicating nodes by camouflaging them, either with peer nodes generating dummy traffic or with peer nodes participating in the actual communication process. The probability of any adversary breaking down the anonymity of the communicating nodes is inversely proportional to the number of peer nodes participating in the network. Hence to maintain the anonymity of the communicating nodes, a large number of peer nodes are needed. Lack of peer availability weakens the anonymity of any large scale anonymity system. This work proposes PayOne, an incentive based scheme for promoting peer availability. PayOne aims to increase the peer availability by encouraging nodes to participate in the anonymity system by awarding them with incentives and thereby promoting the anonymity strength. Existing incentive schemes are designed for single path based approaches. There is no incentive scheme for multipath based or epidemic based anonymity systems. This work has been specifically designed for epidemic protocols and has been implemented over MuON, one of the latest entries to the area of multicasting based anonymity systems. MuON is a peer-to-peer based anonymity system which uses epidemic protocol for data dissemination. Existing incentive schemes involve paying every intermediate node that is involved in the communication between the initiator and the receiver. These schemes are not appropriate for epidemic based anonymity systems due to the incurred overhead. PayOne differs from the existing schemes because it involves paying a single intermediate node that participates in the network. The intermediate node can be any random node that participates in the communication and does not necessarily need to lie in the communication path between the initiator and the receiver. The light-weight characteristics of PayOne make it viable for large-scale epidemic based anonymity systems.

The Monotonicity Puzzle: An Experimental Investigation of Incentive Structures

Non-monotone incentive structures, which - according to theory - are able to induce optimal behavior, are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. We compare the performance of a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract with a monotone one under controlled laboratory conditions. Implementing some features relevant to real-world employment relationships, our paper demonstrates that, in fact, the frequency of income-maximizing decisions made by agents is higher under the monotone contract. Although this observed behavior does not change the superiority of the non-monotone contract for principals, they do not choose this contract type in a significant way. This is what we call the monotonicity puzzle. Detailed investigations of decisions provide a clue for solving the puzzle and a possible explanation for the popularity of monotone contracts.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Informal Credit Contracts: Does the Incentive Mechanism Work Better than Credit Rationing Under Asymmetric Information?

Credit markets with asymmetric information often prefer credit rationing as a profit maximizing device. This paper asks whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing, that is, whether it can alleviate the impact of asymmetric information based on the available information. We used a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to assess this. Using Indian credit market data our study shows that the presence of informal credit market can reduce the cost of credit rationing by separating high risk firms from the low risk firms in the informal market. But even after this improvement, the steady state capital accumulation is still much lower as compared to incentive based market clearing rates. Through self revelation of each firm's type, based on the incentive mechanism, banks can diversify their risk by achieving a separating equilibrium in the loan market. The incentive mechanism helps banks to increase capital accumulation in the long run by charging lower rates and lending relatively higher amount to the less risky firms. Another important finding of this study is that self-revelation leads to very significant welfare improvement, as measured by consumptiuon equivalence.

The Social versus Private Incentive to Sue

The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs' expected recovery at trial compared to their filing costs, whereas the social value consists of the incentives suits create for injurers to invest in accident avoidance. Generally, there is no relationship between these two values: there may be either too many or too few suits from a social perspective. Thus, there is scope for corrective measures, although there is no simple policy. Extending the model to consider a negligence rule rather than strict liability, and to allow for pretrial settlements, leads to some modified conclusions but does not alter the basic insights.

The Economics of Incentive-Based Health Care Plans

Medical savings accounts (MSAs) belong to a larger class of incentive-based health care plans. Using a model that allows the consumer to invest in healthy activities, we examine the efficiency properties of incentive plans and compare them to traditional full- coverage and deductible plans, under both experience rating and community rating. The model also is extended to include utilization of preventive health care. Properly constructed incentive plans have the capacity to induce socially efficient levels of healthy activities and preventive care, raising the expected wealth of consumers without reducing insurers' profits.

Business model with discount incentive in a P2P-cloud multimedia streaming system

Today P2P faces two important challenges: design of mechanisms to encourage users' collaboration in multimedia live streaming services; design of reliable algorithms with QoS provision, to encourage the multimedia providers employ the P2P topology in commercial live streaming systems. We believe that these two challenges are tightly-related and there is much to be done with respect. This paper analyzes the effect of user behavior in a multi-tree P2P overlay and describes a business model based on monetary discount as incentive in a P2P-Cloud multimedia streaming system. We believe a discount model can boost up users' cooperation and loyalty and enhance the overall system integrity and performance. Moreover the model bounds the constraints for a provider's revenue and cost if the P2P system is leveraged on a cloud infrastructure. Our case study shows that a streaming system provider can establish or adapt his business model by applying the described bounds to achieve a good discount-revenue trade-off and promote the system to the users.

A novel monetary incentive for commercial P2P streaming

Today P2P faces two important challenges: design of mechanisms to encourage users’ collaboration in multimedia live streaming services; design of reliable algorithms with QoS provision, to encourage multimedia providers employ the P2P topology in commercial streaming services. We believe that these two challenges are tightly-related and there is much to be done with respect. This paper proposes a novel monetary incentive for P2P multimedia streaming. The incentive model classifies the users in groups according to the perceived video quality. We apply the model to a streaming system’s billing model in order to evaluate its feasibility and visualize its quantitative effect on the users’ motivation and the provider’s profit. We conclude that monetary incentive can boost up users’ cooperation, loyalty and enhance the overall system integrity and performance. Moreover the model defines the constraints for the provider’s cost and profit when the system is leveraged on the cloud. Considering those constraints, a multimedia content provider can adapt the billing model of his streaming service and achieve desirable discount-profit trade-off. This will moreover contribute to better promotion of the service, across the users on the Internet.

Deploying the energy incentive: reinforcing EU integration in South-East Europe. CEPS Policy Brief No. 296, July 2013

This Policy Brief urges the European Union to consider reinforcing the Energy Community by further Europeanising the Energy Community Treaty. It argues that the level of dysfunctionality with respect to the rule of law and corruption will make it very hard to establish a pathway for accession for most Balkan states. However, the demand across the region for a sustainable, competitive and stable energy sector creates an ‘energy incentive’ that the Union can leverage to improve the rule of law and adherence to European rules. Furthermore, a juridical strengthening of the Energy Community Treaty will also strengthen the hand of those parties supporting energy liberalisation rules across the region, such as independent businesses, consumers and NGOs. In addition, there is likely to be significant spill-over effects from decisions of a European Energy Community Court operating in the region on the rule of law in general and the accession process in particular.

Le projet de révision du Code minier de la RDC: de l'incitation à la dissuasion? = The draft revision of the Mining Code of the DRC: the incentive to deterrence? Egmont Paper No. 63, January 2014

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Hearings on H.R. 10451, Navy nuclear career incentive act, before the Subcommittee on Military Compensation of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session ...

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