Corporate social responsibility and communication

Corporate activities are increasingly scrutinized for their effect on society and the environment. It is unthinkable that a corporation today will declare publicly that its only goal is to make money for its shareholders. Instead, corporations typically claim to balance the needs of society and the environment against the need to make a profit. That is, corporations say they practice corporate social responsibility (CSR). This edited volume explores the complexities of this seemingly simple claim.As such it is an essential resource to complement the latest academic thinking from management and communication research on how corporations communicate about CSR This chapter presents an overview of the book.

An analysis of corporate related-party disclosure in the Asia-Pacific region

Related-party (RP) transactions are said to be commonly used opportunistically in business and contribute to corporate failures. While periodic disclosure is widely accepted as an effective means of monitoring such transactions, research is scant, particularly in countries where business dealings may be more susceptible to corruption. This study investigates the nature and extent of corporate RP disclosures across six countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The key finding indicates that companies in countries with stronger regulatory enforcement, shareholders’ protection, and control for corruption, have more transparent RP disclosures. This evidence potentially contributes to reforms aimed at strengthening RP disclosure and compliance.

The 'two strikes' rule on the remuneration report : threats and opportunities for boards

This article examines the fast moving debate on the law and policy surrounding shareholder voting on their companies’ remuneration report, at the AGM. Recently, Australia has moved from the ‘non-binding’ vote provided to shareholders, to the more prescriptive ‘two strikes rule’; that is, two negative shareholder resolutions after 1 July 2011 may result in a board re-election. While much commentary has focused on the potential threats— impacts on remuneration reports and the potential costs to the company — we discuss another potential consequence: an opportunity for board recruitment. At a time when companies are also expected to comment on their diversity policies, planning for a threatened ‘spill’ creates an opportunity for board composition planning and succession. The arguments presented are also placed in the context of the UK debate, where recent proposals advocate for wider stakeholder engagement and diversity in remuneration planning.

Family representatives in family firms

Research Question/Issue: Family control in family firms can extend beyond the direct involvement of family members, but identifying these mechanisms is difficult in most markets. We utilize unique disclosures made by Taiwanese firms to examine the role played by family representatives in listed family firms. Family representatives are non-family members that represent the controlling family’s indirect shareholdings in the firm. We examine whether family representatives are used in the same manner as family members and whether they provide net benefits or costs to shareholders. Research Findings/Insights: In our sample of listed family firms, we find that omitting family representatives understates the influence of controlling families by 46 percent. We show that family representatives are associated with net costs to shareholders, but to a lesser extent than family members. We also find that controlling families use family members and family representatives differently. Family members are more involved in older family firms and in firms founded by the family. Family representatives are more involved in acquired and second generation family firms and in larger firms with more fixed assets. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We apply agency theory to the use of family representatives and show that family representatives are being used by controlling families to extend their influence within their firms, increasing agency costs to minority shareholders. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, our analysis shows that disclosure of family member and representative relationships within firms is important and value-relevant to investors. Furthermore, our results suggest that firm performance could be improved by limiting the involvement of family members and family representatives in family firms.

Outsider board activity, ownership structure and firm value : evidence from Korea

Using a sample of publicly listed firm in Korea from 2002 to 2006, this article examines the impact of board monitoring on firm value and productivity. We use outsider's attendance of board meetings as a proxy for board monitoring. Consistent with the commitment hypothesis, we find that outsider's attendance rate increases firm value, suggesting that attending board meeting itself is a strong signal that reflects outsider's intention to monitor insiders. While ownership of controlling shareholders negatively affects firm value, this relationship is not moderated by increased monitoring by outsiders. Our findings provide further evidence that the outside director system is less effective in chaebol-affiliated firms. Results also indicate that the effect of outsider's board monitoring activity on investor's valuation of the firm is greater than on productivity improvement of the firm. Our conclusions are robust for possible endogeneity in the relationship between firm value and board attendance by outside directors.

