Understanding institutional conversion:the case of the National Reporting and Learning System

This article focuses on one type of institutional change: conversion. One innovative approach to institutional change, the “political-coalitional approach”, acknowledges that: institutions can have unintended effects, which may privilege certain groups over others; institutions are often created and sustained through compromise with external actors; and institutions’ external context can vary significantly over time, as different coalitions’ power waxes and wanes. This approach helps explain the conversion of one institution drawn from the UK National Health Service, the National Reporting and Learning System. However, the shift of this system from producing formative information to facilitate learning to promote safer care, towards producing summative information to support resource allocation decisions, cannot be explained merely by examining the actions of external power coalitions. An internal focus, which considers factors that are normally viewed as “organisational” (such as leadership and internal stability), is also required.

Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games

We consider various lexicographic allocation procedures for coalitional games with transferable utility where the payoffs are computed in an externally given order of the players. The common feature of the methods is that if the allocation is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We first investigate the general relationship between these allocations and obtain two hierarchies on the class of balanced games. Secondly, we focus on assignment games and sharpen some of these general relationship. Our main result is the coincidence of the sets of lemarals (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors), lemacols (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the core) and extreme core points. As byproducts, we show that, similarly to the core and the coalitionally rational payoff set, also the dual coalitionally rational payoff set of an assignment game is determined by the individual and mixed-pair coalitions, and present an efficient and elementary way to compute these basic dual coalitional values. This provides a way to compute the Alexia value (the average of all lemacols) with no need to obtain the whole coalitional function of the dual assignment game.

Estudio comparado de las barreras o umbrales electorales implícitos y explícitos en el sistema electoral

"...En el presente estudio se parte, en primera instancia, de la necesaria conceptualización del término, en general y particular, y en función de ello, posteriormente, a su tipificación, sistematización y análisis especifico en Latinoamérica, mientras que ofrece un panorama general de la aplicación de las barreras electorales explicitas en diferentes regiones del mundo, para luego analizar el caso colombiano en general y visualizar el impacto de la implementación de las barreras electorales explícitas a través del acto legislativo 01 de 2003 y sus efectos en los comicios nacionales de 2006."--introducción

La incidencia de los cupos indicativos en las relaciones ejecutivo-legislativo en la Ley anual de presupuesto

El propósito de este trabajo es analizar la incidencia que tienen los llamados cupos indicativos sobre las relaciones entre el ejecutivo y el legislativo, ubicados en el contexto de discusión y aprobación de la ley anual de presupuesto. El mecanismo conocido anteriormente como auxilios parlamentarios, hoy ha evolucionado y recibe el nombre de cupos indicativos. La investigación se divide en tres momentos: Marco legal de la ley anual de presupuesto y el derecho presupuestario en Colombia, el origen y evolución de los cupos indicativos durante los momentos históricos del derecho presupuestario. Finalmente, la incidencia de los cupos indicativos en las relaciones ejecutivo – legislativo.