The EU's Promotion of External Democracy: In search of the plot. CEPS Policy Brief No. 281, 13 September 2012

This policy brief illustrates that both the conceptualisation of democracy and the means to achieve it remain vague, and explains why this is problematic. It points out the risks that stem from a lack of clear understanding about how human rights, governance, civil society and socio-economic development relate to democratisation. It concludes that the EU should reflect on the substance of its external democracy promotion policies and conceptualise the relationship between the different elements of democracy promotion cited above and democratisation. While ongoing reforms of international democracy promotion should continue, a wider debate on substance could help identify what the EU should support in the future. The EU should also establish a reflective external democracy promotion policy where the assessment of actions on democratic development becomes systematic and is institutionalised.

Agricultural tenancy reform: the end of law; or a new popular culture?

This paper applies a reading of the postmodernisation of law to the incremental reform of agricultural holdings legislation over the last century. In charting the shifting legal basis of agricultural tenancies, from ‘black letter’ positivism to the cultural contextuality of sumptuary law, the paper theorises that the underlying political imperative has been allied to the changing significance of property ownership and use. Rather than reflecting the long-term official desire to maintain the let sector in British agriculture, however, the paper argues that this process has had other aims. In particular, it has been about an annexation of law to legitimise the retention of landowner power while presenting a rhetorical ‘democratisation’ of farming, away from its plutocratic associations and towards a new narrative of ‘depersonalised’ business.

Second-life retailing: a reverse supply chain perspective

Purpose – The authors examine the role of entrepreneurial business models in the reverse supply chain of apparel/fashion retailers. The purpose of this paper is to offer an alternative approach to the “return to the point of origin” prevalent in the reverse chain of manufacturers but less technically and economically feasible in the case of apparel/fashion retailers. This approach, second-life retailing, not only reduces waste but also democratises consumption. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on an extensive literature review, semi-structured interviews with managers of two second-life retailers in Malaysia and observations of a number of stores. Findings – Using the Business Model Canvas, the authors demonstrate the essential characteristics of second-life retailers. Retailers in this study, unlike retailers in the developed world, combine traditional business models with off-price retailing. There is no clear demarcation between the forward and reverse supply chain used to manage first- and second-hand retailing. Practical implications – The paper demonstrates the potential of innovative business models in the reverse supply chain. It encourages managers to look beyond the “return to the point of origin” and seek imaginative alternatives. Such alternatives potentially could result in additional revenue, enhanced sustainability and democratisation of consumption meeting triple bottom line objectives. Originality/value – This paper highlights the importance and relevance of entrepreneurial business models in addressing the reverse supply chain, demonstrating this with the aid of two Malaysian off-price retailers. It also contributes to our nascent knowledge by focusing on emerging markets.

Pro-premiär eller pro-president? : Om distinktionen mellan parlamentarism, presidentialism och semi-presidentialism

Propremiar or pro-president? On the distinction between parliamentarism, presitentialism and semi-presidentialism. From comparative research on the constitutional development in Central and Eastern Europe and also from the longstanding debate on whether parliamentarism or presidentialism best facilitates democracy, it is apparent that there has been and continues to be, a certain degree of confusion concerning the concepts of semi-presidentialism and presidentialism. Different scholars mean different things by the terms and therefore classify countries differently. In this article I argue that the conceptual dichotomy between pro-premiär (premier-presidentialism) and pro-president systems (presidentparliamentary systems) provide the best solution to several of the problems related to categorising constitutional types, most importantly perhaps to the presidential power dilemma. I, furthermore, employ these concepts on the post-communist constitutional systems and try to reveal patterns with regard to presidential power, geographical region and democratisation.

