"Âme et iPad" de Maurizio Ferraris

Compte rendu critique du livre « Âme et iPad » de Maurizio Ferraris (Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, coll. Parcours numériques, 2014).

Remédiation et interaction dans le milieu textuel

A literary text is a milieu in which different intermedial relations can occur. Borrowing on Bolter and Grusin’s notion of remediation and displacing the latter from digital technologies to literature, this article defines three strategies by which a novel can convoke modes that are conventionally related to other forms of mediation. The breaking points and the blanks that result from these intermedial strategies are then discussed from a reader-response perspective, to substantiate the hypothesis that a strong intermedial dynamic in a novel enhances the reader’s activity. Océan mer serves as a ground for an analysis that demonstrates the dynamism of the interactions that characterize such an intermedial object.

Comment vivre en vue du sens ? L’acte libre selon Jan Patočka

Dans cet exposé, l’auteur tente de montrer que le sens que le phénoménologue tchèque Jan Patočka (1907-1977) donne primordialement à « l’action » n’est pas un sens politique, mais plutôt un sens phénoménologique et existentiel. Pris sur ce plan d’analyse, le problème de l ’ agir libre doit être posé au départ de la question la plus fondamentale : Comment vivre en vue du sens ? – question qui concerne en premier lieu l’être individuel et non l’agir-ensemble. En analysant le sens que Patočka donne au monde naturel de la vie, au problème du vital, aux termes « possibilité » et « liberté », l’auteur montre que l’action au sens le plus fondamental, que Patočka nomme « action tragique », est ce qui fait de l’existence humaine un mouvement vivant ouvert sur la totalité du monde.

Perception, aperception et conscience chez Leibniz

Cet article propose une interprétation de certains passages qui posent un problème de cohérence dans la théorie leibnizienne de la perception et de l’aperception. C’est le cas notamment d’un passage des Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704), qui accorde aux animaux l’aperception, et du quatrième paragraphe des Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce (1710), où Leibniz semble plutôt faire coïncider aperception et réflexion, celle-ci étant pourtant réservée aux esprits raisonnables ailleurs dans son œuvre. Afin d’éviter la contradiction, notre interprétation donne une crédibilité particulière au passage des Nouveaux essais en défendant l’idée que Leibniz accorde l’aperception aux animaux, mais réserve la réflexion aux esprits. Nous tâcherons aussi de rendre évident comment certains passages semblant contredire cette position peuvent néanmoins être interprétés en ce sens.

Féminisme et pragmatisme : la question de l’expérience féminine à la lumière des apports du pragmatisme à la théorie féministe

Cet article tente d'entrevoir une expérience féminine redéfinie selon le concept d'expérience propre à la théorie pragmatiste originairement développée par John Dewey. Le concept d'une expérience spécifiquement féminine est à la fois central dans l'histoire du féminisme et très critiqué par celui-ci. Pour Richard Rorty, il maintient un espace problématique à l'extérieur du langage et selon Judith Grant il implique la nécessité qu'il existe une forme de dénominateur commun à l'existence de toutes les femmes. Afin de répondre à ces critiques, nous étudierons en quoi les prémisses du pragmatisme de Dewey, de Timothy V. Kaufman Osborn et même de Richard Rorty lui-même rejoignent celle de l’épistémologie féministe telle quelle est conçue depuis les années 90 ; et en quoi, à la lumière de ces prémisses et de la définition de la femme que propose Sally Haslanger, la notion d’expérience féminine peut être comprise et réhabilitée.

Ontologie et théorie des ensembles

L’ontologie de Leśniewski est un calcul général des noms. Elle fut créée par Leśniewski pour apporter une solution naturelle au paradoxe de Russell en théorie naïve des ensembles. L’ontologie a été perçue par ses défenseurs et par ses adversaires comme une théorie incompatible avec la théorie des ensembles. Dans le présent texte, nous montrons que l’ontologie de Leśniewski permet, au contraire, de définir une théorie des ensembles qui coïncide avec la théorie de Zermelo- Fraenkel.

L’ontologie des vertus dans l’Inquiry (1726) de Hutcheson

Hutcheson fonde sa théorie morale sur un « sens moral ». Ce sens nous permet de faire des distinctions morales (bien et mal). Cette théorie donnera lieu à un débat sur la réalité des valeurs morales. Selon certains commentateurs, nos distinctions morales portent sur des faits moraux réels que l’on peut connaître empiriquement grâce à notre sens moral. Inversement, certains soutiendront que le sens moral ne produit pas de connaissance morale. Les jugements moraux issus de ce sens sont des réponses émotionnelles plus ou moins fiables que l’on ressent face à des motivations qui nous semblent être vertueuses. Nous montrerons que, selon Hutcheson, nos jugements moraux sont bien des réponses émotionnelles, mais qu’ils ont néanmoins un critère d’objectivité. Notre sens moral, grâce à la Providence divine, a pour fonction de préserver le bien-être de l’humanité. Cette fonction du sens moral sert de critère pour évaluer le bon fonctionnement de ce sens moral.

