Comentario Internacional: revista del Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales. 5 (Reseñas)

Presenta las reseñas de los siguientes libros: Perú: entre la realidad y la utopía. 180 años de Política Exterior. José Miguel Bákula. Fundación Academia Diplomática del Perú / Fondo de Cultura Económica. Lima, 2002, 2 tomos. -- Elementos para el debate de la seguridad nacional: política de la defensa nacional del Ecuador. Ministerio de Defensa del Ecuador, Quito, 2002, 271 pp. -- El malestar en la globalización. Joseph Stiglitz. Taurus, Buenos Aires, 348 pp. -- Apocalipsis perpetuo. Eduardo Moreano. Editorial Planeta del Ecuador. Noviembre 2002. 478 pp.

Teoría de la información imperfecta: implicaciones de la política económica. Conferencia en la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Ecuador, en la entrega del Doctorado Honoris Causa (Eventos Especiales)

En esta conferencia, Stiglitz aborda la teoría de la información imperfecta y sus implicaciones en la economía. Cuestiona los fundamentos de aquellos presupuestos económicos mantenidos durante mucho tiempo y sostiene que las fallas del mercado ocurren cada vez que la información es imperfecta o que los mercados son incompletos. Esta teoría de la información imperfecta rebate los fundamentos del conjunto de ideas usualmente denominadas como el "Consenso de Washington", basado en un fundamentalismo de mercado.

Yet another reason to tax goods

The optimal taxation of goods, labor and capital income is considered in a two period model where: i) private information changes through time; ii) savings are not observed, and; iii) savings a§ect preferences conditional on the realization of types. The simultaneous appearance of these three elements cause optimal commodity taxes to depend on o§-equilibrium savings. As a consequence, separability no longer su¢ ces for the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS) to obtain. If preferences are homothetic AS is partially restored: taxes are uniform within periods, however, future consumption is taxed at a higher rate than current consumption.

On choice of technique in the Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model

We report results on the optimal \choice of technique" in a model originally formulated by Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (henceforth, the RSS model) and further discussed by Okishio and Stiglitz. By viewing this vintage-capital model without discounting as a speci c instance of the general theory of intertemporal resource allocation associated with Brock, Gale and McKenzie, we resolve longstanding conjectures in the form of theorems on the existence and price support of optimal paths, and of conditions suÆcient for the optimality of a policy rst identi ed by Stiglitz. We dispose of the necessity of these conditions in surprisingly simple examples of economies in which (i) an optimal path is periodic, (ii) a path following Stiglitz' policy is bad, and (iii) there is optimal investment in di erent vintages at di erent times. (129 words)

On a uniform turnpike of the third kind in the Robinson-Solow-Srinivasan model

On using McKenzie’s taxonomy of optimal accumulation in the longrun, we report a “uniform turnpike” theorem of the third kind in a model original to Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan (RSS), and further studied by Stiglitz. Our results are presented in the undiscounted, discrete-time setting emphasized in the recent work of Khan-Mitra, and they rely on the importance of strictly concave felicity functions, or alternatively, on the value of a “marginal rate of transformation”, ξσ, from one period to the next not being unity. Our results, despite their specificity, contribute to the methodology of intertemporal optimization theory, as developed in economics by Ramsey, von Neumann and their followers.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Redistribution with ex-ante unobserved choice

Introducing dynamics to Mirrlees' (1971) optimal taxation model creates a whole new set of issues that are only starting to be investigated in the literature. When choices are made before one's realizing her productivity incentive constraints ought to be defined as a function of more complex strategies than in the static case. 80 far, all work has assumed that these choices are observable and can be contracted upon by the government. Here we investigate choices that : i) are not observed, andj ii) affect preferences conditional Oil the realization of types. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration is incorporated we show how these two characteristics make it necessary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and it is shown that they bear some resemblance to classic optimal taxation results. We are able to show that in the most 'natural' cases return on capital ought to be taxed . However, we also show that the uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

