Optimal track access rights allocation for agent negotiation in an open railway market

In open railway access markets, a train service provider (TSP) negotiates with an infrastructure provider (IP) for track access rights. This negotiation has been modeled by a multi-agent system (MAS) in which the IP and TSP are represented by separate software agents. One task of the IP agent is to generate feasible (and preferably optimal) track access rights, subject to the constraints submitted by the TSP agent. This paper formulates an IP-TSP transaction and proposes a branch-and-bound algorithm for the IP agent to identify the optimal track access rights. Empirical simulation results show that the model is able to emulate rational agent behaviors. The simulation results also show good consistency between timetables attained from the proposed methods and those derived by the scheduling principles adopted in practice.

Service bid comparisons by fuzzy ranking in open railway market timetabling

In an open railway access market, the Infrastructure Provider (IP), upon the receipts of service bids from the Train Service Providers (TSPs), assigns track access rights according to its own business objectives and the merits of the bids; and produces the train service timetable through negotiations. In practice, IP chooses to negotiate with the TSPs one by one in such a sequence that IP optimizes its objectives. The TSP bids are usually very complicated, containing a large number of parameters in different natures. It is a difficult task even for an expert to give a priority sequence for negotiations from the contents of the bids. This study proposes the application of fuzzy ranking method to compare and prioritize the TSP bids in order to produce a negotiation sequence. The results of this study allow investigations on the behaviors of the stakeholders in bid preparation and negotiation, as well as evaluation of service quality in the open railway market.

Population ageing in a globalizing labour market : implications for older workers

This article concerns the changing nature of the relationship between age and the labour market. Global demographic, economic and technological changes potentially pose major challenges for older workers trying to maintain a secure attachment to the labour market. Recent public policy has responded by defining concepts such as 'active ageing' which encourage older workers to participate fully within society, including maintaining workforce participation. Older workers' ability to secure quality work within a volatile labour market is considered. While activation approaches are currently popular among policymakers, the notion that older workers will easily avoid a diminution of their employment prospects is challenged.

Intelligent negotiation behaviour model for an open railway access market

In an open railway access market, the provisions of railway infrastructures and train services are separated and independent. Negotiations between the track owner and train service providers are thus required for the allocation of the track capacity and the formulation of the services timetables, in which each party, i.e. a stakeholder, exhibits intelligence from the previous negotiation experience to obtain the favourable terms and conditions for the track access. In order to analyse the realistic interacting behaviour among the stakeholders in the open railway access market schedule negotiations, intelligent learning capability should be included in the behaviour modelling. This paper presents a reinforcement learning approach on modelling the intelligent negotiation behaviour. The effectiveness of incorporating learning capability in the stakeholder negotiation behaviour is then demonstrated through simulation.

Conflict resolution through negotiation in a railway open access market : a multi-agent system approach

Open access reforms to railway regulations allow multiple train operators to provide rail services on a common infrastructure. As railway operations are now independently managed by different stakeholders, conflicts in operations may arise, and there have been attempts to derive an effective access charge regime so that these conflicts may be resolved. One approach is by direct negotiation between the infrastructure manager and the train service providers. Despite the substantial literature on the topic, few consider the benefits of employing computer simulation as an evaluation tool for railway operational activities such as access pricing. This article proposes a multi-agent system (MAS) framework for the railway open market and demonstrates its feasibility by modelling the negotiation between an infrastructure provider and a train service operator. Empirical results show that the model is capable of resolving operational conflicts according to market demand.

Application of reinforcement learning in an open railway access market price negotiation

In an open railway access market price negotiation, it is feasible to achieve higher cost recovery by applying the principles of price discrimination. The price negotiation can be modeled as an optimization problem of revenue intake. In this paper, we present the pricing negotiation based on reinforcement learning model. A negotiated-price setting technique based on agent learning is introduced, and the feasible applications of the proposed method for open railway access market simulation are discussed.

Scheduling coordination through negotiation between train service providers in an open railway access market

A schedule coordination problem involving two train services provided by different operators is modeled as an optimization of revenue intake. The coordination is achieved through the adjustment of commencement times of the train services by negotiation. The problem is subject to constraints regarding to passenger demands and idle costs of rolling-stocks from both operators. This paper models the operators as software agents having the flexibility to incorporate one of the two (and potentially more) proposed negotiation strategies. Empirical results show that agents employing different combination of strategies have significant impact on the quality of solution and negotiation time.