The high commissioners : Australia’s representatives in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010

Marks the centenary of the posting of the first Australian High Commissioner in London, so beginning what is today Australia's oldest diplomatic mission. In 1910, when Sir George Reid was appointed its first High Commissioner in London, Australia was a self-governing but not yet sovereign state and the Australian Governor-General remained the most important channel of communication between the Australian and United Kingdom governments until the late 1920s. The book traces the history of the office and in doing so illuminates the larger story of Australian-United Kingdom relations in the twentieth century, the evolution of Australia from British colony to sovereign state and the gradual transition of the United Kingdom from head of an empire to member of the European Union.

Relações Brasil-Angola no pós-guerra fria : os condicionantes internos e a via multilateral

Este estudo apresenta reflexões a respeito das relações Brasil-Angola no período compreendido entre os anos de 1990 e 2002. Tendo como ponto de partida o estabelecimento (e aprofundamento) das relações bilaterais no período entre os anos de 1975 e 1990, o presente estudo fornece subsídios que orientam o teor do contato Brasília-Luanda no período pós-Guerra Fria. Entre esses subsídios encontram-se os condicionantes internos, que em cada país influíram de modo determinante na sua respectiva atuação externa, aliados ao contexto de reestruturação internacional. Assim, pela relevância da adaptação por que passaram esses contatos bilaterais, o trabalho distingue essas relações entre diretas e indiretas, estas últimas efetivadas pela via multilateral, seja no cenário regional (notadamente na implantação da CPLP e possibilidade de concretização da ZOPACAS), seja no cenário internacional, com a atuação conjunta nas Nações Unidas.

Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union: striving for a renewed partnership

Includes bibliography

A construção da coordenação política e da cooperação estratégica entre o Brasil e Argentina na área nuclear (1980-1997)

Pós-graduação em História - FCHS

As relações políticas e econômicas entre Brasil e Espanha da transição democrática a nossos dias

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

Rotulagem ambiental e sua incidência sobre as exportações brasileiras à União Européia

The study aims at analyzing the potential impacts of environmental labeling programs, emphasizing the European Community program on Brazilian exports to the EU. For this, we traced the historical growth of bilateral relations between the EU and Brazil, which shows a strategic partnership, and then it was listed trade barriers (tariff and nontariff) imposed by these two markets to the international trade relations. Later, the emergence of environmental seals was discussed, as well as their potential barriers to trade. Finally, selected products were analyzed in order to know the potential effects of environmental labeling on products exported by Brazil

Mudança política no Paraguai e as relações com o Brasil: o caso da renegociação do Tratado de Itaipu

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Cooperación internacional en ciencia, tecnología e innovación entre Brasil y Colombia durante los gobiernos Lula da Silva (2003 - 2010)

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

Paraguai 2012: o papel do Brasil e a ação da Unasul

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Italia e Francia nell'Ungheria di Trianon (1919-1939): due modelli di penetrazione politico-culturale

Italy and France in Trianon’s Hungary: two political and cultural penetration models During the first post-war, the Danubian Europe was the theatre of an Italian-French diplomatic challenge to gain hegemony in that part of the continent. Because of his geographical position, Hungary had a decisive strategic importance for the ambitions of French and Italian foreign politics. Since in the 1920s culture and propaganda became the fourth dimension of international relations, Rome and Paris developed their diplomatic action in Hungary to affirm not only political and economic influence, but also cultural supremacy. In the 1930, after Hitler’s rise to power, the unstoppable comeback of German political influence in central-eastern Europe determined the progressive decline of Italian and French political and economic positions in Hungary: only the cultural field allowed a survey of Italian-Hungarian and French-Hungarian relations in the contest of a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Nevertheless, the radical geopolitical changes in second post-war Europe did not compromise Italian and French cultural presence in the new communist Hungary. Although cultural diplomacy is originally motivated by contingent political targets, it doesn’t respect the short time of politics, but it’s the only foreign politics tool that guarantees preservations of bilateral relations in the long run.

