988 resultados para agent theory
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Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.
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Starting from the idea that economic systems fall into complexity theory, where its many agents interact with each other without a central control and that these interactions are able to change the future behavior of the agents and the entire system, similar to a chaotic system we increase the model of Russo et al. (2014) to carry out three experiments focusing on the interaction between Banks and Firms in an artificial economy. The first experiment is relative to Relationship Banking where, according to the literature, the interaction over time between Banks and Firms are able to produce mutual benefits, mainly due to reduction of the information asymmetry between them. The following experiment is related to information heterogeneity in the credit market, where the larger the bank, the higher their visibility in the credit market, increasing the number of consult for new loans. Finally, the third experiment is about the effects on the credit market of the heterogeneity of prices that Firms faces in the goods market.
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Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
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A multi-agent system with a percolation approach to simulate the driving pattern of Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV), especially suited to simulate the PEVs behavior on any distribution systems, is presented. This tool intends to complement information about the driving patterns database on systems where that kind of information is not available. So, this paper aims to provide a framework that is able to work with any kind of technology and load generated of PEVs. The service zone is divided into several sub-zones, each subzone is considered as an independent agent identified with corresponding load level, and their relationships with the neighboring zones are represented as network probabilities. A percolation approach is used to characterize the autonomy of the battery of the PVEs to move through the city. The methodology is tested with data from a mid-size city real distribution system. The result shows the sub-area where the battery of PEVs will need to be recharge and gives the planners of distribution systems the necessary input for a medium to long term network planning in a smart grid environment. © 2012 IEEE.
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Reasoning under uncertainty is a human capacity that in software system is necessary and often hidden. Argumentation theory and logic make explicit non-monotonic information in order to enable automatic forms of reasoning under uncertainty. In human organization Distributed Cognition and Activity Theory explain how artifacts are fundamental in all cognitive process. Then, in this thesis we search to understand the use of cognitive artifacts in an new argumentation framework for an agent-based artificial society.
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This thesis presents some different techniques designed to drive a swarm of robots in an a-priori unknown environment in order to move the group from a starting area to a final one avoiding obstacles. The presented techniques are based on two different theories used alone or in combination: Swarm Intelligence (SI) and Graph Theory. Both theories are based on the study of interactions between different entities (also called agents or units) in Multi- Agent Systems (MAS). The first one belongs to the Artificial Intelligence context and the second one to the Distributed Systems context. These theories, each one from its own point of view, exploit the emergent behaviour that comes from the interactive work of the entities, in order to achieve a common goal. The features of flexibility and adaptability of the swarm have been exploited with the aim to overcome and to minimize difficulties and problems that can affect one or more units of the group, having minimal impact to the whole group and to the common main target. Another aim of this work is to show the importance of the information shared between the units of the group, such as the communication topology, because it helps to maintain the environmental information, detected by each single agent, updated among the swarm. Swarm Intelligence has been applied to the presented technique, through the Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm (PSO), taking advantage of its features as a navigation system. The Graph Theory has been applied by exploiting Consensus and the application of the agreement protocol with the aim to maintain the units in a desired and controlled formation. This approach has been followed in order to conserve the power of PSO and to control part of its random behaviour with a distributed control algorithm like Consensus.
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Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.
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Recent experiments revealed that the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster has a dedicated mechanism for forgetting: blocking the G-protein Rac leads to slower and activating Rac to faster forgetting. This active form of forgetting lacks a satisfactory functional explanation. We investigated optimal decision making for an agent adapting to a stochastic environment where a stimulus may switch between being indicative of reward or punishment. Like Drosophila, an optimal agent shows forgetting with a rate that is linked to the time scale of changes in the environment. Moreover, to reduce the odds of missing future reward, an optimal agent may trade the risk of immediate pain for information gain and thus forget faster after aversive conditioning. A simple neuronal network reproduces these features. Our theory shows that forgetting in Drosophila appears as an optimal adaptive behavior in a changing environment. This is in line with the view that forgetting is adaptive rather than a consequence of limitations of the memory system.
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The paper offers a critical discussion of Simon Keller’s individuals view concerning the grounds of special obligations. It is argued that the view offers a misleading account of agent-relative reasons, which leads to problems with the arguments Keller offers for his view – the Kantian, consequentialist, particularistic argument. Furthermore, it argues that Keller’s argument from phenomenology suffers from not distinguishing between reasons for partiality and reasons from partiality. At best, it can be applied to reasons from partiality – reasons that agents have in virtue of standing in a relationship of partiality with some other person. Thus, the argument does not support the individuals view, as it is compatible with the other approaches Keller discusses. The paper suggests a modified relationship view to ground reasons of partiality.
