Plasmodium falciparum gametocyte carriage, emergence, clearance and population sex ratios in anaemic and non-anaemic malarious children

Anaemia in falciparum malaria is associated with an increased risk of gametocyte carriage, but its effects on transmission have not been extensively evaluated in malarious children. Plasmodium falciparum gametocyte carriage, emergence, clearance, population sex ratios (SR) (defined as the proportion of gametocytes that are male), inbreeding rates and temporal changes in SR were evaluated in 840 malarious children. Gametocyte carriage pre-treatment was at a level of 8.1%. Anaemia at enrolment was an independent risk factor for gametocyte carriage post-treatment. The emergence of gametocytes seven days post-treatment was significantly more frequent in anaemic children (7/106 vs. 10/696, p = 0.002). In the initially detected gametocytes, the proportion of children with a male-biased SR (MBSR) (> 0.5) was significantly higher in anaemic children (6/7 vs. 3/10, p = 0.027). Pre-treatment SR and estimated inbreeding rates (proportion of a mother's daughters fertilised by her sons) were similar in anaemic and non-anaemic children. Pre-treatment SR became more female-biased in non-anaemic children following treatment. However, in anaemic children, SR became male-biased. Anaemia was shown to significantly increase gametocyte emergence and may significantly alter the SR of emerging gametocytes. If MBSR is more infective to mosquitoes at low gametocytaemia, then these findings may have significant implications for malaria control efforts in endemic settings where malaria-associated anaemia is common.

Factors associated with the emergence of K65R in patients with HIV-1 infection treated with combination antiretroviral therapy containing tenofovir.

BACKGROUND: The human immunodeficiency virus type 1 reverse-transcriptase mutation K65R is a single-point mutation that has become more frequent after increased use of tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF). We aimed to identify predictors for the emergence of K65R, using clinical data and genotypic resistance tests from the Swiss HIV Cohort Study. METHODS: A total of 222 patients with genotypic resistance tests performed while receiving treatment with TDF-containing regimens were stratified by detectability of K65R (K65R group, 42 patients; undetected K65R group, 180 patients). Patient characteristics at start of that treatment were analyzed. RESULTS: In an adjusted logistic regression, TDF treatment with nonnucleoside reverse-transcriptase inhibitors and/or didanosine was associated with the emergence of K65R, whereas the presence of any of the thymidine analogue mutations D67N, K70R, T215F, or K219E/Q was protective. The previously undescribed mutational pattern K65R/G190S/Y181C was observed in 6 of 21 patients treated with efavirenz and TDF. Salvage therapy after TDF treatment was started for 36 patients with K65R and for 118 patients from the wild-type group. Proportions of patients attaining human immunodeficiency virus type 1 loads <50 copies/mL after 24 weeks of continuous treatment were similar for the K65R group (44.1%; 95% confidence interval, 27.2%-62.1%) and the wild-type group (51.9%; 95% confidence interval, 42.0%-61.6%). CONCLUSIONS: In settings where thymidine analogue mutations are less likely to be present, such as at start of first-line therapy or after extended treatment interruptions, combinations of TDF with other K65R-inducing components or with efavirenz or nevirapine may carry an enhanced risk of the emergence of K65R. The finding of a distinct mutational pattern selected by treatment with TDF and efavirenz suggests a potential fitness interaction between K65R and nonnucleoside reverse-transcriptase inhibitor-induced mutations.

Emergence and characterisation of vanB vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecalis in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Here we describe the detection and characterisation of three isolates of vancomycin-resistant VanB-type Enterococcus faecalis. Sequence analysis suggested that these isolates harboured the vanB1 gene. The isolates were susceptible to the majority of antimicrobial agents tested, with the exception of chloramphenicol, erythromycin and vancomycin, and showed distinct profiles of high-level resistance to aminoglycosides. Analysis of the clonal relatedness of the vanB E. faecalis isolates showed similar pulsed-field gel electrophoresis profiles. To our knowledge, this is the first report of the occurrence of enterococcal strains carrying vanB genes in Brazil.

Emergence of young human genes after a burst of retroposition in primates.

