Earth system commitments due to delayed mitigation

As long as global CO₂ emissions continue to increase annually, long-term committed Earth system changes grow much faster than current observations. A novel metric linking this future growth to policy decisions today is the mitigation delay sensitivity (MDS), but MDS estimates for Earth system variables other than peak temperature (ΔT max) are missing. Using an Earth System Model of Intermediate Complexity, we show that the current emission increase rate causes a ΔT max increase roughly 3–7.5 times as fast as observed warming, and a millenial steric sea level rise (SSLR) 7–25 times as fast as observed SSLR, depending on the achievable rate of emission reductions after the peak of emissions. These ranges are only slightly affected by the uncertainty range in equilibrium climate sensitivity, which is included in the above values. The extent of ocean acidification at the end of the century is also strongly dependent on the starting time and rate of emission reductions. The preservable surface ocean area with sufficient aragonite supersaturation for coral reef growth is diminished globally at an MDS of roughly 25%–80% per decade. A near-complete loss of this area becomes unavoidable if mitigation is delayed for a few years to decades. Also with respect to aragonite, 12%–18% of the Southern Ocean surface become undersaturated per decade, if emission reductions are delayed beyond 2015–2040. We conclude that the consequences of delaying global emission reductions are much better captured if the MDS of relevant Earth system variables is communicated in addition to current trends and total projected future changes.

Credible Criminal Enforcement

Economic models of crime and punishment implicitly assume that the government can credibly commit to the fines, sentences, and apprehension rates it has chosen. We study the government's problem when credibility is an issue. We find that several of the standard predictions of the economic model of crime and punishment are robust to commitment, but that credibility may in some cases result in lower apprehension rates, and hence a higher crime rate, compared to the static version of the model.

European antitrust control and standard setting. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/01, February 2012

Standards reduce production costs and increase products’ value to consumers. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the chosen technology normally lacks credible substitutes. The owner of the patented technology might thus have additional market power relative to locked-in licensees, and might exploit this power to charge higher access rates. In the economic literature this phenomenon is referred to as ‘hold-up’. To reduce the risk of hold-up, standard-setting organisations often require patent holders to disclose their standard-essential patents before the adoption of the standard and to commit to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The European Commission normally investigates unfair pricing abuse in a standard-setting context if a patent holder who committed to FRAND ex-ante is suspected not to abide to it ex-post. However, this approach risks ignoring a number of potential abuses which are likely harmful for welfare. That can happen if, for example, ex-post a licensee is able to impose excessively low access rates (‘reverse hold-up’) or if a patent holder acquires additional market power thanks to the standard but its essential patents are not encumbered by FRAND commitments, for instance because the patent holder did not directly participate to the standard setting process and was therefore not required by the standard-setting organisations to commit to FRAND ex-ante. A consistent policy by the Commission capable of tackling all sources of harm should be enforced regardless of whether FRAND commitments are given. Antitrust enforcement should hinge on the identification of a distortion in the bargaining process around technology access prices, which is determined by the adoption of the standard and is not attributable to pro-competitive merits of any of the involved players.

Commitments or prohibition? The EU antitrust dilemma. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/01, 31 January 2014

The issue: Excluding cartels, most investigations into suspected infringements of European Union competition law are resolved with ‘commitment decisions’. The European Commission drops the case in exchange for a commitment from the company under investigation to implement measures to stop the presumed anti-competitive behaviour. Commitment decisions are considered speedier than formal sanctions (prohibition decisions) in restoring normal competitive market conditions. They have a cost, however: commitments are voluntary and are unlikely to be subject to judicial review. This reduces the European Commission’s incentive to build a robust case. Because commitment decisions do not establish any legal precedent, they provide for little guidance on the interpretation of the law. Policy challenge: The European Commission relies increasingly on commitment decisions. More transparency on the substance of allegations, and the establishment of a higher number of legal precedents, are however necessary. This applies in particular to cases that tackle antitrust issues in new areas, such as markets for digital goods, in which companies might find it difficult to assess if a certain behaviour constitutes a violation of competition rules. To ensure greater transparency and mitigate some of the drawbacks of commitment decisions, while retaining their main benefits, the full detail of the objections addressed by the European Commission to defendants should be published.

Putin's 'couldn't care less' attitude towards Russia's international commitments. CEPS Commentaries, 5 March 2014

By militarily invading and annexing Crimea, Russia has acted in breach of its obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Yet the Kremlin seems unfazed that it is violating general principles of international law. This seems emblematic for the ‘can’t care less’ attitude of Putin’s Russia. Moscow allows itself to be inconsistent with its own commitments and is reneging on its own words. This has all the trappings of a panicking dictatorship, which crushes dissent at home and portrays confidence in winning a great battle with enemies abroad. How can anyone now trust what Putin’s Russia says or commits to in the future?

Criminal commitments and dangerous mental patients : legal issues of confinement, treatment, and release /

Includes bibliographical references.

Commodity reserves. Hearings before a sub-committee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate, Ninetieth Congress, second session on S.2233, S.2617, and S.2743; bills to provide for the establishment and maintenance of reserve stocks of agricultural commodities by producers and the Commodity Credit Corporation for National security, public protection, meeting international commitments, and for other purposes.

Hearings held Jan. 30-31, 1968.

DCCA marketing strategies : commitments and directions for the future, and foundations for planned effectiveness /

"November, 1983."

Reducing juvenile commitments in Illinois to the St. Charles School for Boys /

Reproduced from typewritten copy.