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An intermediate-bandphotovoltaicmaterial, which has an isolated metallic band located between the top of the valence band and bottom of the conduction band of some semiconductors, has been proposed as third generation solar cell to be used in photovoltaic applications. Density functional theory calculations of Zn in CuGaS2:Ti have previously shown that, the intermediate-band position can be modulated in proportion of Zn insertion in such a way that increasing Zn concentration can lead to aband-gap reduction, and an adjustment of the intermediate-band position. This could be interesting in the formation of an intermediate-bandmaterial, that has the maximum efficiency theoretically predicted for the intermediate-band solar cell. In this work, the energetics of several reaction schemes that could lead to the decomposition of the modulated intermediate-bandphotovoltaicmaterial, CuGaS2:Ti:Zn, is studied in order to assess the thermodynamic stability of this material. Calculations of the total free energy and disorder entropy have been taken into account, to get the reaction energy and free energy of the compound decomposition, which is found to be thermodynamically favorable
Application of the agency theory for the analysis of performance-based mechanisms in road management
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El WCTR es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte, y aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.
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The primary hypothesis stated by this paper is that the use of social choice theory in Ambient Intelligence systems can improve significantly users satisfaction when accessing shared resources. A research methodology based on agent based social simulations is employed to support this hypothesis and to evaluate these benefits. The result is a six-fold contribution summarized as follows. Firstly, several considerable differences between this application case and the most prominent social choice application, political elections, have been found and described. Secondly, given these differences, a number of metrics to evaluate different voting systems in this scope have been proposed and formalized. Thirdly, given the presented application and the metrics proposed, the performance of a number of well known electoral systems is compared. Fourthly, as a result of the performance study, a novel voting algorithm capable of obtaining the best balance between the metrics reviewed is introduced. Fifthly, to improve the social welfare in the experiments, the voting methods are combined with cluster analysis techniques. Finally, the article is complemented by a free and open-source tool, VoteSim, which ensures not only the reproducibility of the experimental results presented, but also allows the interested reader to adapt the case study presented to different environments.
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An autotrophic theory of the origin of metabolism and life has been proposed in which carbon dioxide is reduced by ferrous sulfide and hydrogen sulfide by means of a reversed citric acid cycle, leading to the production of amino acids. Similar processes have been proposed for purine synthesis. Ferrous sulfide is a strong reducing agent in the presence of hydrogen sulfide and can produce hydrogen as well as reduce alkenes, alkynes, and thiols to saturated hydrocarbons and reduce ketones to thiols. However, the reduction of carbon dioxide has not been demonstrated. We show here that no amino acids, purines, or pyrimidines are produced from carbon dioxide with the ferrous sulfide and hydrogen sulfide system. Furthermore, this system does not produce amino acids from carboxylic acids by reductive amination and carboxylation. Thus, the proposed autotrophic theory, using carbon dioxide, ferrous sulfide, and hydrogen sulfide, lacks the robustness needed to be a geological process and is, therefore, unlikely to have played a role in the origin of metabolism or the origin of life.
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This thesis presents the results of a multi-method investigation of employee perceptions of fairness in relation to their career management experiences. Organisational justice theory (OJT) was developed as a theoretical framework and data were gathered via 325 quantitative questionnaires, 20 semi-structured interviews and the analysis of a variety of company documents and materials. The results of the questionnaire survey provided strong support for the salience of employee perceptions of justice in regard to their evaluations of organisational career management (OCM) practices, with statistical support emerging for both an agent-systems and interaction model of organisational justice. The qualitative semi-structured interviews provided more detailed analysis of how fairness was experienced in practice, and confirmed the importance of the OJT constructs of fairness within this career management context. Fairness themes to emerge from this analysis included, equity, needs, voice, bias suppression, consistency, ethicality, respect and feedback drawing on many of the central tenants of distributive, procedural, interpersonal and information justice. For the career management literature there is empirical confirmation of a new theoretical framework for understanding employee evaluations of, and reactions to, OCM practices. For the justice literatures a new contextual domain is explored and confirmed, thus extending further the influence and applicability of the theory. For practitioners a new framework for developing, delivering and evaluating their own OCM policies and systems is presented.
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TEST is a novel taxonomy of knowledge representations based on three distinct hierarchically organized representational features: Tropism, Embodiment, and Situatedness. Tropic representational features reflect constraints of the physical world on the agent's ability to form, reactivate, and enrich embodied (i.e., resulting from the agent's bodily constraints) conceptual representations embedded in situated contexts. The proposed hierarchy entails that representations can, in principle, have tropic features without necessarily having situated and/or embodied features. On the other hand, representations that are situated and/or embodied are likely to be simultaneously tropic. Hence, although we propose tropism as the most general term, the hierarchical relationship between embodiment and situatedness is more on a par, such that the dominance of one component over the other relies on the distinction between offline storage versus online generation as well as on representation-specific properties. © 2013 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.