Lattice-based threshold changeability for standard shamir sectret-sharing schemes

We consider the problem of increasing the threshold parameter of a secret-sharing scheme after the setup (share distribution) phase, without further communication between the dealer and the shareholders. Previous solutions to this problem require one to start off with a nonstandard scheme designed specifically for this purpose, or to have communication between shareholders. In contrast, we show how to increase the threshold parameter of the standard Shamir secret-sharing scheme without communication between the shareholders. Our technique can thus be applied to existing Shamir schemes even if they were set up without consideration to future threshold increases. Our method is a new positive cryptographic application for lattice reduction algorithms, inspired by recent work on lattice-based list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes with noise bounded in the Lee norm. We use fundamental results from the theory of lattices (geometry of numbers) to prove quantitative statements about the information-theoretic security of our construction. These lattice-based security proof techniques may be of independent interest.

The impact of corporate governance on private placements in Australia

In private placement transactions, issuing firms sell a block of securities to just a small group of investors at a discounted price. Non-participating shareholders suffer from ownership dilution and lose the opportunity to receive the discount. This thesis provides the first evidence on whether and how corporate governance can protect non-participating shareholders' interests. Results from an examination of 329 private placements issued by the top 250 Australian firms between 2002 and 2009 demonstrate that firms with higher governance quality are more likely to issue a share purchase plan (SPP) along with the private placement, thus providing greater protection to non-participating shareholders' interests.

Lattice-based threshold-changeability for standard CRT secret-sharing schemes

We consider the problem of increasing the threshold parameter of a secret-sharing scheme after the setup (share distribution) phase, without further communication between the dealer and the shareholders. Previous solutions to this problem require one to start off with a non-standard scheme designed specifically for this purpose, or to have secure channels between shareholders. In contrast, we show how to increase the threshold parameter of the standard CRT secret-sharing scheme without secure channels between the shareholders. Our method can thus be applied to existing CRT schemes even if they were set up without consideration to future threshold increases. Our method is a positive cryptographic application for lattice reduction algorithms, and we also use techniques from lattice theory (geometry of numbers) to prove statements about the correctness and information-theoretic security of our constructions.

Lattice-based threshold-changeability for standard Shamir secret-sharing schemes

We consider the problem of increasing the threshold parameter of a secret-sharing scheme after the setup (share distribution) phase, without further communication between the dealer and the shareholders. Previous solutions to this problem require one to start off with a non-standard scheme designed specifically for this purpose, or to have communication between shareholders. In contrast, we show how to increase the threshold parameter of the standard Shamir secret-sharing scheme without communication between the shareholders. Our technique can thus be applied to existing Shamir schemes even if they were set up without consideration to future threshold increases. Our method is a new positive cryptographic application for lattice reduction algorithms, inspired by recent work on lattice-based list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes with noise bounded in the Lee norm. We use fundamental results from the theory of lattices (Geometry of Numbers) to prove quantitative statements about the information-theoretic security of our construction. These lattice-based security proof techniques may be of independent interest.

Invisible ties : implicit contracting and its implications for the agency relationship in corporate governance research

Research that applies agency theory to boards of directors suffers from being quite narrow as it does not recognize the true legal relationships between directors, managers and shareholders. Instead, the board of directors is best conceptualized as the principal, management as agents and stockholders’ relationships as a mix of legal and implicit contracts. We propose a recast agency relationship and develop a contingency approach that proposes (1) how a corporation’s goals vary with a board’s implicit contracting and (2) a reconceptualization of the agency problem facing boards.

