The engineer under FDIC's conditions of contract for construction

FIDIC has over the years produced standard forms of contracts for the international procurement of projects. A source of continuing criticism of its Red Book concerns the duality in the traditional role of the engineer as the employer's agent and as an independent third party holding the balance fairly between the employer and the contractor. In response to this and other criticisms FIDIC produced a replacement for it in 1999. The role of the engineer under the new Red Book is critically examined in the light of relevant case law, expert commentaries and feedback from two multidisciplinary workshops with international participation. The examination identified three major changes: (1) a duty to act impartially has been replaced by a duty to make fair determination of certain matters; (2) it is open to parties to allow greater control of the engineer by the employer by stating in the appropriate part of the contract powers the engineer must not exercise without the employer's approval; (3) there is provision for a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) to which disputes may be referred. Although the duality has not been eliminated completely, the contract is structured flexibly enough to support those who wish to contract on the basis of the engineer acting solely as the agent of the employer.

Using bargaining-game theory for negotiating concession period for BOT-type contract

This paper extends the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) to a new method for identifying a concession period by using bargaining-game theory. Concession period is one of the most important decision variables in arranging a BOT-type contract, and there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of this variable. The BOTCcM presents an alternative method by which a group of concession period solutions are produced. Nevertheless, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot recommend a specific time span for concessionary. This paper introduces a new method called BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) to enable the identification of a specific concession period, which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two parties concerned in engaging a BOT contract, namely, the investor and the government concerned. The application of BOTBaC is demonstrated through using an example case.

Practicing sustainability in PFI project management

This paper investigates the relationship of the project management in Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and sustainability. A live PFI project is selected as a case study, where contract review and monitoring on project management are carried out to evaluate the sustainability of project management. The PFI procurement shows great advantages in increased contractual responsibilities of the contractor in sustainable construction, and also in practicing sustainability in project management. Six main sustainable attributes of the project management are selected to evaluate the sustainability of project management in the PFI project. The project management process in the case study is closely monitored in order to verify how the PFI project promotes sustainability in practice. The project management in the different stages of the PFI project, including tendering, design, construction and operation, contributes to the six sustainable attributes in different ways. The project management in PFI project paid more attention in sustainable development during its whole process. As the private sector is responsible to the whole life of the building project, the project manager has to consider the long-term benefits during the management process. The government should take advantages of PFI project management in practicing sustainability therefore to promote sustainable development of the national infrastructure services.

Construction contracts: law and management. 4th edition

This is a fully revised edition of the UK’s leading textbook on the law governing construction contracts and the management and administration of those contracts. Although the legal principles involved are an aspect of general contract law, the practical and commercial complexities of the construction industry have increasingly made this a specialist area. This new edition has been brought up to date with recent cases and developments in the law as it stands at March 2007. The basic approach of the book has been retained. Rather than provide a commentary on standard-form contracts, our approach is to introduce the general principles that underlie contracts in construction, illustrating them by reference to the most important standard forms currently in use. Some of the common standard-form contracts have been revised since the previous edition, and the text has been revised to take account of these changes. Practitioners (consultants, builders, clients and lawyers) will find this an extremely useful source of reference, providing in-depth explanations for all of the features found in contemporary construction contracts, with reasons. A unique feature of this book is the way that it brings together the relevant principles of law with the practical issues arising in construction cases. It is a key text for construction undergraduates and postgraduates as well as for those taking the RIBA Part III and CIOB Part II examinations.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark-up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent 30 years, little progress has been made, due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. The debate is resumed by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to ensure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of 12 construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.

Towards a Monitoring Framework for Agent-Based Contract Systems

The behaviours of autonomous agents may deviate from those deemed to be for the good of the societal systems of which they are a part. Norms have therefore been proposed as a means to regulate agent behaviours in open and dynamic systems, and may be encoded in electronic contracts in order to specify the obliged, permitted and prohibited behaviours of agents that are signatories to such contracts. Enactment and management of electronic contracts thus enables the use of regulatory mechanisms to ensure that agent behaviours comply with the encoded norms. To facilitate such mechanisms requires monitoring in order to detect and explain violation of norms. In this paper we propose a framework for monitoring that is to be implemented and integrated into a suite of contract enactment and management tools. The framework adopts a non-intrusive approach to monitoring, whereby the states of a contract with respect to its contained norms can be inferred on the basis of messages exchanged. Specifically, the framework deploys agents that observe messages sent between contract signatories, where these messages correspond to agent behaviours and therefore indicate whether norms are, or are in danger of, being violated.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Use of hydroclimatic forecasts for improved water management in central Texas

