985 resultados para common foreign
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In mid-2012 the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden took the initiative to launch the debate on a European Global Strategy and invited think tanks to set up a dialogue leading to the delivery of a report by May 2013.
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Important decisions on Europes military capabilities are expected from the December 2013 European Council. But why? What do Europeans actually want to do with their capabilities? The answer to that question would be the crowning piece of the European Councils decisions.
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In an age of major power shifts, which we know from history always to be particularly dangerous, different scenarios are possible; the only promising one is that of more and well-structured international cooperation. Yet, critical voices point at a drifting apart of longstanding allies. Recalibrating CSDPNATO relations has become more important than ever.
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When the European Council meets in December, it will face a range of decisions which will lay the foundations for Europe's defence posture and role in the wider world for decades to come, perhaps even beyond the remainder of this century. The Lisbon Treaty has, for the first time, equipped the EU with the range of means to meet that role in practice. The question that remains to be answered is whether Europe's leaders have the political will to implement those means in full.
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The first year of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has already elicited much comment, both internally and externally. This contribution briefly reviews the nature of this commentary and then suggests some possible short-term wins for the Service, as well as some challenges that will require a longer-term perspective. The main shorter-term issue considers the need to create stronger linkages and priorities between existing strategies and to start the difficult process of melding a common mindset within the Service. The longer-term challenges revolve around recruitment, balance and resources. The latter is particularly important in order to enable the delegations to assume their full roles. The barrage of criticism that greeted the EEASs first birthday is also a commentary on how critical the role of the Service is to achieving the core goals of the Lisbon Treaty in external relations; namely, to aim towards more coherence, effectiveness and visibility.
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Over 90% of the external relations budget of the EU is processed through its external financial instruments. With the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), the institutional architecture of these instruments was significantly reformed. This contribution analyses strategic programming both pre- and post-Lisbon, identifies winners and losers, and examines the potential of the new provisions to increase the coherence of EU external action. The examination shows that the instruments can be categorised into three groupings: the big three comprising the bulk of funding characterised by joint programming and responsibilities; the Commission-only instruments where all powers remain with the Commission; and the EEAS-led rest in which the High Representative and the EEAS play a strong role but only have limited financial resources available. The new system calls for strong coordination of all involved actors in order to make it work. Findings of a case study on the Instrument for Stability reveal, however, that so far the establishment of the EEAS has not made a substantial impact on strategic programming in its first two years.
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From the Preface. Pursuant to Article 13(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, the High Representative is held to provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS by mid-2013. This review will cover, inter alia, the implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11), so as to ensure an adequate geographical and gender balance and a meaningful presence of nationals from all member states in the EEAS. If necessary, the review will be accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision of the 2010 Council Decision (e.g., suggestions for additional specific measures to correct possible imbalances of staffing). In that case, the Council will, in accordance with Article 27(3) TEU, revise the Decision in light of the review by the beginning of 2014. This short and user-friendly legal commentary on the 2010 Council Decision is the first of its kind and is intended to inform those involved in the review process and to serve as a reference document for practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. This commentary is not an elaborate doctrinal piece, but rather a textual and contextual analysis of each article, that takes account of i) other relevant legal provisions (primary, secondary, international), ii) the process leading to the adoption of the 2010 Council Decision (i.e. travauxprparatoires), iii) the preamble of the Council Decision, and iv) insofar as it is possible at this stage, early implementation. Wherever relevant, cross-references to other provisions of the EEAS Council Decision have been made so as to tie in the different commentaries and ensure overall consistency.
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The European Commission has now released its 2013 Communication on defence-industrial policy. But does the latest set of policy ideas offer European defence-industrial cooperation any new impetus? This Brief argues that while the majority of the Commissions initiatives are not new, some much needed ideas have made their way into the latest Communication.
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No abstract.
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This Special Report offers recommendations for the amendment of the Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. Its purpose is to contribute, in practical legal terms, to the ongoing review of the Decision in 2013, as well as to the possible discussion on its revision that may take place in 2014. In particular, it sheds light on possible adjustments in the application of the Decision droit constant, but also suggests potential alteration of its formulation.
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Defence matters. This is the opening sentence (probably the shortest ever) of the conclusions of the December 2013 European Council. And that matters too.
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The true causes of the EUs inertia as a security actor in its neighbourhood and beyond are not a lack of capability or even austerity measures, but the absence of a core group of states committed to driving integration forward, argues Giovanni Faleg. Member states are reluctant to set clear common strategic priorities and struggle to agree on a revision of the institutional rules. Their strategic cultures and interests differ significantly; they hold different visions of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and are unwilling to use the CSDP instruments at their disposal.
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The recent decision by Baroness Ashton to end the mandate of a number of European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs) and her proposal to integrate these posts within the European External Action Service have raised concerns among member states. In the view of Erwan Four, these developments underline the urgency of a more comprehensive and strategic discussion between Baroness Ashton and the member states on the future role of EUSRs in the EU's expanding foreign policy tool box.
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The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that hard power is no longer sufficient to address the complex security challenges of todays world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising soft power, is now able to exercise smart power. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Security Strategy: a secure Europe in a better world.
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The Normative Power Europe debate has been a leitmotif in the academic discourse for over a decade. Far from being obsolete, the topic is as relevant as when the term was first coined by Ian Manners in 2002.1 To be or not to be a normative power is certainly one of the existential dilemmas in the foreign policy of the European Union. This paper, however, intends to move beyond the black-and-white debate on whether the European Union is a normative power and to make it more nuanced by examining the factors that make it such. Contrary to the conventional perception that the European Union is a necessarily benign force in the world, it assumes that it has aspirations to be a viable international actor. Consequently, it pursues different types of foreign policy behaviour with a varying degree of normativity in them. The paper addresses the question of under what conditions the European Union is a normative power. The findings of the study demonstrate that the normative power of the European Union is conditioned upon internal and external elements, engaged in a complex interaction with a decisive role played by the often neglected external elements.