A discourse analysis on how the sustainability agenda is defined within the mining industry

The mining industry has positioned itself within the sustainability agenda, particularly since the establishment of the International Council of Mining and Minerals (ICMM). However, some critics have questioned this position, since mining requires the extraction of non-renewable finite resources and commercial mining companies have the specific responsibility to produce profit. Complicating matters is that terms that represent the sustainability such as ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ have multiple definitions with varying degrees of sophistication. This work identifies eleven sustainability agenda definitions that are applicable to the mining industry and organises them into three tiers: first, Perpetual Sustainability, that focuses on mining continuing indefinitely with its benefits limited to immediate shareholders; second, Transferable Sustainability, that focuses on how mining can benefit society and the environment and third, Transitional Sustainability, that focuses on the intergenerational benefits to society and the environment even after mining ceases. Using these definitions, a discourse analysis was performed on sustainability reports from member companies of the ICMM and the academic journal Resources Policy. The discourse analysis showed that in both media the definition of the sustainability agenda was focussed on Transferable Sustainability, with the sustainability reports focused on how it can be applied within a business context while the academic journal took a broader view of mining’s social and environmental impacts.

Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.

Agency problems of corporate philanthropy

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.

How should regulators deal with entrenched company executives?

The regulatory framework for corporate governance, both in Australia and internationally, shifts between rules based regimes and principles based approach. The rules based regimes are typified by legislation that imposes mandated compliance based rules, such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Other regimes, such as Australia’s CLERP 9 and the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s principles, have opted for a disclosure approach. This paper examines these approaches in the context of the non-binding vote rule, which arguably combines aspects of both. The study’s methodology empirically considers evidence relating to actual voting patterns as well as case study examples of the non-binding vote’s effectiveness. Significantly, our analyses show that from its inception, the non-binding vote was effective in motivating management to change the remuneration package to one they perceived as more acceptable to shareholders and that the non-binding vote is an effective regime to manage CEO remuneration (and by extension) executive remuneration.

Making the profitable transition towards sustainable business practice

The last three decades have been difficult for companies and industry. In an increasingly competitive international business climate with shifting national environmental regulations, higher standards are being demanded by the consumer and community groups, not-to-mention the escalating cost of primary resources such as water, steel and minerals. The cause of these pressures is the traditional notion held by business executives and engineers that there is an inherent trade off between eco-efficiency and improving the economic bottom line. However there is significant evidence and examples of best practice to show that there is in fact no trade-off between the environment and the economy if sustainable development through continual improvement is adopted. It is highly possible therefore for companies to make a profitable transition towards sustainable business practice, where along the transition significant business opportunities can be taken advantage of. Companies are by their very nature dynamic, influential and highly capable of adapting to change. Making an organisational transformation to a sustainable business is not outside the capacity of the typical company, who know much of what is needed already to change their activities to satisfy current market demands while achieving competitiveness. However in order to make the transition towards sustainable business practice companies require some key mechanisms such as accurate information on methodologies and opportunities, understanding of the financial and non-financial incentives, permission from stakeholders and shareholders, understanding of the emerging market opportunities, a critical mass of leaders in their sector and demonstrated case studies, and awarding appropriate risk-taking activities undertaken by engineers and CEOs. Satisfying these requirements will adopt an innovative culture within the company that strives for continual improvement and successfully transforms itself to achieve competitiveness in the 21st Century. This paper will summarise the experiences of The Natural Edge Project (TNEP) and its partners in assisting organisations to make a profitable transition towards sustainable business practice through several initiatives. The Natural Advantage of Nations publication provides the critical information required by business leaders and engineers to set the context of sustainable business practice. The Profiting in a Carbon Constrained World report, developed with Natural Capitalism Inc led by Hunter Lovins, summarises the opportunities available to companies to take advantage of the carbon trading market mechanisms such as the Chicago Climate Exchange and European Climate Exchange. The Sustainability Helix then guides the company through the transition by identifying the key tools and methodologies required by companies to reduce environmental loading while dramatically improving resource productivity and achieving competitiveness. Finally, the Engineering Sustainable Solutions Program delivers the key engineering information required by companies and university departments to deliver sustainable engineering solutions. The initiatives are of varying complexity and level of application, however all are designed to provide key staff the critical information required to make a profitable transition towards sustainable business practice. It is then their responsibility to apply and teach their knowledge to the rest of the organisation.