905 resultados para Service limited State
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In cooperation with state agricultural experiment stations, Cooperative Extension Service, other state agencies, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Cover title.
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"April 1985"--P. [2]
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Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.
The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.
The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.
The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.
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In Canada, increases in rural development has led to a growing need to effectively manage the resulting municipal and city sewage without the addition of significant cost- and energy- expending infrastructure. Storring Septic Service Limited is a family-owned, licensed wastewater treatment facility located in eastern Ontario. It makes use of a passive waste stabilization pond system to treat and dispose of waste and wastewater in an environmentally responsible manner. Storring Septic, like many other similar small-scale wastewater treatment facilities across Canada, has the potential to act as a sustainable eco-engineered facility that municipalities and service providers could utilize to manage and dispose of their wastewater. However, it is of concern that the substantial inclusion of third party material could be detrimental to the stability and robustness of the pond system. In order to augment the capacity of the current facility, and ensure it remains a self-sustaining system with the capacity to safely accept septage from other sewage haulers, it was hypothesized that pond effluent treatment could be further enhanced through the incorporation of one of three different technology solutions, which would allow the reduction of wastewater quality parameters below existing regulatory effluent discharge limits put in place by Ontario’s Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MOECC). Two of these solutions make use of biofilm technologies in order to enhance the removal of wastewater parameters of interest, and the third utilizes the natural water filtration capabilities of zebra mussels. Pilot-scale testing investigated the effects of each of these technologies on treatment performance under both cold and warm weather operation. This research aimed to understand the important mechanisms behind biological filtration methods in order to choose and optimize the best treatment strategy for full-scale testing and implementation. In doing so, a recommendation matrix was elaborated provided with the potential to be used as a universal operational strategy for wastewater treatment facilities located in environments of similar climate and ecology.
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INHS Technical Report prepared for Corporation for Openlands, US Fish and Wildlife Service
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Shows points of interest along southern part of the N.J. Heritage Trail.
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Shows points of interest along the Delaware Bay portion of the N.J. Heritage Trail.
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Also shows project area, subregions, and welcome centers.
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This article examines regulatory governance of the post-initial training market in The Netherlands. From an historical perspective on policy formation processes, it examines market formation in terms of social, economic, and cultural factors in the development of provision and demand for post-initial training; the roles of stakeholders in the longterm construction of regulatory governance of the market; regulation of and public providers; policy responses to market failure; and tripartite division of responsibilities between the state, social partners, commercial and publicly-funded providers. Historical description and analysis examine policy narratives of key stakeholders with reference to: a) influence of societal stakeholders on regulatory decision-making; b) state regulation of the post-initial training market; c) public intervention regulating the market to prevent market failure; d) market deregulation, competition, employability and individual responsibility; and, e) regulatory governance to prevent ‘allocative failure’ by the market in non-delivery of post-initial training to specific target groups, particularly the low-qualified. Dominant policy narratives have resulted in limited state regulation of the supply-side, a tripartite system of regulatory governance by the state, social partners and commercial providers as regulatory actors. Current policy discourses address interventions on the demand-side to redistribute structures of opportunity throughout the life courses of individuals. Further empirical research from a comparative historical perspective is required to deepen contemporary understandings of regulatory governance of markets and the commodification of adult learning in knowledge societies and information economies. (DIPF/Orig.)
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Minorities constitute 31.0 percent of South Carolina's population, with African Americans representing 96.1 percent of all minorities in the State. With such a large minority population, it is imperative that information regarding the socio-economic status of minorities and their contribution to the overall socio-economic prosperity of the State be well researched and documented. This report and subsequent documents published by the Commission, will provide data that will be useful in determining the best way to disperse limited state and federal resources and implement new and better targeted public policy initiatives.