Geographic patterns in the distribution of social systems in terrestrial arthropods.

The role of ecology in the evolution and maintenance of arthropod sociality has received increasing research attention in recent years. In some organisms, such as halictine bees, polistine wasps, and social spiders, researchers are investigating the environmental factors that may contribute to high levels of variation in the degree of sociality exhibited both among and within species. Within lineages that include only eusocial members, such as ants and termites, studies focus more on identifying extrinsic factors that may contribute to the dramatic variation in colony size, number of queens, and division of labour that is evident across these species. In this review, I propose a comparative approach that seeks to identify environmental factors that may have a common influence across such divergent social arthropod groups. I suggest that seeking common biogeographic patterns in the distribution of social systems or key social traits may help us to identify ecological factors that play a common role in shaping the evolution of sociality across different organisms. I first review previous studies of social gradients that form along latitudinal and altitudinal axes. Within families and within species, many organisms show an increasing degree of sociality at lower latitudes and altitudes. In a smaller number of cases, organisms form larger groups or found nests cooperatively at higher latitudes and altitudes. I then describe several environmental factors that vary consistently along such gradients, including climate variables and abundance of predators, and outline their proposed role in the social systems of terrestrial arthropods. Finally, I map distributions of a social trait against several climatic factors in five case studies to demonstrate how future comparative studies could inform empirical research.

Effects of Interviewer Experience on Components of Nonresponse in the European Social Survey

We analyze interviewer related nonresponse differences in face-to-face surveys distinguishing three types of interviewers: those who have previous experience with the same high standard cross-sectional survey ("experienced"), those who were chosen by the survey agency to complete refusal conversions ("seniors"), and usual interviewers. The nonresponse components are obtaining household contact, target person contact, and target person cooperation. In addition we examine if interviewer homogeneity with respect to these components is different across the three interviewer groups. Data come from the European Social Survey (ESS) contact forms from four countries which participated during the three rounds 2002/04/06 and used the same survey agency that in turn used to some extent the same interviewers. To analyze interviewer effects, we use discrete two-level models. We find some evidence of better performance by both senior and experienced interviewers and indications of greater homogeneity for nonresponse components, especially for those that contain room for improvement. Surprisingly, the senior interviewers do not outperform those experienced. We conclude that survey agencies should make more efforts to decrease the comparatively high interviewer turnover.

The generation and re-generation of social capital and enterprises in multi-stakeholders social cooperative enterprises: a system dynamic approach

Theories on social capital and on social entrepreneurship have mainly highlighted the attitude of social capital to generate enterprises and to foster good relations between third sector organizations and the public sector. This paper considers the social capital in a specific third sector enterprise; here, multi-stakeholder social cooperatives are seen, at the same time, as social capital results, creators and incubators. In the particular enterprises that identify themselves as community social enterprises, social capital, both as organizational and relational capital, is fundamental: SCEs arise from but also produce and disseminate social capital. This paper aims to improve the building of relational social capital and the refining of helpful relations drawn from other arenas, where they were created and from where they are sometimes transferred to other realities, where their role is carried on further (often working in non-profit, horizontally and vertically arranged groups, where they share resources and relations). To represent this perspective, we use a qualitative system dynamic approach in which social capital is measured using proxies. Cooperation of volunteers, customers, community leaders and third sector local organizations is fundamental to establish trust relations between public local authorities and cooperatives. These relations help the latter to maintain long-term contracts with local authorities as providers of social services and enable them to add innovation to their services, by developing experiences and management models and maintaining an interchange with civil servants regarding these matters. The long-term relations and the organizational relations linking SCEs and public organizations help to create and to renovate social capital. Thus, multi-stakeholder cooperatives originated via social capital developed in third sector organizations produce new social capital within the cooperatives themselves and between different cooperatives (entrepreneurial components of the third sector) and the public sector. In their entrepreneurial life, cooperatives have to contrast the "working drift," as a result of which only workers remain as members of the cooperative, while other stakeholders leave the organization. Those who are not workers in the cooperative are (stake)holders with "weak ties," who are nevertheless fundamental in making a worker's cooperative an authentic social multi-stakeholders cooperative. To maintain multi-stakeholder governance and the relations with third sector and civil society, social cooperatives have to reinforce participation and dialogue with civil society through ongoing efforts to include people that provide social proposals. We try to represent these processes in a system dynamic model applied to local cooperatives, measuring the social capital created by the social cooperative through proxies, such as number of volunteers and strong cooperation with public institutions. Using a reverse-engineering approach, we can individuate the determinants of the creation of social capital and thereby give support to governance that creates social capital.