Accurate seasonal to interannual streamflow forecasts based on climate information are critical for optimal management and operation of water resources systems. Considering most water supply systems are multipurpose, operating these systems to meet increasing demand under the growing stresses of climate variability and climate change, population and economic growth, and environmental concerns could be very challenging. This study was to investigate improvement in water resources systems management through the use of seasonal climate forecasts. Hydrological persistence (streamflow and precipitation) and large-scale recurrent oceanic-atmospheric patterns such as the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO), Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), the Pacific North American (PNA), and customized sea surface temperature (SST) indices were investigated for their potential to improve streamflow forecast accuracy and increase forecast lead-time in a river basin in central Texas. First, an ordinal polytomous logistic regression approach is proposed as a means of incorporating multiple predictor variables into a probabilistic forecast model. Forecast performance is assessed through a cross-validation procedure, using distributions-oriented metrics, and implications for decision making are discussed. Results indicate that, of the predictors evaluated, only hydrologic persistence and Pacific Ocean sea surface temperature patterns associated with ENSO and PDO provide forecasts which are statistically better than climatology. Secondly, a class of data mining techniques, known as tree-structured models, is investigated to address the nonlinear dynamics of climate teleconnections and screen promising probabilistic streamflow forecast models for river-reservoir systems. Results show that the tree-structured models can effectively capture the nonlinear features hidden in the data. Skill scores of probabilistic forecasts generated by both classification trees and logistic regression trees indicate that seasonal inflows throughout the system can be predicted with sufficient accuracy to improve water management, especially in the winter and spring seasons in central Texas. Lastly, a simplified two-stage stochastic economic-optimization model was proposed to investigate improvement in water use efficiency and the potential value of using seasonal forecasts, under the assumption of optimal decision making under uncertainty. Model results demonstrate that incorporating the probabilistic inflow forecasts into the optimization model can provide a significant improvement in seasonal water contract benefits over climatology, with lower average deficits (increased reliability) for a given average contract amount, or improved mean contract benefits for a given level of reliability compared to climatology. The results also illustrate the trade-off between the expected contract amount and reliability, i.e., larger contracts can be signed at greater risk.

The Risk Management of Minimum Return Guarantees

Contracts paying a guaranteed minimum rate of return and a fraction of a positive excess rate, which is specified relative to a benchmark portfolio, are closely related to unit-linked life-insurance products and can be considered as alternatives to direct investment in the underlying benchmark. They contain an embedded power option, and the key issue is the tractable and realistic hedging of this option, in order to rigorously justify valuation by arbitrage arguments and prevent the guarantees from becoming uncontrollable liabilities to the issuer. We show how to determine the contract parameters conservatively and implement robust risk-management strategies.

Results of herd health management in veal calf production

The aim of this study was to document experience gained with herd health management in veal calf production and to describe the calves' most frequent health problems. Fifteen farms with an 'all-in-all-out' animal flow system and 20 farms with a continuous animal flow system were investigated and data on animal movements, housing, feeding, medical treatments, and management were collected. Cadavers underwent pathological examination, and data were recorded from the carcasses of slaughtered calves. On the 15 'all-in-all-out'-farms, 2'747 calves were clinically examined by the contract-veterinarian upon arrival at the farm, and 71,1 % of the calves showed at least one sign of illness. The main causes of death were with 54,9 % digestive disorders (a perforating abomasal ulcer being the most frequent diagnosis), followed by respiratory diseases (29,6 %, mainly pneumonia). The meat color of 25 % of the carcasses was red. Calves from farms with the continuous animal flow system, which recruit mainly animals originating from the same farm, showed significantly better results regarding antibiotic use, performance and carcass quality than those calves from farms with the 'all-in-all-out'-system.

Contractual Difficulties in Environmental Management and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Case of Conservation and Mitigation Banking

This paper offers a principal-agent model of feasible private contracting in mitigation and conservation banking aimed at the protection of natural habitat and bio-diversity of US wetlands and uplands. It is shown that while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract, such a contract may not achieve the federally mandated objective of no net loss of habitat. This is because the minimum payment required as an economic incentive to private agents may be greater than what they should receive for the habitat values that they actually created in the field. This possible problem is shown to derive from nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the biological value of land as natural habitat and in non-habitat uses such as in urban development. The paper concludes with a consideration of several institutional devises that may promote the convergence of private contracting and the attainment of no net loss. These include the payment of subsidies, greater accuracy in the identification of actual quality by the principal, and the use of several incentive alignment devises.

Conformance monitoring, contract of objectives, tube in the sky

Ponencia invitada sobre asignacion y gestion de losts en el curso de verano de la UPM Research in Decisión Support Systems for future Air Traffic Management