Crédito imobiliário e déficit de moradias : uma investigação dos fatores econômicos e institucionais do desenvolvimento habitacional no Chile e no Brasil

O objetivo geral desta dissertação é analisar a influência do crédito imobiliário no desenvolvimento habitacional do Chile e Brasil, considerando também as diferenças institucionais e econômicas dos dois países. O capítulo 1 inicia a discussão dos fatores determinantes do desenvolvimento habitacional descrevendo a história de financiamento imobiliário nos dois países. É dado destaque também para as políticas sociais e os arcabouços institucionais que afetam a dinâmica do desenvolvimento habitacional. O segundo capítulo apresenta os modelos tradicionais de equilíbrio no mercado habitacional, todos baseados na premissa de mercado de capitais perfeito. Na seqüência da análise, é apresentada teoria de mercado de crédito racionado, proposta de Stiglitz e Weiss (1981), da qual se deriva um modelo de racionamento de crédito para projetos imobiliários. Nessa abordagem, a assimetria de informação, as restrições de riqueza, a falta de liquidez, a não satisfação de direitos de propriedade e de salvaguardas legais que garantam o adimplemento de contratos tornam o crédito imobiliário racionado. Por fim, propõe-se um modelo de equilíbrio no mercado habitacional em que o crédito é racionado. A taxa primária de juros, a disponibilidade de fundos e o desenvolvimento institucional determinam a taxa de juros de empréstimo, de forma independente do nível de demanda por crédito, caracterizando um mercado em que a taxa de juros não opera como um instrumento automático de eliminação da escassez relativa de habitações. O capítulo 3 avalia, do ponto de vista quantitativo, em que medida há racionamento de crédito no Chile e no Brasil. Primeiramente, é discutida a metodologia empregada para medir o déficit habitacional e são apresentadas suas estimativas para os dois países a partir de dados censitários das últimas três décadas. Então, são apresentados o modelo econométrico e a metodologia empregada na pesquisa empírica, prosseguindo com a discussão de seus resultados. Nessa etapa da pesqu

Teoria científica das empresas e participações societárias estatais - TEPSES: governanças pública, corporativa e o caso do Brasil

