A lower bound in Nehari's theorem on the polydisc

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt"

Documenting a time-bound, circular view of hierarchies: a microanalysis of parent-infant dyadic interaction.

This article presents a new theory that separates the levels of communication and relates them circularly, namely, by separating time from space/meaning variables. Documenting this proposition requires sequential microdescriptions--a far-out project in the field of family therapy. In an extensive study of clinical and nonclinical families, starting with available microanalytic data on nonverbal parent-infant dialogue, distinct time organizations have been found to modify the degree of circularity between the levels of interaction according to the observed types of engagement, that is, consensual, conflictual, and paradoxical. The double description of the dyad as a totality versus the dyad as a framing/developing organization imparts crucial information on how development proceeds in dyadic, co-evolutive systems, and presumably in larger ones too. In this perspective, a model is elaborated and then applied to a case description in our therapeutic consultation.

Social rationality and scales of action: inter-ethnic relations in cockfighting and game-fishing, Raiatea, French Polynesia

This article challenges the notion of economic rationality as a criterion for explaining ethnic boundary maintenance. It offers an ethnographic analysis of inter-ethnic relations in the context of games (cockfights and game-fishing contests) in the island of Raiatea (French Polynesia). Although all players engage in the same basic gambling practices, money is differentially scaled and mobilized by the Tahitian and Chinese participants. Building on recent pragmatic approaches to rationality, it is shown that the players' rationalities differ not from the point of view of economic maximization, but only in so far as they participate in social relations at different scales.

Regions of rationality: Maps for bounded agents

An important problem in descriptive and prescriptive research in decision making is to identify regions of rationality, i.e., the areas for which heuristics are and are not effective. To map the contours of such regions, we derive probabilities that heuristics identify the best of m alternatives (m > 2) characterized by k attributes or cues (k > 1). The heuristics include a single variable (lexicographic), variations of elimination-by-aspects, equal weighting, hybrids of the preceding, and models exploiting dominance. We use twenty simulated and four empirical datasets for illustration. We further provide an overview by regressing heuristic performance on factors characterizing environments. Overall, sensible heuristics generally yield similar choices in many environments. However, selection of the appropriate heuristic can be important in some regions (e.g., if there is low inter-correlation among attributes/cues). Since our work assumes a hit or miss decision criterion, we conclude by outlining extensions for exploring the effects of different loss functions.

The contribution of schooling in development accounting: Results from a nonparametric upper bound

How much would output increase if underdeveloped economies were toincrease their levels of schooling? We contribute to the development accounting literature by describing a non-parametric upper bound on theincrease in output that can be generated by more schooling. The advantage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for any number ofschooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.Another advantage is that the upper bound is robust to certain forms ofendogenous technology response to changes in schooling. We also quantify the upper bound for all economies with the necessary data, compareour results with the standard development accounting approach, andprovide an update on the results using the standard approach for a largesample of countries.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

Economic rationality and ethical behavior

This paper argues that economic rationality and ethical behavior cannotbe reduced one to the other, casting doubts on the validity of formulaslike 'profit is ethical' or 'ethics pays'. In order to express ethicaldilemmas as opposing economic interest with ethical concerns, we proposea model of rational behavior that combines these two irreducible dimensions in an open but not arbitrary manner. Behaviors that are neither ethicalnor profitable are considered irrational (non-arbitrariness). However,behaviors that are profitable but unethical, and behaviors that are ethicalbut not profitable, are all treated as rational (openness). Combiningethical concerns with economic interest, ethical business is in turn anoptimal form of rationality between venality and sacrifice.Because every one prefers to communicate that he acts ethically, ethicalbusiness remains ambiguous until some economic interest is actuallysacrificed. We argue however that ethical business has an interest indemonstrating its consistency between communication and behavior by atransparent attitude. On the other hand, venal behaviors must remainconfidential to hide the corresponding lack of consistency. Thisdiscursive approach based on transparency and confidentiality helpsto further distinguish between ethical and unethical business behaviors.

A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates fromthe classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two importantquestions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best forextracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis.In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundationalanalysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis ofindividual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealedpreference data. We call such measure minimal index.

Money and prices in models of bounded rationality in high inflation economies

This paper studies the short run correlation of inflation and money growth. We study whether a model of learning can do better than a model of rational expectations, we focus our study on countries of high inflation. We take the money process as an exogenous variable, estimated from the data through a switching regime process. We findthat the rational expectations model and the model of learning both offer very good explanations for the joint behavior of money and prices.

hShroom1 links a membrane bound protein to the actin cytoskeleton.

hShroom1 (hShrm1) is a member of the Apx/Shroom (Shrm) protein family and was identified from a yeast two-hybrid screen as a protein that interacts with the cytoplasmic domain of melanoma cell adhesion molecule (MCAM). The characteristic signature of the Shrm family is the presence of a unique domain, ASD2 (Apx/Shroom domain 2). mRNA analysis suggests that hShrm1 is expressed in brain, heart, skeletal muscle, colon, small intestine, kidney, placenta and lung tissue, as well a variety of melanoma and other cell lines. Co-immunoprecipitation and bioluminescence resonance energy transfer (BRET) experiments indicate that hShrm1 and MCAM interact in vivo and by immunofluorescence microscopy some co-localization of these proteins is observed. hShrm1 partly co-localises with beta-actin and is found in the Triton X-100 insoluble fraction of melanoma cell extracts. We propose that hShrm1 is involved in linking MCAM to the cytoskeleton.

Continuum bound states as surface states of a finite periodic system

We discuss the relation between continuum bound states (CBSs) localized on a defect, and surface states of a finite periodic system. We model an experiment of Capasso et al. [F. Capasso, C. Sirtori, J. Faist, D. L. Sivco, S-N. G. Chu, and A. Y. Cho, Nature (London) 358, 565 (1992)] using the transfer-matrix method. We compute the rate for intrasubband transitions from the ground state to the CBS and derive a sum rule. Finally we show how to improve the confinement of a CBS while keeping the energy fixed.