Towards Presidential Rule in Ukraine : Hybrid Regime Dynamics under Semi-Presidentialism

This article sets out to analyse recent regime developments in Ukraine in relation to semi-presidentialism. The article asks: to what extent and in what ways theoretical arguments against semi-presidentialism (premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems) are relevant for understanding the changing directions of the Ukrainian regime since the 1990s? The article also reviews the by now overwhelming evidence suggesting that President Yanukovych is turning Ukraine into a more authoritarian hybrid regime and raises the question to what extent the president-parliamentary system might serve this end. The article argues that both kinds of semi-presidentialism have, in different ways, exacerbated rather than mitigated institutional conflict and political stalemate. The return to the president-parliamentary system in 2010 – the constitutional arrangement with the most dismal record of democratisation – was a step in the wrong direction. The premier-presidential regime was by no means ideal, but it had at least two advantages. It weakened the presidential dominance and it explicitly anchored the survival of the government in parliament. The return to the 1996 constitution ties in well with the notion that President Viktor Yanukovych has embarked on an outright authoritarian path.

A trajetória de democratização da gestão municipal em Recife e Salvador: escolhas políticas e processo decisório

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Generidade e politicidade no último Lukács

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Democracy Reconsidered : Britain, France, Sweden, and the EU

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether some positions in democratic theory should be adjusted or abandoned in view of internationalisation; and if adjusted, how. More specifically it pursues three different aims: to evaluate various attempts to explain levels of democracy as consequences of internationalisation; to investigate whether the taking into account of internationalisation reveals any reason to reconsider what democracy is or means; and to suggest normative interpretations that cohere with the adjustments of conceptual and explanatory democratic theory made in the course of meeting the other two aims. When empirical methods are used, the scope of the study is restricted to West European parliamentary democracies and their international affairs. More particularly, the focus is on the making of budget policy in Britain, France, and Sweden after the Second World War, and recent budget policy in the European Union. The aspects of democracy empirically analysed are political autonomy, participation, and deliberation. The material considered includes parliamentary debates, official statistics, economic forecasts, elections manifestos, shadow budgets, general election turnouts, regulations of budget decision-making, and staff numbers in government and parliament budgetary divisions. The study reaches the following conclusions among others. (i) The fact that internationalisation increases the divergence between those who make and those who are affected by decisions is not by itself a democratic problem that calls for political reform. (ii) That international organisations may have authorities delegated to them from democratic states is not sufficient to justify them democratically. Democratisation still needs to be undertaken. (iii) The fear that internationalisation dissolves a social trust necessary for political deliberation within nations seems to be unwarranted. If anything, views argued by others in domestic budgetary debate are taken increasingly serious during internationalisation. (iv) The major difficulty with deliberation seems to be its inability to transcend national boundaries. International deliberation at state level has not evolved in response to internationalisation and it is undeveloped in international institutions. (v) Democratic political autonomy diminishes during internationalisation with regard to income redistribution and policy areas taken over by international organisations, but it seems to increase in public spending. (vi) In the area of budget policy-making there are no signs that governments gain power at the expense of parliaments during internationalisation. (vii) To identify crucial democratic issues in a time of internationalisation and to make room for theoretical virtues like general applicability and normative fruitfulness, democracy may be defined as a kind of politics where as many as possible decide as much as possible.

What Happened to Participation? Urban Development and Authoritarian Upgrading in Cairo's Informal Neighbourhoods