RESUMO Ao identificar a existência de lacuna teórica, o presente trabalho definiu como seu objetivo: Estabelecer os alicerces de uma epistéme sobre o fenômeno por meio do desenvolvimento de um arcabouço capaz de a) direcionar e dar sustentação à construção e ao desenvolvimento coletivo de uma Teoria Científica das Empresas e Participações Societárias Estatais – TEPSES, e de b) identificar elementos que viabilizem o desenvolvimento de respostas à questão aplicada central: Como devem os governos definir as missões, os critérios de desempenho e os mecanismos de governança das empresas estatais em um ambiente em mudança? Considerando sua materialidade, a relevância estratégica dessas empresas para os Estados contemporâneos, suas implicações para os processos de globalização e a administração uma ciência aplicada a demandarem nível de análise societal e abordagem multiparadigmática, o arcabouço e seus elementos proporcionaram resposta a várias inquietações e problemas expressos, alguns por mais de meio século, por autoridades no campo como Pritchett, Seidman, Sherwood, Shepherd, Aharoni, Millward, Hinds e Baumol. Oferecendo por redução fenomenológica uma definição de conceito universal para as empresas estatais e introduzindo, inter allia, os conceitos de capacidade essencial de Estado em seu intervalo – CEEi e de estatal patrimonial, que permitiram a construção de uma escala de interesses públicos; o arcabouço teórico focado rueschemeyeriano da TEPSES, constrói pontes entre os hemisférios da grande dicotomia do direito e entre aspectos de governanças pública e corporativa, por meio de tipologias lazarsfeldianas. Em suas seis dimensões iniciais e trinta e três relações o arcabouço foi aplicado por sondagem plausibilística ao caso das estatais diretas brasileiras, apresentando elevado grau de plausibilidade e qualidade, inclusive segundo critérios de Wacker. As formulações e explicitações da TEPSES oferecem respostas e possibilidades de tratamento a várias questões científicas mais amplas como: o paradoxo do conhecimento na regulação de Balleisen, a armadilha de Schneider, a dúvida de Ikeda/Mises e a reabertura da questão de adequação organizacional pelo nobel Simon; proporcionando ainda extensões a: tipologia de estruturas de governança do nobel Williamson, as concepções de sociedade prismática de Riggs, a definição da administração como ciência aplicada do nobel Simon, as formulações institucionalistas de Acemoglu e Robinson e as abordagens sobre intervenção de Estado do nobel Stiglitz. O arcabouço da TEPSES possibilita: a) a cada país, construir sua própria tipologia empírica de empresas estatais e assim geri-las a partir de respostas customizadas à questão aplicada central, analisar sua adequação como instrumento de políticas públicas e desenvolver critérios para suas privatizações; b) a gestores, pesquisadores e estudiosos de caso situar e analisar suas empresas a partir do arcabouço; c) às pesquisas pretéritas, terem seus dados reinterpretados à luz de um novo referencial e d) a todos, a possibilidade de conectarem seus trabalhos à epistéme da qual a TEPSES é alicerce e repositório. Conclui-se que o grau de relevância, em nível global, do fenômeno é na realidade muito superior à sua materialidade e ao grau de relevância atribuído inicialmente, devido à identificação de sua condição como fator empírico de capacidades de Estado, uma vez que à ausência e deficiências dessas capacidades são atribuídos colapsos e débâcles de vários Estados nacionais, que resultaram em elevadíssimos e incalculáveis custos humanos.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those deriveStiglitz's (1976) results on uniform commodity taxation are valid in this setup. We incorporate pre-committed goods - those whose consumption must be decided before the resolution of uncertainty - and show that tax prescriptions are also analogous to the existing literature. The robustness of tax rules across these setups is explained by the relaxation of incentive compatibility constraints.

Bertrand, Cournot and monopolistically competitive equilibria

Using an example, we study the analogs, for the differentiated product case, of the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. These equilibria can be shown to exist and be uni que if we impose a sim pie and natural restriction on the elasticities of the demand functions for the differentiated products. Our characterizations of these equilibria make it possible to compare them and to determine how they are affected by the size of the market and the number of firms. We are also able to prove the existence of Cournot free-entry equilibria in which the number of firms is determined endogenously. In addition, we are able to prove that, in a large market, the Cournot free-entry equilibria approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive equilibria. The free-entry equilibrium concept we study is an analog of the one studied by Novshek for the case of firms selling products that are perfect substitutes. Our results are extensions of Novshek's. While we were unable to establish a general existence result for Bertrand free-entry equilibria, we were able to prove that, when these equilibria exist, they are unique and that in large markets they also approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz equilibria.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.

Three applications of the marginal cost of public funds concept

This paper illustrates the use of the marginal cost of public funds concept in three contexts. First, we extend Parry’s (2003) analysis of the efficiency effects excise taxes in the U.K., primarily by incorporating the distortion caused by imperfect competition in the cigarette market and distinguishing between the MCFs for per unit and ad valorem taxes on cigarettes. Our computations show, contrary to the standard result in the literature, that the per unit tax on cigarettes has a slightly lower MCF than the ad valorem tax on cigarettes. Second, we calculate the MCF for a payroll tax in a labour market with involuntary unemployment, using the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model as our framework. Our computations, based on Canadian labour market data, indicate that incorporating the distortion caused by involuntary unemployment raises the MCF by 25 to 50 percent. Third, we derive expressions for the distributionally-weighted MCFs for the exemption level and the marginal tax rate for a “flat tax”, such as the one that has been adopted by the province of Alberta. This allows us to develop a restricted, but tractable, version of the optimal income tax problem. Computations indicate that the optimal marginal tax rate may be quite high, even with relatively modest pro-poor distributional preferences.