Social capabilities in Alzheimer's patients

Patients with stage-I (very mild and mild) Alzheimer's disease were asked to participate in a Dictator Game, a type of game in which a subject has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of money between himself and another person. The game enables the experimenter to examine the influence of social norms and social preferences on the decision-making process. When the results of treatments involving Alzheimer's disease patients were compared with those of identical treatments involving patients with mild cognitive impairment or healthy control subjects, with similar ages and social backgrounds, no statistically significant difference was found. This finding suggests that stage-I Alzheimer's disease patients may be as capable of making decisions involving social norms and preferences as other individuals of their age. Whatever brain structures are affected by the disease, they do not appear to influence, at this early stage, the neural basis for cooperation-enhancing social interactions.

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Bowling for fascism: Social capital and the rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33

Social capital a dense network of associations facilitating cooperation within a community typically leads to positive political and economic outcomes, as demonstrated by a large literature following Putnam. A growing literature emphasizes the potentially "dark side" of social capital. This paper examines the role of social capital in the downfall of democracy in interwar Germany by analyzing Nazi party entry rates in a cross-section of towns and cities. Before the Nazi Party's triumphs at the ballot box, it built an extensive organizational structure, becoming a mass movement with nearly a million members by early 1933. We show that dense networks of civic associations such as bowling clubs, animal breeder associations, or choirs facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. The effects are large: Towns with one standard deviation higher association density saw at least one-third faster growth in the strength of the Nazi Party. IV results based on 19th century measures of social capital reinforce our conclusions. In addition, all types of associations veteran associations and non-military clubs, "bridging" and "bonding" associations positively predict NS party entry. These results suggest that social capital in Weimar Germany aided the rise of the Nazi movement that ultimately destroyed Germany's first democracy.

Social capabilities in Alzheimer’s patients

Patients with stage-I (very mild and mild) Alzheimer s disease were asked to participatein a Dictator Game, a type of game in which a subject has to decide how to allocate acertain amount of money between himself and another person. The game enables theexperimenter to examine the influence of social norms and social preferences on thedecision-making process. When the results of treatments involving Alzheimer s diseasepatients were compared with those of identical treatments involving patients with mildcognitive impairment or healthy control subjects, with similar ages and socialbackgrounds, no statistically significant difference was found. This finding suggests thatstage-I Alzheimer s disease patients may be as capable of making decisions involvingsocial norms and preferences as other individuals of their age. Whatever brain structuresare affected by the disease, they do not appear to influence, at this early stage, the neuralbasis for cooperation-enhancing social interactions.

Cooperação Portugal-PALOP no Domínio da Comunicação Social

The paper examines the cooperation between Portugal and the African Portuguese Speaking Countries (APSC: Angola, Cabo Verbe, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and S. Tomé and Príncipe) in media-relevant fields. It starts off with an outlook into cooperation activities undertaken by various countries in the APSC in such a field and assesses those initiatives in terms of linguistic and cultural significance. Next, I review the Portuguese institutional framework and the legal instruments for this kind of cooperation. The central aspect of the paper is a critical analysis of measures and projects related to training of journalists and other media professionals. The goal is to identify sensitive aspects and difficulties. I conclude with a global assessment of the Portuguese cooperation in the field of media and advance some suggestions for improvement.

