Macroeconomic Rationality and Lucas' Misperceptions Model: Further Evidence from Forty-One Countries

Several researchers have examined Lucas's misperceptions model as well as various propositions derived from it within a cross-section empirical framework. The cross-section approach imposes a single monetary policy regime for the entire period. Our paper innovates on existing tests of those rational expectations propositions by allowing the simultaneous effect of monetary and short run aggregate supply (oil price) shocks on output behavior and the employment of advanced panel econometric techniques. Our empirical findings, for a sample of 41 countries over 1949 to 1999, provide evidence in favor of the majority of rational expectations propositions.

The Abelian equations of the tenth degree irreducible in a given domain of rationality,

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, 1912.

Application Behavior as a Consequential Juncture in the Take-Up of Postsecondary Education

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Cost-benefit analyses for your group and yourself: The rationality of decision-making in conflict

Two studies in the context of English-French relations in Québec suggest that individuals who strongly identify with a group derive the individual-level costs and benefits that drive expectancy-value processes (rational decision-making) from group-level costs and benefits. In Study 1, high identifiers linked group- and individual-level outcomes of conflict choices whereas low identifiers did not. Group-level expectancy-value processes, in Study 2, mediated the relationship between social identity and perceptions that collective action benefits the individual actor and between social identity and intentions to act. These findings suggest the rational underpinnings of identity-driven political behavior, a relationship sometimes obscured in intergroup theory that focuses on cognitive processes of self-stereotyping. But the results also challenge the view that individuals' cost-benefit analyses are independent of identity processes. The findings suggest the importance of modeling the relationship of group and individual levels of expectancy-value processes as both hierarchical and contingent on social identity processes

Grumbling, voting, demonstrating, and rioting: ''Rationality'' and decision-making in intergroup conflict

An individual faced with intergroup conflict chooses A from a vast array of possible actions, ranging from grumbling among ingroup friends to voting and demonstrating to rioting and revolution. The present paper conceptualises these intergroup choices as rationally shaped by perceptions of the benefits and costs associated with the action (expectancy-value processes). However, in presenting a model of agentic normative influence, it is argued that in intergroup contexts group-level costs and benefits play a critical role in individuals' decision-making. In the context of English-French conflict in Quebec, in Canada, four studies provide evidence that group-level costs and benef influence individuals' decision-making in intergro conflict; that the individual level of analysis need mediate the group level of analysis; that group-level co and benefits mediate the relationship between soc identity and intentions to engage in collective action; a that perceptions of outgroup and ingroup norms for inte group behaviours are relatively invariant and predictal related to perceptions of the group- and individual-le, benefits and costs associated with individualistic vers collective actions. By modelling the relationship betwe group norms and group-level costs and benefits, soc psychologists may begin to address the processes th underlie identity-behaviour relationships in collecti action and intergroup conflict.

Rationality as a barrier to peace:micro-evidence from Kosovo

Despite a significant expansion of the literature on conflicts and fragility of states, only a few systematic attempts have been made to link the theoretical literature on social conflicts to the available micro-level information about the people who are involved in these conflicts. We address this lacuna in the literature using a household-level data set from Kosovo. Our analysis suggests that it is individually rational for competing ethnic communities, Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs, to resist a quick agreement on a social contract to share the region's resources.

Block, L. (2011). ‘From politics to policing: the rationality gap in EU Council policy- making’

Book review: L Block. (2011). From Politics to Policing: The Rationality Gap in EU Council Policy-Making The Hague: Eleven International Publishing. ISBN: 978-94-9094-737-8, 361 pages.

Tax morale and tax evasion: Social preferences and bounded rationality

We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting audits and wage differences. We focus on the comparison of two modeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the traditionally shaped Laffer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffercurves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.