L’infini dans la théorie ergodique

En mécanique statistique, un système physique est représenté par un système mécanique avec un très grand nombre de degrés de liberté. Ce qui est expérimentalement accessible, croit-on, se limite à des moyennes temporelles sur de longues périodes. Or, il est bien connu qu’un système physique tend vers un équilibre thermodynamique. Ainsi, les moyennes temporelles censées représenter les résultats de mesure doivent être indépendantes du temps. C’est pourquoi elles sont associées à des temps infinis. Ces moyennes sont par contre difficilement analysables, et c’est pourquoi la moyenne des phases est utilisée. La justification de l’égalité de la moyenne temporelle infinie et de la moyenne des phases est le problème ergodique. Ce problème, sous une forme ou une autre, a fait l’objet d’études de la part de Boltzmann (1868 ; 1872), les Ehrenfest (1912), Birkhoff (1831), Khinchin (1949), et bien d’autres, jusqu’à devenir une théorie à part entière en mathématique (Mackey 1974). Mais l’introduction de temps infinis pose des problèmes physiques et philosophiques d’importance. En effet, si l’infini a su trouver une nouvelle place dans les mathématiques cantoriennes, sa place en physique n’est pas aussi assurée. Je propose donc de présenter les développements conceptuels entourant la théorie ergodique en mécanique statistique avant de me concentrer sur les problèmes épistémologiques que soulève la notion d’infini dans ces mêmes développements.

Causalité, explication scientifique et théorie économique

Le modèle déductivo-nomologique domine depuis longtemps la réflexion philosophique concernant l’explication en science économique. Or, pour plusieurs, comme James Woodward et Tony Lawson, ce modèle ne considère pas suffisamment la causalité dans l’explication. L’objectif de cet article est double : 1- renforcer la critique que Tony Lawson adresse à l’économie contemporaine et 2- évaluer la théorie alternative qu’il propose, le « réalisme critique », qui tente de réintroduire la causalité dans l’explication en science économique. Nous conclurons que les considérations causales sont très importantes pour l’explication en science économique mais aussi pour bien comprendre les limites de cette science.

Le long trajet vers le Nord : de la traduction de la littérature de jeunesse française en suédois

Depuis très récemment, un changement est en train de se produire dans le domaine de la traduction de la littérature jeunesse: auparavant et pendant de nombreuses années, les ouvrages traduits venaient le plus souvent de la Suède pour être traduits en français (Gossas & Lindgren, 2011). Dans l’autre sens, on trouvait des imagiers plus ou moins sans texte, des bandes-dessinées (surtout franco-belges), des retraductions et quelques classiques comme les très populaires ouvrages de Jules Verne ou Le Petit Prince. Or, la littérature jeunesse française est certes abondante – et ce même si l’on s’en tient aux livres publiés en France, mais aussi souvent de grande qualité littéraire et iconique, ce qui devrait a priori encourager sa diffusion. Cette littérature a de surcroît la chance de pouvoir surfer sur la vague actuelle des traductions du français au suédois de livres ne faisant pas partie de cette catégorie. Mais il est bien connu que le système littéraire suédois de la littérature jeunesse comporte peu de livres traduits, en dehors des traductions massives d’ouvrages en anglais. Les questions auxquelles nous répondrons lors de notre présentation sont : Quels sont les livres actuellement traduits du français vers le suédois ? Qui les traduit (quels éditeurs et quels traducteurs) ? Nous allons ainsi montrer quelle a été l’évolution depuis 1970 jusqu’à nos jours. Nous ferons aussi le lien avec nos études précédentes concernant le sens inverse, c’est-à-dire la traduction en français de la littérature suédoise contemporaine pour la jeunesse et de nos résultats en la matière sur les livres traduits, les éditeurs et les traducteurs. Nous utiliserons comme base théorique la théorie du polysystème (Even-Zohar), notamment concernant le rôle de la littérature traduite dans un système littéraire, et les études descriptives de la traduction (voir Toury, Shavit, etc.).

A interpretação e a comunicação das regras matemáticas na resolução de problemas de divisão por alunos da 5ª série do ensino fundamental

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo compreender os dizeres e as produções escritas no processo de interpretação das regras matemáticas pelos alunos na resolução de problemas individuais e em díades. Valorizando o diálogo, como fonte de proporcionar a comunicação entre os alunos e o texto. A comunicação exerce um importante papel na construção do conhecimento matemático, pois é por meio do jogo de linguagem, - teoria fundamentada por Ludwig Wittgenstein - que os sentidos são atribuídos pelos alunos. Nesta direção, as regras matemáticas evidenciam diferentes formas de vida no seu uso, associadas às diferentes experiências vivenciadas pelo aluno na leitura e na escrita. A comunicação surge, para que os alunos estabeleçam os direcionamentos nas atividades de leitura e escrita nos problemas matemáticos, como também na aplicação da regra matemática. Nesta pesquisa participaram 8 alunos de 5ª série de uma escola pública de Belém, onde executaram, individualmente e em díades, tarefas de resolução de problemas de divisão de números naturais. As respostas, dada pelos alunos nos encontros individuais e em díades, foram filmadas, e posteriormente analisadas. Com base na análise dos dados, observei: (a) a lógica do aluno nem sempre está em conformidade com a regra matemática; (b) a importância da leitura do enunciado do problema é destacada, pois os alunos se projetam nas possibilidades de interpretação das regras matemáticas, e podem re-significar suas ações; (c) a importância da comunicação na interpretação da regra matemática, mediante a negociação de significados, podendo ainda, esclarecer por meio da fala, as ações dos alunos de como as regras estão sendo aplicadas. Neste sentido, a comunicação tem sido princípio básico para se evitar mal-entendidos no processo de construção de conceitos matemáticos, como também estabelece condições favoráveis para a produção textual.

Formas de vida da mulher em letras de canções brasileiras: as práticas semióticas do cotidiano nos séculos XX e XXI

Pós-graduação em Linguística e Língua Portuguesa - FCLAR

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists