The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice

Bringing protection home : healing the schism between international obligations and national safeguards created by extraterritorial processing

Extraterritorial processing schemes are designed to prevent and deter access to statutory and judicial safeguards in the country responsible for the interception and transfer of asylum seekers to a third country. In line with this objective, they incorporate interdiction, transfer and processing practices and standards that are deliberately isolated from the national legal and institutional protections within either the intercepting state or the third country where processing occurs. Australia's recent disbandment of its extraterritorial processing centres in third countries highlights the fact that extraterritorial processing schemes have proven unworkable as a matter of international law, as they negate the national safeguards fundamental to the satisfaction of a state's protection obligations.

Removing barriers to protection at the exported border : visas, carrier sanctions, and international obligation

Asylum is being gradually denuded of the national institutional mechanisms (judicial, legislative and administrative) that provide the framework for a fair and effective asylum hearing. In this sense, there is an ongoing ‘denationalization’ or ‘deformalization’ of the asylum process. This chapter critically examines one of the linchpins of this trend: the erection of pre-entry measures at ports of embarkation in order to prevent asylum seekers from physically accessing the territory of the state. Pre-entry measures comprise the core requirement that foreigners possess an entry visa granting permission to enter the state of destination. Visa requirements are increasingly implemented by immigration officials posted abroad or by officials of transit countries pursuant to bilateral agreements (so-called ‘juxtaposed’ immigration controls). Private carriers, which are subject to sanctions if they bring persons to a country who do not have permission to enter, also engage in a form of de facto immigration control on behalf of states. These measures constitute a type of ‘externalized’ or ‘exported’ border that pushes the immigration boundaries of the state as far from its physical boundaries as possible. Pre-entry measures have a crippling impact on the ability of asylum seekers to access the territory of states to claim asylum. In effect, states have ‘externalized’ asylum by replacing the legal obligation on states to protect refugees arriving at ports of entry with what are perceived to be no more than moral obligations towards asylum seekers arriving at the external border of the state.

The role of legislative, executive and judicial mechanisms in ensuring a fair and effective asylum process

A good faith reading of core international protection obligations requires that states employ appropriate legislative, administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure the enjoyment of a fair and effective asylum process. Restrictive asylum policies instead seek to ‘denationalize’ the asylum process by eroding access to national statutory, judicial and executive safeguards that ensure a full and fair hearing of an asylum claim. From a broader perspective, the argument in this thesis recognizes hat international human rights depend on domestic institutions for their effective implementation, and that a rights-based international legal order requires that power is limited, whether that power is expressed as an instance of the sovereign right of states in international law or as the authority of governments under domestic constitutions.

Libya and the international community’s 'responsibility to protect'

The Libyan regime’s attacks on its own civilian population are a test case for the international community’s commitment to the notion of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The UN Security Council’s statement on 22 February 2011 explicitly invoked this concept by calling on “the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population”. Yet, with Muammar Gaddafi encouraging further violence against protesters and threatening to fight “until the last drop of blood” it seems unlikely that the Security Council’s warning will be heeded. Greater pressure from the international community will be needed to bring an end to the atrocities in Libya. The international response to the Libyan crisis represents an opportunity to translate the theory of R2P into practice.

Access to protection for 'Offshore Entry Persons' aka asylum seekers

In 2001, amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) made possible the offshore processing of protection claims. The same amendments also foreshadowed the processing of claims by ‘offshore entry persons’ in Australia according to non-statutory procedures. After disbanding offshore processing the then Rudd Labor Government commenced processing of protection claims by ‘offshore entry persons’ in Australia under the Refugee Status Assessment process (RSA). The RSA process sought to substitute well established legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa, as interpreted by the courts, with administrative guidelines and decision-making immune from judicial review. This approach was rejected by the High Court in the cases M61 and M69. This article analyses these developments in light of Australia’s international protection obligations, as well as considering the practical obstacles that continue to confront offshore entry persons as they pursue judicial review of adverse refugee status determinations after the High Court’s decision.