Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Inequality and a repeated joint project

Agents voluntarily contribute to an infinitely repeated joint project. We investigate the conditions for cooperation to be a renegotiation-proof and coalition-proof equilibrium before examining the influence of output share inequality on the sustainability of cooperation. When shares are not equally distributed, cooperation requires agents to be more patient than under perfect equality. Beyond a certain degree of share inequality, full efficiency cannot be reached without redistribution. This model also explains the coexistence of one cooperating and one free-riding coalition. In this case, increasing inequality can have a positive or negative impact on the aggregate level of effort.

The spatial inequality of wage income in Barcelona Metropolitan Area

ABSTRACT The measure and estimation of income levels in Barcelona Metropolitan Area (BMA) goes back a long way. Using different approaches and focusing on different municipalities, there is a lot of work in the field. The majority of the literature has focused on the estimation of income levels using variables related to consumption. The empirical evidence on wage differentials has shown an important growth during 80’s and 90’s especially in United Kingdom and USA. Less is known on spatial distribution of inequality. This paper presents a new data set for analyzing spatial distribution of wage income. This data is obtained by matching Wage Structure Survey (WSS) with data from Census disaggregated by census tracts. In this way we have a unique data set with wage incomes for every census track for 36 municipalities belonging to BMA. We develop a descriptive analysis of spatial distribution, testing for spatial autocorrelation and use the family of Generalised Entropy Indices to measure inequality. Properties of the index allow us to decompose inequality into inter and intra-municipality measures. Since we have two cross-sectional data for WSS (1995-2002) we can also analyze the evolution of the inequality in this period of economic growth. Key words: spatial distribution of wages, spatial autocorrelation, inequality indices.

Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship?

This paper briefly and informally surveys different theoretical models of relative concerns and their relation to inequality. Models of inequity aversion in common use in experimental economics imply a negative relation between inequality and happiness. In contrast, empirical studies on happiness typically employ models of relative concerns that assume that increases in others’ income always have a negative effect on own happiness. However, in these latter models, the relation between inequality and happiness can be positive. One possible solution is a rivalry model where a distinction is made between endowment and reward inequality which have respectively a negative and positive effect on happiness. These different models and their contrasting results may clarify why the empirical relationship between inequality and happiness has been difficult to establish.

Which Inequality? The Inequality of Endowments Versus the Inequality of Rewards

Society often allocates valuable resources - such as prestigious positions, salaries, or marriage partners - via tournament-like institutions. In such situations, inequality affects incentives to compete and hence has a direct effect on equilibrium choices and hence material outcomes. We introduce a new distinction between inequality in initial endowments (e.g. ability, inherited wealth) and inequality of what one can obtain as rewards (e.g. prestigious positions, money). We show that these two types of inequality have opposing effects on equilibrium behavior and wellbeing. Greater inequality of rewards tends to hurt most people — both the middle class and the poor, — who are forced into greater effort. In contrast, greater inequality of endowments tends to benefit the middle class. Thus, which type of inequality is considered hugely affects the correctness of our intuitions about the implications of inequality.

Longitudinal analysis of income-related health inequality

This paper considers the characterisation and measurement of income-related health inequality using longitudinal data. The paper elucidates the nature of the Jones and Lopez Nicholas (2004) index of “health-related income mobility” and explains the negative values of the index that have been reported in all the empirical applications to date. The paper further questions the value of their index to health policymakers and proposes an alternative index of “income-related health mobility” that measures whether the pattern of health changes is biased in favour of those with initially high or low incomes. We illustrate our work by investigating mobility in the General Health Questionnaire measure of psychological well-being over the first nine waves of the British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 1999.

Measuring Avoidable Health Inequality with Realization of Conditional Potential Life Years (RCPLY)

In a series of papers (Tang, Chin and Rao, 2008; and Tang, Petrie and Rao 2006 & 2007), we have tried to improve on a mortality-based health status indicator, namely age-at-death (AAD), and its associated health inequality indicators that measure the distribution of AAD. The main contribution of these papers is to propose a frontier method to separate avoidable and unavoidable mortality risks. This has facilitated the development of a new indicator of health status, namely the Realization of Potential Life Years (RePLY). The RePLY measure is based on the concept of a “frontier country” that, by construction, has the lowest mortality risks for each age-sex group amongst all countries. The mortality rates of the frontier country are used as a proxy for the unavoidable mortality rates, and the residual between the observed mortality rates and the unavoidable mortality rates are considered as avoidable morality rates. In this approach, however, countries at different levels of development are benchmarked against the same frontier country without considering their heterogeneity. The main objective of the current paper is to control for national resources in estimating (conditional) unavoidable and avoidable mortality risks for individual countries. This allows us to construct a new indicator of health status – Realization of Conditional Potential Life Years (RCPLY). The paper presents empirical results from a dataset of life tables for 167 countries from the year 2000, compiled and updated by the World Health Organization. Measures of national average health status and health inequality based on RePLY and RCPLY are presented and compared.