Participation appeared in development discourses for the first time in the 1970s, as a generic call for the involvement of the poor in development initiatives. Over the last three decades, the initial perspectives on participation intended as a project method for poverty reduction have evolved into a coherent and articulated theoretical elaboration, in which participation figures among the paraphernalia of good governance promotion: participation has acquired the status of “new orthodoxy”. Nevertheless, the experience of the implementation of participatory approaches in development projects seemed to be in the majority of cases rather disappointing, since the transformative potential of ‘participation in development’ depends on a series of factors in which every project can actually differ from others: the ultimate aim of the approach promoted, its forms and contents and, last but not least, the socio-political context in which the participatory initiative is embedded. In Egypt, the signature of a project agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1998, inaugurated a Participatory Urban Management Programme (PUMP) to be implemented in Greater Cairo by the German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ) and the Ministry of Planning (now Ministry of Local Development) and the Governorates of Giza and Cairo as the main counterparts. Now, ten years after the beginning of the PUMP/PDP and close to its end (December 2010), it is possible to draw some conclusions about the scope, the significance and the effects of the participatory approach adopted by GTZ and appropriated by the Egyptian counterparts in dealing with the issue of informal areas and, more generally, of urban development. Our analysis follows three sets of questions: the first set regards the way ‘participation’ has been interpreted and concretised by PUMP and PDP. The second is about the emancipating potential of the ‘participatory approach’ and its ability to ‘empower’ the ‘marginalised’. The third focuses on one hand on the efficacy of GTZ strategy to lead to an improvement of the delivery service in informal areas (especially in terms of planning and policies), and on the other hand on the potential of GTZ development intervention to trigger an incremental process of ‘democratisation’ from below.

Demokratisierungs- und Dezentralisierungsprozesse im lokalen Machtgefüge Kameruns /// Arbeitspapiere / Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien ; 80

Gegenstand der vorliegenden Arbeit sind die aktuellen Prozesse der Demokratisierung und der Dezentralisierung in Kamerun. Anhand eines Fallbeispiels wird dargestellt, welche Auswirkungen diese Prozesse auf das lokale Machtgefüge einer Gemeinde haben können. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist es, die Forschungsergebnisse aus der Gemeinde Foumbot eingebettet in den sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskurs um Demokratisierungs- und Dezentralisierungsprozesse in Afrika zu analysieren. Dabei werden mit Hilfe des akteursorientierten Ansatzes die wichtigsten Akteursgruppen der lokalen politischen Arena Foumbots zunächst im nationalen und regionalen Kontext dargestellt, bevor ihre Beziehung zueinander auf der lokalen Ebene analysiert wird. Die zentrale Fragestellung lautet: „Welche Auswirkungen haben die Demokratisierungs- und Dezentralisierungsprozesse auf das lokale Machtgefüge einer Gemeinde?“ Die Hypothese ist, dass die gesellschaftliche Dynamik, die durch die Demokratisierung ausgelöst wurde, durch die Dezentralisierung gehemmt wird. Der Dezentralisierungsprozess verstärkte die Heterogenität der lokalen politischen Arena, indem er neuen, demokratisch legitimierten Akteuren einen Machtzugang eröffnete. Gleichzeitig verstärkte er auch die Konflikte zwischen den Akteursgruppen, da der Machtgewinn einer Gruppe immer mit dem Machtverlust anderer Gruppen verbunden ist. Diese Konflikte blockieren nicht nur die neue, dezentralisierte Kommune, sondern letztlich den Dezentralisierungsprozess selbst.

A Comparative Study of Central and Eastern European Social Policy Concernig Mental Disability