Migration in the Central Mediterranean. Jean Monnet Occasional Papers 02/2013

In the last decade irregular immigration has emerged as a “security” challenge (in the language of International Relations military “threat”) in the Mediterranean region particularly in the central, sub-region1. The designation of this issue as a “security challenge” or “threat” is itself controversial and will be discussed further down. This paper focuses on the situation in the central Mediterranean involving mainly four countries namely Italy, Libya, Malta and Tunisia all of which have long standing historic links and bilateral relations and participate in the so called “5+5” Dialogue in the Western Mediterranean. Two of these Central Mediterranean countries (Italy, Malta) are EU member states and Tunisia has a long standing relationship with the EU [Association Agreement, Barcelona Process (EMP), Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)] while Libya so far has no formal relations at all with the EU. This paper analyses some of the aspects of migration in the central Mediterranean focusing on the link between the domestic and international politics of the issue in Italy and Malta and contrasting the different approaches taken. For example, although Italy and Malta both resort to self-help and both try to involve the EU in helping them tackle the problem, they do this in a markedly different way: Italy uses the EU as a supplement to its independent and bilateral efforts while Malta looks to the EU as the major solution to the problem. Lacking the power and influence to deal with the issue, Malta tends to see the problem as primarily a multilateral issue or one that can only be tackled in concert with stronger powers in the region preferably within an EU context. On the other hand, Italy has been keen in involving the EU but decided to go it alone when this option turned out to be a dead end. In this paper I also try to show the extent (or limitations) to which multilateral initiatives such as the “5+5” and Euro operation really play a decisive role in incentivizing or facilitating inter-state cooperation or joint solutions. This paper also refers to the EU acquis, the notion of solidarity (norms) and the extent to which it is implemented as well as a number of connected issues. The subjects of this paper, the Mediterranean Boat People, have been referred to by various names in the literature, all of which may be more or less deficient in actually defining them all. They have been referred to as “illegal” or “irregular” immigrants, “refugees” in search of international protection, “migrants at sea” and “boat people”. The use of “boat people” dispenses with the need of having to define the various categories of migrants involved and is thus preferred in this paper.

Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap? OSW COMMENTARY No. 154, 2014-12-01

The Eurasian Union (or, to give it its full name, the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU) is Russia's flagship project, by use of which it aims to institutionally subordinate the post-Soviet states to itself using political ties and the projected common economic space. The Kremlin has so far managed to persuade Belarus and Kazakhstan, and tentatively also Armenia, to join this integration project, which on the surface looks like a multilateral initiative but in reality conceals a network of bilateral relations centred on Russia. However, in order for Russia to reconstruct its influence in its neighbourhood permanently and without change, it is of key importance that Ukraine is incorporated into the EEU. That still seemed feasible even in 2013, but the Maidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have undone this possibility. However, they also opened up an alternative scenario for Russia, one in which the Western states recognise the Eurasian Union as a legitimate partner in discussions about a new order in Europe with a view to restoring peace in Ukraine. It is worth taking into account the strategic consequences of that scenario. We need to consider if the idea which Moscow has been lobbying for – and which has found some supporters in Brussels and Berlin – threatens to take us back to the Cold War system of geopolitical blocs and implies recognition of Russia's dominance over Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership countries?

Ukraine and Russia: a hindered rapprochement. OSW Commentary No. 44, 2010-12-15

The policy of rapprochement with Russia that President Victor Yanukovych and his entourage had been actively promoting in the first months of his presidency has slowed down notably. One of the reasons for this lowered pace is that current talks between Russia and Ukraine concern the spheres in which Kyiv is not ready to make concessions to Russia. Despite numerous top-level meetings, recent months have failed to bring a breakthrough in energy issues of key importance. First of all, no compromise was reached in gas issues where the divergence of interests is particularly large and where Ukraine has adopted a tough stance to negotiate the best conditions possible. Even though some agreements were signed during the October session of the inter-governmental committee presided over by the prime ministers (the agreement on linking the two states’ aircraft production and on the joint construction of a nuclear fuel production plant), these resulted from prior agreements. Economic negotiations will continue in the coming months but the observed deadlock is not likely to be broken any time soon. The results of these talks are likely to reflect the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the competition among Ukrainian business groups, some of which opt for closer cooperation with their Eastern neighbour. Ukraine’s consent to send oil to Belarus along the Odessa-Brody pipeline shows that the government in Kyiv is ready to engage in projects they consider profitable, even those that run counter to Russian interests. Ukraine’s adoption of this stance may trigger irritation in Moscow and lead to a cooling in bilateral relations.

The bear watches the dragon. The Russian debate on China. OSW Point of View Number 31, February 2013

Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.