The origin of new genes through gene duplication is fundamental to the evolution of lineage- or species-specific phenotypic traits. In this report, we estimate the number of functional retrogenes on the lineage leading to humans generated by the high rate of retroposition (retroduplication) in primates. Extensive comparative sequencing and expression studies coupled with evolutionary analyses and simulations suggest that a significant proportion of recent retrocopies represent bona fide human genes. We estimate that at least one new retrogene per million years emerged on the human lineage during the past approximately 63 million years of primate evolution. Detailed analysis of a subset of the data shows that the majority of retrogenes are specifically expressed in testis, whereas their parental genes show broad expression patterns. Consistently, most retrogenes evolved functional roles in spermatogenesis. Proteins encoded by X chromosome-derived retrogenes were strongly preserved by purifying selection following the duplication event, supporting the view that they may act as functional autosomal substitutes during X-inactivation of late spermatogenesis genes. Also, some retrogenes acquired a new or more adapted function driven by positive selection. We conclude that retroduplication significantly contributed to the formation of recent human genes and that most new retrogenes were progressively recruited during primate evolution by natural and/or sexual selection to enhance male germline function.

The Emergence and Governance of Euroregions: The Case of the Euregio on the Dutch-German Border

Amb una història que data de la dècada de 1950, la EUREGIO és un de les més antigues euroregions a Europa. Es pot considerar com un cas exitós d'una regió transfronterera (CBR) en el sentit que s'ha establert fermament com una agència de fronteres dins del seu tram de la frontera holandesa-alemanya. L'EUREGIO també ha estat una de les protagonistes principals darrere de l'Associació de Regions Frontereres Europees (ARFE), que en les últimes dècades va actuar per difondre el model d'euroregió a tot el territori europeu. Aquest capítol té diversos objectius. En primer lloc, es presenta el cas de la EUREGIO i presenta evidència sobre la seva història, estructura orgànica i polítiques. En segon lloc, s'analitzen les condicions del context en què la EUREGIO ha sorgit i les estructures de govern que es van crear com a resultat. Es fa especial èmfasi en la posició i el paper de l'Euroregió en el context més ampli del marc de governança europea multinivell generat per la política de cohesió de la UE. El capítol conclou amb un intent d'avaluar l'èxit i l'impacte de la EUREGIO i una discussió dels reptes relacionats amb la doble funció de l'EUREGIO com a representant dels interessos de les autoritats locals i les agències de cohesió de la UE posada en pràctica de les polítiques.

The Farm, the city, and the emergence of social security

We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrialization are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together in a political economy equilibrium. In the model economy, there are two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial) and the decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Farmers rely on land inheritance for their old age and do not support a pay-as-you-go social security system. With structural change, people migrate to the city, the land loses its importance and support for social security arises. We show that a calibrated version of this economy, where social security taxes are determined by majority voting, is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States.

The emergence of biofuels and the co-movement between crude oil and agricultural prices

Biofuels are becoming an alternative to non-renewable energy sources but we know little about the economic mechanisms influencing their prices. This paper studies the interrelationships between the spot prices of oil and those of agricultural commodities used as biofuel feedstocks. Using daily data since 1988, we identify a co-movement after 2005 that does not appear for other food-related commodities and is not due to general economic variables. We also find traces of the co-movement in the prices of a large biofuel stock. The results amount to the first systematic piece of empirical evidence linking spot oil and agricultural markets via the emergence of biofuels.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Epidemiological characterization of Plasmodium falciparum in the Republic of Cabo Verde: implications for potential large-scale re-emergence of malaria

Background: Malaria has come near eradication at archipelago of Cabo Verde in 1970. Infections are now only observed in Santiago, where outbreaks occur. In these islands, malaria is considered by the international community as being of limited risk and, therefore, no prophylaxis is recommended. Since the understanding of factors that determine malaria outbreaks are crucial for controlling the disease, the present study aimed to investigate if the malaria infections observed in Santiago Island are maintained in isolated foci and in asymptomatic individuals.

Negativity effect and the emergence of ideologies

``Negativity effect'' refers to the psychological phenomenon that peopletend to attach greater weight to negative information than to equallyextreme and equally likely positive information in a variety of informationprocessing tasks. Numerous studies of impression formation have found thatnegative information is weighted more heavily than positive information asimpressions of others are formed. There is empirical evidence in politicalscience that shows the importance of the negativity effect in the informationprocessing of the voters. This effect can explain the observed decreaseof popularity for a president the longer he is in office. \\We construct a dynamic model of political competition, incorporating thenegativity effect in the decision rule of the voters and allowing their preferencesto change over time, according to the past performance of the candidateswhile in office. Our model may explain the emergence of ideologies out ofthe competition for votes of myopic candidates freely choosing policypositions. This result gives rise to the formation of political parties,as infinitely--lived agents with a certain ideology. Furthermore, in thismodel some voters may start out by switching among parties associated withdifferent policies, but find themselves supporting one of the parties fromsome point on. Thus, the model describes a process by which some votersbecome identified with a ``right'' or ``left'' bloc, while others ``swing''between the two parties.