Emergence of Cooperation on Static and Dynamic Networks

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used to analyze situation where two or more agents are interacting. Originally it was developed as a model for conflicts and collaborations between rational and intelligent individuals. Now it finds applications in social sciences, eco- nomics, biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science, international relations, computer science, and philosophy. Networks are an abstract representation of interactions, dependencies or relationships. Net- works are extensively used in all the fields mentioned above and in many more. Many useful informations about a system can be discovered by analyzing the current state of a network representation of such system. In this work we will apply some of the methods of game theory to populations of agents that are interconnected. A population is in fact represented by a network of players where one can only interact with another if there is a connection between them. In the first part of this work we will show that the structure of the underlying network has a strong influence on the strategies that the players will decide to adopt to maximize their utility. We will then introduce a supplementary degree of freedom by allowing the structure of the population to be modified along the simulations. This modification allows the players to modify the structure of their environment to optimize the utility that they can obtain.

Report of the Section of Agencies and Institutions Division of Child Welfare State Department of Social Welfare, 1943

History of child and social welfare in the State of Iowa including legal responsibilities, rules and regulations, inspections and licensing and supervision. it also covers cooperation with state agencies. It also describes in detail the histories, functions and problems of individual welfare homes and schools.

Empresas, instituciones y red social: la Compañía Hispanoamericana de Electricidad (CHADE) entre Barcelona y Buenos Aires

En este trabajo se presenta la vinculación entre la Casa de América de Barcelona y la Compañía Hispanoamericana de Electricidad (CHADE) en Buenos Aires a través del estudio de tres momentos: primero, la fundación de la asociación y la presencia de Francisco Cambó en el Centro Jurídico Iberoamericano; segundo, la fundación de la CHADE para salvar los capitales alemanes del pago de reparaciones económicas a los Aliados por su participación en la Primera Guerra Mundial; y tercero, la conversión de la asociación americanista barcelonesa en Instituto de Economía Americana (IDEA)-Casa de América para reforzar su naturaleza internacional en consonancia con la Sociedad de Naciones, así como el declive de la asociación por la interrupción de remesas de capital del Cono Sur que llegaban a Barcelona en forma de subsidios para la asociación americanista.

Rapid antagonistic coevolution between strains of the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum.

Social groups face a fundamental problem of overcoming selfish individuals capable of destroying cooperation. In the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, there is evidence that some clones ('cheaters') contribute disproportionately to the viable spores in a fruiting body while avoiding the dead stalk cell fate. It remains unclear, however, whether this cheating is actually the product of selection. Here, I report the results of an experimental evolution study designed to test whether clones of D. discoideum will evolve resistance to cheating in the laboratory with genetic variation created only through spontaneous mutation. Two strains, one green fluorescent protein (GFP)-labelled and one wild-type, were allowed to grow and develop together before the wild-type strain was removed and replaced with a naïve strain evolving in parallel. Over the course of 10 social generations, the GFP-labelled strain reliably increased its representation in the spores relative to control populations that had never experienced the competitor. This competitive advantage extended to the non-social, vegetative growth portion of the life cycle, but not to pairwise competition with two other strains. These results indicate strong antagonism between strains, mediated by ample mutational variation for cheating and also suggest that arms races between strains in the wild may be common.

Eusociality and cooperation.

The evolution of eusociality, here defined as the emergence of societies with reproductive division of labour and cooperative brood care, was first seen as a challenge to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Why should individuals permanently forgo direct reproduction to help other individuals to reproduce? Kin selection, the indirect transmission of genes through relatives, is the key process explaining the evolution of permanently nonreproductive helpers. However, in some taxa helpers delay reproduction until a breeding opportunity becomes available. Overall, eusociality evolved when ecological conditions promote stable associations of related individuals that benefit from jointly exploiting and defending common resources. High levels of cooperation and robust mechanisms of division of labour are found in many animal societies. However, conflicts among individuals are still frequent when group members that are not genetically identical compete over reproduction or resource allocation.