910 resultados para Versailles, Treaty of, 1783.
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Relief shown pictorially.
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Relief shown pictorially.
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Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Subtitle varies slightly.
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Mimeographed and distributed to press correspondents at the request of President Wilson.
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Added t.-p.: Moore, J. B. International adjudications, ancient and modern ... Modern series. vol. III.
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The Treaty of Lisbon has brought remarkable changes and innovations to the European Union. As far as the Council of Ministers of the European Union (“the Council” hereinafter) is concerned, there are two significant innovations: double qualified majority voting and new rotating Presidency scheme, which are considered to make the working of the Council more efficiently, stably and consistently. With the modification relating to other key institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament, and with certain procedures being re-codified, the power of the Council varies accordingly, where the inter-institutional balance counts for more research. As the Council is one of the co-legislatures of the Union, the legislative function of it would be probably influenced, positively or negatively, by the internal innovations and the inter-institutional re-balance. Has the legislative function of the Council been reinforced or not? How could the Council better reach its functional goal designed by the Treaties’ drafter? How to evaluate the Council’s evolution after Lisbon Treaty in the light of European integration? This thesis is attempting to find the answers by analyzing two main internal innovations and inter-institutional re-balance thereinafter.
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Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).
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This study examines the legal and political implications of the forthcoming end of the transitional period for the measures in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as set out in Protocol 36 to the EU Treaties. This Protocol limits some of the most far-reaching innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon over EU cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs for a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (until 1 December 2014), and provides the UK with special ‘opt out/opt-in’ possibilities. The study focuses on the meaning of the transitional period for the wider European Criminal Justice area. The most far-reaching change emerging from the end of this transition will be the expansion of the European Commission and Luxembourg Court of Justice scrutiny powers over Member States’ implementation of EU criminal justice law. The possibility offered by Protocol 36 for the UK to opt out and opt back in to pre-Lisbon Treaty instruments poses serious challenges to a common EU area of justice by further institutionalising ‘over-flexible’ participation in criminal justice instruments. The study argues that in light of Article 82 TFEU the rights of the defence are now inextricably linked to the coherency and effective operation of the principle of mutual recognition of criminal decisions, and calls the European Parliament to request the UK to opt in EU Directives on suspects procedural rights as condition for the UK to ‘opt back in’ measures like the European Arrest Warrant.
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Many scholars now argue that the Treaty of Lisbon has removed the role and influence of the rotating Council Presidency in the domain of the European Union’s foreign affairs. This paper will, however, go beyond a superficial, treaty-based analysis of the influence of the post-Lisbon rotating Council Presidency and instead look at two primary, residual, informal Presidential roles, namely agenda-shaping and brokering. It will examine the extent to which these informal roles allowed the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies of July to December 2011 and 2013 respectively to influence the development of the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the Eastern Partnership. The paper will argue that the considerable influence of these rotating Presidencies defied the logic of the Lisbon Treaty, suggesting that the ‘golden age’ of this six-month position, whereby individual Member States pursue foreign policy issues of significant domestic interest at the European level, has not yet passed.
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Russia alleges that at the end of the Cold War it underwent a soft version of a Versailles Treaty, pushing it into the periphery of global politics and cutting it out of European decision-making. The crisis in Ukraine is about the survival of Putin’s regime and the dismantling of the post-Cold War settlement. We should not accept the fallacious narrative of victimhood propagated by the Kremlin’s Versailles syndrome. Even so, it is time to explore practical ways of coexisting with Russia. The Helsinki Process and the disarmament and arms control agreements of the Cold War could serve as a model for a mutually acceptable security architecture.
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"Reprinted from the June issue of the U.D.C."
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Bound with the author's Réponse des Puissances alliées et associées aux remarques de la Délégation allemande sur les conditions de paix. [Paris?, 1919?]
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Mode of access: Internet.