Report of the Independent Body on Pharmacy Contract Pricing

Report of the Independent Body on Pharmacy Contract Pricing On 18 February 2008 the Minister for Health and Children announced the appointment of an Independent Body to recommend a new, interim community pharmacy dispensing fee for the General Medical Service (GMS), Drugs Payment Scheme (DPS) and other community drug schemes.The Terms of Reference for the Independent Body on Pharmacy Contract Pricing are as follows: â?oTo advise the Minister for Health and Children on the appropriate level of dispensing fee to be paid to community pharmacists for existing services provided under the GMS and community drug schemes having regard to: Click here to download PDF: 110kb

Proposed Model for Reference Pricing and Generic Substitution

Proposed Model for Reference Pricing and Generic Substitution Click here to download PDF 137KB   Click here to download the Frequently Asked Questions PDF 23KB

The Efficacy of Minimum Unit Pricing, Fiscal and other Pricing Public Policies for Alcohol

This report was commissioned from CJP Consultants Limited by the Department of Health. It sets out the issues relating to hazardous and harmful consumption of alcohol in Ireland. It looks at the international experience and policy response;and makes recommendations about how the problems caused by hazardous alcohol consumption can and should be tackled in Ireland. Click here to download Report on The Efficacy of Minimum Unit Pricing, Fiscal and other Pricing Public Policies for Alcohol PDF 1MB

Essays in equilibrium asset pricing

This thesis consists of four essays in equilibrium asset pricing. The main topic is investors' heterogeneity: I investigates the equilibrium implications for the financial markets when investors have different attitudes toward risk. The first chapter studies why expected risk and remuneration on the aggregate market are negatively related, even if intuition and standard theory suggest a positive relation. I show that the negative trade-off can obtain in equilibrium if investors' beliefs about economic fundamentals are procyclically biased and the market Sharpe ratio is countercyclical. I verify that such conditions hold in the real markets and I find empirical support for the risk-return dynamics predicted by the model. The second chapter consists of two essays. The first essay studies how het¬erogeneity in risk preferences interacts with other sources of heterogeneity and how this affects asset prices in equilibrium. Using perceived macroeconomic un¬certainty as source of heterogeneity, the model helps to explain some patterns of financial returns, even if heterogeneity is small as suggested by survey data. The second essay determines conditions such that equilibrium prices have analytical solutions when investors have heterogeneous risk attitudes and macroeconomic fundamentals feature latent uncertainty. This approach provides additional in-sights to the previous literature where models require numerical solutions. The third chapter studies why equity claims (i.e. assets paying a single future dividend) feature premia and risk decreasing with the horizon, even if standard models imply the opposite shape. I show that labor relations helps to explain the puzzle. When workers have bargaining power to exploit partial income insurance within the firm, wages are smoother and dividends are riskier than in a standard economy. Distributional risk among workers and shareholders provides a rationale to the equity short-term risk, which leads to downward sloping term structures of premia and risk for equity claim. Résumé Cette thèse se compose de quatre essais dans l'évaluation des actifs d'équilibre. Le sujet principal est l'hétérogénéité des investisseurs: J'étudie les implications d'équilibre pour les marchés financiers où les investisseurs ont des attitudes différentes face au risque. Le première chapitre étudie pourquoi attendus risque et la rémunération sur le marché global sont liées négativement, même si l'intuition et la théorie standard suggèrent une relation positive. Je montre que le compromis négatif peut obtenir en équilibre si les croyances des investisseurs sur les fondamentaux économiques sont procyclique biaisées et le ratio de Sharpe du marché est anticyclique. Je vérifier que ces conditions sont réalisées dans les marchés réels et je trouve un appui empirique à la dynamique risque-rendement prédites par le modèle. Le deuxième chapitre se compose de deux essais. Le première essai étudie com¬ment hétérogénéité dans les préférences de risque inter agit avec d'autres sources d'hétérogénéité et comment cela affecte les prix des actifs en équilibre. Utili¬sation de l'incertitude macroéconomique perù comme source d'hétérogénéité, le modèle permet d'expliquer certaines tendances de rendements financiers, même si l'hétérogénéité est faible comme suggéré par les données d'enquête. Le deuxième essai détermine des conditions telles que les prix d'équilibre disposer de solutions analytiques lorsque les investisseurs ont des attitudes des risques hétérogènes et les fondamentaux macroéconomiques disposent d'incertitude latente. Cette approche fournit un éclairage supplémentaire à la littérature antérieure où les modèles nécessitent des solutions numériques. Le troisième chapitre étudie pourquoi les equity-claims (actifs que paient un seul dividende futur) ont les primes et le risque décroissante avec l'horizon, mme si les modèles standards impliquent la forme opposée. Je montre que les relations de travail contribue à expliquer l'énigme. Lorsque les travailleurs ont le pouvoir de négociation d'exploiter assurance revenu partiel dans l'entreprise, les salaires sont plus lisses et les dividendes sont plus risqués que dans une économie standard. Risque de répartition entre les travailleurs et les actionnaires fournit une justification à le risque à court terme, ce qui conduit à des term-structures en pente descendante des primes et des risques pour les equity-claims.

