A passion for white elephants : some lessons from Australia’s experience of nation building

A ‘white elephant’ is a magnificent, high-status possession that is not particularly productive, costs a lot to maintain, and which you cannot get rid of. Since colonial times, Australians have had a weakness for white elephants. Traditionally, these were massive, debt-funded public works schemes that were economically, environmentally or socially dubious. In recent years, our white elephants have taken on different guises, but the ruinous expense and misdirected effort remain the same. This paper explores some of the reasons for our society’s historic enthusiasm for white elephants, and suggests some remedies.

Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

The new arts leader: the Australia Council and cultural policy change

One consequence of the development of cultural policy has been a demand for more creative leadership in arts organisations. This article provides a case study of how leadership of the Australia Council changed from the 1970s to the beginning of the 21st century. It argues that changes to the way in which Australia Council chairs approached their role was shaped by, and contributed to, the trend towards constructing the arts as an industry. Part of this change sees the Australia Council subjected to aspects of reform, which were widely endorsed by the Australian public sector. The article identifies three styles of leadership exhibited by the chairs over the period: visionary, statesman and reformer, in three phases of the Council's history. It examines the political and social imperatives shaping these leadership styles.

The mutual obligation policy in Australia : the rhetoric and reasoning of recent social security policy

Since 1997, the Australian Federal Liberal Government has introduced policies which have sought to reduce rates of unemployment, particularly long-term unemployment. The policy, known as Mutual Obligation, increased the expectations on unemployed people in return for their social security payment. At the same time, previous labour market programmes and government assistance schemes were scrapped or privatised. This article explores the justification of the term 'Mutual Obligation' by examining both the language and the underlying principles of the policy. By defining the problem of unemployment in terms of flaws in the previous social security system, the stage is set for the government to introduce policies which remedy those flaws by emphasising self- reliance in favour of government assistance. Further, by invoking notions of fairness and mutuality, the article argues that the term 'Mutual Obligation' masks both the extent and the strength of the obligations imposed on unemployed people.

Re-examining the "twin deficits" hypothesis: evidence from Australia

This paper re-examines the relationship between fiscal imbalances and net foreign borrowing. A general analytical approach is first developed which suggests that, other things equal, a rise (fall) in any advanced economy’s fiscal deficit should be fully matched by a rise (fall) in its net foreign borrowing, in accordance with the so-called twin deficits hypothesis. In the case of Australia, one of the world’s largest foreign borrower economies for its size, empirical estimation yields the novel result that Australia’s consolidated budget imbalance and its foreign borrowing were approximately twinned on the basis of quarterly data for 1983–2009, when Australia’s exchange rate floated and international capital mobility was high. This result is consistent with the conceptual framework and suggests that fiscal policy is likely to be ineffective as an instrument for influencing the real economy.

Fiscal trends and policy issues and implications for the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Fiscal Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2015: Policy space and dilemmas. Executive Summary

The present document provides an up-to-date overview of public debt and fiscal space in the region. The main conclusions show that public debt levels are low in Latin America and high in the Caribbean. Overall, the region has enough fiscal space to apply countercyclical policies and boost production development and the fiscal management of non-renewable natural resources needs to be modernized. It explains that fiscal policy has a very limited impact on the distribution of disposable income and in a volatile macroeconomic environment, reforms should aim to strengthen personal income tax.

Interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in a dynamic nonlinear model

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact. CEPS Working Document No. 381, August 2013

This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.

How EU Fiscal Norms Will Become a Safety Net for the Failure of National Golden Rules. European Policy Brief No. 6, January 2012

If introduced successfully, national Golden Rules will completely overturn fiscal governance in the eurozone. Golden Rules would almost always be more stringent than EU-level fiscal norms. EU fiscal norms will hence evolve into a safety net in case a Golden Rule fails. The possibility of such a failure is, indeed, not to be dismissed. Because of the severity of the Golden Rules, eurozone leaders should reflect on their design. There is a real risk that they will undercut public investment, which would be at the cost of the EU’s other long-term challenges.

A case for adjusting fiscal consolidation in the eurozone. European Policy Brief No. 14, January 2013

Fiscal consolidation is essential to ensure the sustainability of eurozone countries’ public debt. However, as a principle, consolidation should not be pursued at a pace unnecessarily undermining growth in the short term. Repeated downward revisions of growth call for the use of the flexibility foreseen in the EU fiscal framework. The Commission should adapt the deadlines for fiscal correction to prevent excessive, pro-cyclical adjustment in 2013. In turn, adequate surveillance and coordination must ensure structural adjustments constitute the core of fiscal consolidation plans.

Contractual arrangements: the overlooked step towards a fiscal union. European Policy Brief No. 18, December 2013

‘Contractual arrangements’ were proposed as an initial step towards a fiscal union that would consolidate the EMU. At this stage, the debate should be centred on the cornerstone of these contracts: the solidarity mechanism. The form of the financial support should not be limited to loans, and include the possibility for grants. Only the countries with the greatest adjustment needs should benefit from the financial support of other countries. This solidarity could be justified in principle by the intensity of the ‘shocks’ they experienced. In this way, contractual arrangement would facilitate the completion of the necessary adjustment in the current crisis – thanks both to more structural reforms and more mutual support within the eurozone.

Which fiscal union for the euro area? Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/05, February 2016

At the current level of political and societal integration, a large federal budget is unrealistic in the euro area. The authors make three recommendations that would lead national fiscal policies to be more stabilising with respect to the economic cycle, while achieving long-term sustainability. They also recommend a move towards a European unemployment insurance scheme targeted at ‘large’ shocks, and a minimum set of labour-market harmonisation criteria.