The Living Wage: Reducing inequality in the UK?

The revival of support for a living wage has reopened a long-run debate over the extent to which active regulation of labour markets may be necessary to attain desired outcomes. Market failure is suggested to result in lower wages and remuneration for low skilled workers than might otherwise be expected from models of perfect competition. This paper examines the theoretical underpinning of living wage campaigns and demonstrates that once we move away from idealised models of perfect competition to one where employers retain power over the bargaining process, such as monopsony, it is readily understandable that low wages may be endemic in low skilled employment contracts. The paper then examines evidence, derived from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey, for the extent to which a living wage will address low pay within the labour force. We highlight the greater incidence of low pay within the private sector and then focus upon the public sector where the Living Wage demand has had most impact. We examine the extent to which addressing low pay within the public sector increases costs. We further highlight the evidence that a predominance of low pay exists among public sector young and women workers (and in particular lone parent women workers) but not, perhaps surprisingly, among workers from ethnic minority backgrounds. The paper then builds upon the results from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey with analysis of the British Household Panel Survey in order to examine the impact the introduction of a living wage, within the public sector, would have in reducing household inequality. The paper concludes that a living wage is indeed an appropriate regulatory response to market failure for low skilled workers and can act to reduce age and gender pay inequality, and reduce household income inequality among in-work households below average earnings.

Longitudinal analysis of income-related health inequality: welfare foundations and alternative measures

This paper elaborates the approach to the longitudinal analysis of income-related health inequalities first proposed in Allanson, Gerdtham and Petrie (2010). In particular, the paper establishes the normative basis of their mobility indices by embedding their decomposition of the change in the health concentration index within a broader analysis of the change in “health achievement” or wellbeing. The paper further shows that their decomposition procedure can also be used to analyse the change in a range of other commonly-used incomerelated health inequality measures, including the generalised concentration index and the relative inequality index. We illustrate our work by extending their investigation of mobility in the General Health Questionnaire measure of psychological well-being over the first nine waves of the British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 1999.

On decomposing the causes of changes in income-related health inequality with longitudinal data

Regression-based decomposition procedures are used to both standardise the concentration index and to determine the contribution of inequalities in the individual health determinants to the overall value of the index. The main contribution of this paper is to develop analogous procedures to decompose the income-related health mobility and health-related income mobility indices first proposed in Allanson, Gerdtham and Petrie (2010) and subsequently extended in Petrie, Allanson and Gerdtham (2010) to account for deaths. The application of the procedures is illustrated by an empirical study that uses British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data to analyse the performance of Scotland in tackling income-related health inequalities relative to England & Wales over the five year period 1999 to 2004.

Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour

This paper investigates social influences on attitudes to risk and offers an evolutionary explanation of risk-taking by young low-ranked males. Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status. Here their model is generalised by use of the insight of Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments. While Becker et al. found that risk-taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments, it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament. Further, it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is sufficiently low. Thus, the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are sufficiently unequal. Finally, as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling, it can cause greater inequality of wealth.

Agglomeration and inequality across space: what can we learn from the European experience?

The purpose of this contribution is to draw a picture of the (uneven) distribution of economic activities across the states of the European Union (EU) and the consequences entailed by it. We will briefly summarize the most salient and recent contributions. Then, in the light of the economic geography theory, we will discuss the economic and social advantages and disadvantages associated with a core- periphery structure. In this sense, particular attention will be addressed to the EU financial system of Structural Funds and the effects they produced. Finally, we will formulate some suggestions, relying on the EU experience, that could be of interest to the current Brazilian regional policy.

Understanding the vertical equity judgements underpinning health inequality measures

The choice of income-related health inequality measures in comparative studies is often determined by custom and analytical concerns, without much explicit consideration of the vertical equity judgements underlying alternative measures. This note employs an inequality map to illustrate how it these judgements that affect the ranking of populations by health inequality. In particular, it is shown that relative indices of inequality in health attainments and shortfalls embody distinct vertical equity judgments, where each may represent ethically defensible positions in specific contexts. Further research is needed to explore people’s preferences over distributions of income and health.

Median Independent Inequality Orderings

To date, inequality orderings for ordered response data are only suitable for comparing distributions that share a common median state. In this paper we propose a methodology for comparing distributions irrespective of their medians. We set out to do so by introducing a general pre-ordering and equivalence relation defined over distributions with different median responses, leading us naturally to derive a partial ordering over equivalence classes. We then discuss the implications of our results for the axiomatic derivation of inequality indices for ordered response data.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.