Iowa Department of Transportation, Contracts Accepted, March 28, 2011

Contracts Accepted by Iowa Department of Transportation

Civil Rights, Iowa Department of Contracts, March 15, 2011, Vol. 1, no. 1

Newsletter produced by the Iowa Department of Contract for Iowa Department of Transportation, on civil rights.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, March 28, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, April 4, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, April 11, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, April 18, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Report on a Review of Statewide Procurement for contracts established between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008

Report on a Review of Statewide Procurement for contracts established between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011

Twelve regularly scheduled lettings and three emergency/special lettings were held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period covered by this report. At these lettings, projects totally $741,289,234 were approved.

Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a "fundamental transformation" (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Consumer Advisory: Cell Phone Contracts, January 2014

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Cell Phone Contracts

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.