The main goal of this project was to identity whether an imported system of social policy can be suitable for a host country, and if not why not. Romanian social policy concerning the mentally disabled represents a paradoxical situation in that while social policy is designed to ensure both an institutional structure and a juridical environment, in practice it is far from successful. The central question which Ms. Ciumageanu asked therefore was whether this failure was due to systemic factors, or whether the problem lay in reworking an imported social policy system to meet local needs. She took a comparative approach, also considering both the Scandinavian model of social policy, particularly the Danish model which has been adopted in Romania, and the Hungarian system, which has inherited a similar universal welfare system and perpetuated it to some extent. In order to verify her hypothesis, she also studied the transformation of the welfare system in Great Britain, which meant a shift from state responsibility towards community care. In all these she concentrated on two major aspects: the structural design within the different countries and, at a micro level, the societal response. Following her analyses of the various in the other countries concerned, Ms. Ciumageanu concluded that the major differences lie first in the difference between the stages of policy design. Here Denmark is the most advanced and Romania the most backwards. Denmark has a fairly elaborate infrastructure, Britain a system with may gaps to bridge, and Hungary and Romania are struggling with severe difficulties owing both to the inherited structure and the limits imposed by an inadequate GDP. While in Denmark and Britain, mental patients are integrated into an elaborate system of care, designed and administered by the state (in Denmark) or communities (in Britain), in Hungary and Romania, the state designs and fails to implement the policy and community support is minimal, partly due to the lack of a fully developed civil society. At the micro level the differences are similar. While in Denmark and Britain there is a consensus about the roles of the state and of civil societies (although at different levels in the two countries, with the state being more supportive in Denmark), in Romania and to a considerable extent in Hungary, civil society tends to expect too much from the state, which in its turn is withdrawing faster from its social roles than from its economic ones, generating a gap between the welfare state and the market economy and disadvantaging the expected transition from a welfare state to a welfare society and, implicitly, the societal response towards those mentally disabled persons in it. On an intermediate level, the factors influencing social policy as a whole were much the same for Hungary and Romania. Economic factors include the accumulated economic resources of both state and citizens, and the inherited pattern of redistribution, as well as the infrastructure; institutional resources include the role of the state and the efficiency of the state bureaucracy, the strength and efficiency of the state apparatus, political stability and the complexity of political democratisation, the introduction of market institutions, the strength of civil society and civic sector institutions. From the standpoint of the societal response, some factors were common to all countries, particularly the historical context, the collective and institutional memories and established patterns of behaviour. In the specific case of Romania, general structural and environmental factors - industrialisation and forced urbanisation - have had a definite influence on family structure, values and behavioural patterns. The analysis of Romanian social policy revealed several causes for failure to date. The first was the instability of the policy and the failure to consider the structural network involved in developing it, rather than just the results obtained. The second was the failure to take into account the relationship between the individual and the group in all its aspects, followed by the lack of active assistance for prevention, re-socialisation or professional integration of persons with mental disabilities. Finally, the state fails to recognise its inability to support an expensive psychiatric enterprise and does not provide any incentive to the private sector. This creates tremendous social costs for both the state and the individual. NGOs working in the field in Romania have been somewhat more successful but are still limited by their lack of funding and personnel and the idea of a combined system is as yet utopian in the circumstances in the country.

The Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Through studying German, Polish and Czech publications on Silesia, Mr. Kamusella found that most of them, instead of trying to objectively analyse the past, are devoted to proving some essential "Germanness", "Polishness" or "Czechness" of this region. He believes that the terminology and thought-patterns of nationalist ideology are so deeply entrenched in the minds of researchers that they do not consider themselves nationalist. However, he notes that, due to the spread of the results of the latest studies on ethnicity/nationalism (by Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith, Erikson Buillig, amongst others), German publications on Silesia have become quite objective since the 1980s, and the same process (impeded by under funding) has been taking place in Poland and the Czech Republic since 1989. His own research totals some 500 pages, in English, presented on disc. So what are the traps into which historians have been inclined to fall? There is a tendency for them to treat Silesia as an entity which has existed forever, though Mr. Kamusella points out that it emerged as a region only at the beginning of the 11th century. These same historians speak of Poles, Czechs and Germans in Silesia, though Mr. Kamusella found that before the mid-19th century, identification was with an inhabitant's local area, religion or dynasty. In fact, a German national identity started to be forged in Prussian Silesia only during the Liberation War against Napoleon (1813-1815). It was concretised in 1861 in the form of the first Prussian census, when the language a citizen spoke was equated with his/her nationality. A similar census was carried out in Austrian Silesia only in 1881. The censuses forced the Silesians to choose their nationality despite their multiethnic multicultural identities. It was the active promotion of a German identity in Prussian Silesia, and Vienna's uneasy acceptance of the national identities in Austrian Silesia which stimulated the development of Polish national, Moravian ethnic and Upper Silesian ethnic regional identities in Upper Silesia, and Polish national, Czech national, Moravian ethnic and Silesian ethnic identities in Austrian Silesia. While traditional historians speak of the "nationalist struggle" as though it were a permanent characteristic of Silesia, Mr. Kamusella points out that such a struggle only developed in earnest after 1918. What is more, he shows how it has been conveniently forgotten that, besides the national players, there were also significant ethnic movements of Moravians, Upper Silesians, Silesians and the tutejsi (i.e. those who still chose to identify with their locality). At this point Mr. Kamusella moves into the area of linguistics. While traditionally historians have spoken of the conflicts between the three national languages (German, Polish and Czech), Mr Kamusella reminds us that the standardised forms of these languages, which we choose to dub "national", were developed only in the mid-18th century, after 1869 (when Polish became the official language in Galicia), and after the 1870s (when Czech became the official language in Bohemia). As for standard German, it was only widely promoted in Silesia from the mid 19th century onwards. In fact, the majority of the population of Prussian Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia were bi- or even multilingual. What is more, the "Polish" and "Czech" Silesians spoke were not the standard languages we know today, but a continuum of West-Slavic dialects in the countryside and a continuum of West-Slavic/German creoles in the urbanised areas. Such was the linguistic confusion that, from time to time, some ethnic/regional and Church activists strove to create a distinctive Upper Silesian/Silesian language on the basis of these dialects/creoles, but their efforts were thwarted by the staunch promotion of standard German, and after 1918, of standard Polish and Czech. Still on the subject of language, Mr. Kamusella draws attention to a problem around the issue of place names and personal names. Polish historians use current Polish versions of the Silesian place names, Czechs use current Polish/Czech versions of the place names, and Germans use the German versions which were in use in Silesia up to 1945. Mr. Kamusella attempted to avoid this, as he sees it, nationalist tendency, by using an appropriate version of a place name for a given period and providing its modern counterpart in parentheses. In the case of modern place names he gives the German version in parentheses. As for the name of historical figures, he strove to use the name entered on the birth certificate of the person involved, and by doing so avoid such confusion as, for instance, surrounds the Austrian Silesian pastor L.J. Sherschnik, who in German became Scherschnick, in Polish, Szersznik, and in Czech, Sersnik. Indeed, the prospective Silesian scholar should, Mr. Kamusella suggests, as well as the three languages directly involved in the area itself, know English and French, since many documents and books on the subject have been published in these languages, and even Latin, when dealing in depth with the period before the mid-19th century. Mr. Kamusella divides the policies of ethnic cleansing into two categories. The first he classifies as soft, meaning that policy is confined to the educational system, army, civil service and the church, and the aim is that everyone learn the language of the dominant group. The second is the group of hard policies, which amount to what is popularly labelled as ethnic cleansing. This category of policy aims at the total assimilation and/or physical liquidation of the non-dominant groups non-congruent with the ideal of homogeneity of a given nation-state. Mr. Kamusella found that soft policies were consciously and systematically employed by Prussia/Germany in Prussian Silesia from the 1860s to 1918, whereas in Austrian Silesia, Vienna quite inconsistently dabbled in them from the 1880s to 1917. In the inter-war period, the emergence of the nation-states of Poland and Czechoslovakia led to full employment of the soft policies and partial employment of the hard ones (curbed by the League of Nations minorities protection system) in Czechoslovakian Silesia, German Upper Silesia and the Polish parts of Upper and Austrian Silesia. In 1939-1945, Berlin started consistently using all the "hard" methods to homogenise Polish and Czechoslovakian Silesia which fell, in their entirety, within the Reich's borders. After World War II Czechoslovakia regained its prewar part of Silesia while Poland was given its prewar section plus almost the whole of the prewar German province. Subsequently, with the active involvement and support of the Soviet Union, Warsaw and Prague expelled the majority of Germans from Silesia in 1945-1948 (there were also instances of the Poles expelling Upper Silesian Czechs/Moravians, and of the Czechs expelling Czech Silesian Poles/pro-Polish Silesians). During the period of communist rule, the same two countries carried out a thorough Polonisation and Czechisation of Silesia, submerging this region into a new, non-historically based administrative division. Democratisation in the wake of the fall of communism, and a gradual retreat from the nationalist ideal of the homogeneous nation-state with a view to possible membership of the European Union, caused the abolition of the "hard" policies and phasing out of the "soft" ones. Consequently, limited revivals of various ethnic/national minorities have been observed in Czech and Polish Silesia, whereas Silesian regionalism has become popular in the westernmost part of Silesia which remained part of Germany. Mr. Kamusella believes it is possible that, with the overcoming of the nation-state discourse in European politics, when the expression of multiethnicity and multilingualism has become the cause of the day in Silesia, regionalism will hold sway in this region, uniting its ethnically/nationally variegated population in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity championed by the European Union.

