Grande fístula bilateral da artéria coronária: a escolha do tratamento clínico

Relatamos o caso de um paciente do sexo feminino, assintomática, com grande fístula bilateral da artéria coronária-artéria pulmonar. O monitoramento clínico foi a opção escolhida para tratamento. Discutimos os pormenores das opções terapêuticas, enfatizando a tendência excessiva de utilizar a abordagem cirúrgica e a grande escassez de acompanhamentos clínicos de longo prazo em pacientes assintomáticos.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

An episode mimicking a versive seizure in acute bilateral pontine stroke.

Pontine ischemia usually results in focal deficits such as hemiparesis, facial palsy, dysarthria, disorders of eye movements or vertigo. Although rarely described, involuntary abnormal movements and "convulsions" due to pontine lesions can also occur. Here we describe a 67-year-old woman with hypertension who presented with a tonic movement mimicking a versive seizure in the acute phase of bilateral pontine ischemia. Post-stroke movement disorders are well known. They are usually associated with supratentorial lesions and rarely occur in the acute phase, but "seizure-like" episodes can be seen in pontine ischemia. Awareness of this rare phenomenon is useful for the management of acute stroke patients.

Trade of permits for greenhouse gas emissions; bilateral trade need not be the answer

The Kyoto Protocol sets national quotas on CO2 emissions and allows international trade of these quotas. We argue that this trade is characterized by asymmetric, identity-dependent externalities, and show that bilateral trade may not be sufficient for an efficient allocation of emissions. We derive conditions under which bilateral trade does improve the allocation of permits. The conditions are strong. In this sense, we argue that, for emissions permits, market design matters.

New FFT/IFFT Factorizations with Regular Interconnection Pattern Stage-to-Stage Subblocks

Les factoritzacions de la FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) que presenten un patró d’interconnexió regular entre factors o etapes son conegudes com algorismes paral·lels, o algorismes de Pease, ja que foren originalment proposats per Pease. En aquesta contribució s’han desenvolupat noves factoritzacions amb blocs que presenten el patró d’interconnexió regular de Pease. S’ha mostrat com aquests blocs poden ser obtinguts a una escala prèviament seleccionada. Les noves factoritzacions per ambdues FFT i IFFT (Inverse FFT) tenen dues classes de factors: uns pocs factors del tipus Cooley-Tukey i els nous factors que proporcionen la mateix patró d’interconnexió de Pease en blocs. Per a una factorització donada, els blocs comparteixen dimensions, el patró d’interconnexió etapa a etapa i a més cada un d’ells pot ser calculat independentment dels altres.

The interconnection of somatic and mental issues within a multidisciplinary adolescent health unit. [L'intrication des problématiques somatiques et psychiques dans une unité multidisciplinaire de santé des adolescents.]

Les aspects physiques et psychiques sont étroitement intriqués à l'adolescence, et le corps représente un lieu privilégié d'expression des conflits. C'est dire l'importance de donner une place de choix au versant psychologique au sein d'une consultation de santé des adolescents, pour tenter de discerner la souffrance psychique souvent cachée derrière la plainte somatique.

A General model of bilateral migration agreements

Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.

Trade in bilateral oligopoly with endogenous market formation

We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.

Bilateral symmetry of radial pulse in high-level tennis players: implications for the validity of central aortic pulse wave analysis.

BACKGROUND: Reconstruction of the central aortic pressure wave from the noninvasive recording of the radial pulse with applanation tonometry has become a standard tool in the field of hypertension. It is not presently known whether recording the radial pulse on the dominant or the nondominant side has any effect on such reconstruction. METHOD: We carried out radial applanation tonometry on both forearms in young, healthy, male volunteers, who were either sedentary (n = 11) or high-level tennis players (n = 10). The purpose of including tennis players was to investigate individuals with extreme asymmetry between the dominant and nondominant upper limb. RESULTS: In the sedentary individuals, forearm circumference and handgrip strength were slightly larger on the dominant (mean +/- SD respectively 27.9 +/- 1.5 cm and 53.8 +/- 10 kg) than on nondominant side (27.3 +/- 1.6 cm, P < 0.001 vs. dominant, and 52.1 +/- 11 kg, P = NS). In the tennis players, differences between sides were more conspicuous (forearm circumference: dominant 28.0 +/- 1.7 cm nondominant 26.4 +/- 1.5 cm, P < 0.001; handgrip strength 61.4 +/- 10.8 vs. 53.4 +/- 9.7 kg, P < 0.001). We found that in both sedentary individuals and tennis players, the radial pulse had identical shape on both sides and, consequently, the reconstructed central aortic pressure waveforms, as well as derived indices of central pulsatility, were not dependent on the side where applanation tonometry was carried out. CONCLUSION: Evidence from individuals with maximal asymmetry of dominant vs. nondominant upper limb indicates that laterality of measurement is not a methodological issue for central pulse wave analysis carried out with radial applanation tonometry.