Lightweight monitoring of label switched paths for bandwidth management

The purpose of resource management is the efficient and effective use of network resources, for instance bandwidth. In this article, a connection oriented network scenario is considered, where a certain amount of bandwidth is reserved for each label switch path (LSP), which is a logical path, in a MPLS or GMPLS environment. Assuming there is also some kind of admission control (explicit or implicit), these environments typically provide quality of service (QoS) guarantees. It could happen that some LSPs become busy, thus rejecting connections, while other LSPs may be under-utilised. We propose a distributed lightweight monitoring technique, based on threshold values, the objective of which is to detect congestion when it occurs in an LSP and activate the corresponding alarm which will trigger a dynamic bandwidth reallocation mechanism

Dynamic bandwidth management as part of an integrated network management system based on distributed agents

We present a system for dynamic network resource configuration in environments with bandwidth reservation and path restoration mechanisms. Our focus is on the dynamic bandwidth management results, although the main goal of the system is the integration of the different mechanisms that manage the reserved paths (bandwidth, restoration, and spare capacity planning). The objective is to avoid conflicts between these mechanisms. The system is able to dynamically manage a logical network such as a virtual path network in ATM or a label switch path network in MPLS. This system has been designed to be modular in the sense that in can be activated or deactivated, and it can be applied only in a sub-network. The system design and implementation is based on a multi-agent system (MAS). We also included details of its architecture and implementation

Bandwidth allocation based on real time calculations using the convolution approach

This paper focuses on one of the methods for bandwidth allocation in an ATM network: the convolution approach. The convolution approach permits an accurate study of the system load in statistical terms by accumulated calculations, since probabilistic results of the bandwidth allocation can be obtained. Nevertheless, the convolution approach has a high cost in terms of calculation and storage requirements. This aspect makes real-time calculations difficult, so many authors do not consider this approach. With the aim of reducing the cost we propose to use the multinomial distribution function: the enhanced convolution approach (ECA). This permits direct computation of the associated probabilities of the instantaneous bandwidth requirements and makes a simple deconvolution process possible. The ECA is used in connection acceptance control, and some results are presented

Non-peaky signals in wideband fading channels: achievable bit rates and optimal bandwidth

In the context of fading channels it is well established that, with a constrained transmit power, the bit rates achievable by signals that are not peaky vanish as the bandwidth grows without bound. Stepping back from the limit, we characterize the highest bit rate achievable by such non-peaky signals and the approximate bandwidth where that apex occurs. As it turns out, the gap between the highest rate achievable without peakedness and the infinite-bandwidth capacity (with unconstrained peakedness) is small for virtually all settings of interest to wireless communications. Thus, although strictly achieving capacity in wideband fading channels does require signal peakedness, bit rates not far from capacity can be achieved with conventional signaling formats that do not exhibit the serious practical drawbacks associated with peakedness. In addition, we show that the asymptotic decay of bit rate in the absence of peakedness usually takes hold at bandwidths so large that wideband fading models are called into question. Rather, ultrawideband models ought to be used.

A Simple Access Pricing Rule to Achieve the Ramsey Outcome in Two-Way Access

In this paper, I consider a general and informationally effcient approach to determine the optimal access rule and show that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. My approach is informationally effcient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique access rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability among networks' services.

Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

Fiscal policy, pricing frictions and monetary accommodation

We investigate the theoretical conditions for effectiveness of government consumptionexpenditure expansions using US, Euro area and UK data. Fiscal expansions taking placewhen monetary policy is accommodative lead to large output multipliers in normal times.The 2009-2010 packages need not produce significant output multipliers, may havemoderate debt effects, and only generate temporary inflation. Expenditure expansionsaccompanied by deficit/debt consolidations schemes may lead to short run output gains buttheir success depends on how monetary policy and expectations behave. Trade opennessand the cyclicality of the labor wedge explain cross-country differences in the magnitude ofthe multipliers.

On the term structure of Interbank interest rates: Jump-diffusion processes and option pricing

In this paper we study the dynamic behavior of the term structureof Interbank interest rates and the pricing of options on interest ratesensitive securities. We posit a generalized single factor model withjumps to take into account external influences in the market. Daily datais used to test for jump effects. Qualitative examination of the linkagebetween Monetary Authorities' interventions and jumps are studied. Pricingresults suggests a systematic underpricing in bonds and call options ifthe jumps component is not included. However, the pricing of put optionson bonds presents indeterminacies.

Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No

This note elaborates on a recent article by Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor(1992) who contend that fairly priced deposit insurance is incompatiblewithfree competition in the banking sector, in the presence of adverseselection.We show here that at soon as one introduces a real economic motivationfromprivate banks to manage the deposits from the public, then fairly priceddeposit insurance becomes possible. However, we also show that sucha fairlypriced insurance is never desirable, precisely because of adverseselection.We compute the characteristics of the optimal premium schedule, whichtradesoff between the cost of adverse selection and the cost of ``unfaircompetition ''.