Development of Socio-Economic Behaviour and Attitudes of Baltic Nationalities: Perspectives for Integration with Europe

This project is the third stage of a comparative research project, The New Baltic Barometer, which was carried out simultaneously with the "New Democracies Barometer" of the Paul Lazerfeld Society (Vienna) and The Russian Barometer. It studied the opinion and behaviour of the largest Baltic ethnic groups (Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians). The main focus was on the attitudes of Baltic residents towards the changes in the economic and political system, attitudes towards political values, political trust, and attitudes to the Baltic countries joining the European Union. An analysis of macroeconomic indicators of the Baltic states made it possible to deduce the link between the country's economic development, and satisfaction with the political regime and attitudes towards democratic values. The study analysed the conditions for the democratisation of society, i.e. the development of culture and public opinion in the Baltic states. Attention was also paid to the development of a social network of individuals, showing the transition from informal networks to impersonal institutions. The group concluded that the participation of residents in formal organisations, NGOs in particular, considerably fosters political trust and also increases political efficacy. Participation in formal organisations also reduces the importance of esteem for an authoritarian leader.

Verwitwung im Alter damals und heute: Die subjektiv Empfundenen Folgen im Zeitvergleich

Während die Verwitwungsforschung negative körperliche, psychische und soziale Folgen auf Individualebene vielseitig aufzuzeigen vermochte, wurde kaum untersucht, inwiefern diese individuellen Auswirkungen einer Verwitwung im Alter von Kohortenzugehörigkeit und historischem Kontext mitdeterminiert sind. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass sich sowohl Geschlechtsrollenverständnis, Familienstrukturen, aber auch das Gesundheits-­ und Sozialsystem in unserem Lande stark verändert haben, ist davon auszugehen, dass Verwitwete unterschiedlicher Kohorten sich hinsichtlich Ressourcen und Belastungen unterscheiden. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht mit Hilfe von Daten des IP13 des Nationalen Forschungsschwerpunkts LIVES (‚Democratisation of old Age’), inwiefern die subjektiv empfundenen psychophysischen, sozialen und finanziellen Folgen der Verwitwung zwischen zwei Kohorten variieren. Dazu werden Daten zweier Kohorten von verwitweten Personen aus den Kantonen Genf und Wallis im Alter von 65 Jahren und älter verglichen. Die eine Befragung fand 1979 statt (455 Verwitwete), die andere 2011 (298 Verwitwete). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich in den berichteten Schwierigkeiten nach einer Verwitwung eine Verbesserung der ökonomischen und sozialen Situation in der Schweiz in den vergangenen dreissig Jahren widerspiegelt, insbesondere für Frauen. Im Gegensatz dazu zeigen sich bei den psychischen Auswirkungen keine bedeutenden periodenspezifischen Veränderungen. Es spricht somit vieles dafür, dass der Verlust des Partners/der Partnerin psychisch auch bei günstigen sozialen Rahmenbedingungen ein kritisches Lebensereignis darstellt, das nach wie vor individuell zu bewältigen ist.