From Survival to Revival: The Riga Summit 2015 and the revised ENP. Egmont Security policy Brief No. 65, July 2015

With the European Parliament’s July report on the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) calling on the Commission to ‘go back to basics’, this article argues that such a move would be counter-productive and that instead, the ENP needs to move towards the future and break away with the historical elusiveness of this overarching policy. The Riga Summit serves as an illustration of what will not suffice if the EU is to strengthen or even maintain its role in its neighbourhoods. The revision of the ENP is described as 3Dimensional process which needs to yield a concrete and forward-looking new ENP. The recommendations put forth herein map out what a truly revised ENP would entail.

Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces. OSW COMMENTARY 190/23.11.2015

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The implementation of the Gender Perspective in the EU civilian and military missions: Leadership wanted. Security Policy Brief No. 67, October 2015

Fifteen years have passed since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, through which time the EU has grown as a security actor. The keys to produce a change in implementing gender mainstreaming in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are well known by member states; the EU and external implementation reports1 are repeated again and again, but real change requires real willingness on the part of member states, and leadership.

The EU-China Bilateral Investment Agreement: Between High Hopes and Real Challenges. Security Policy Brief No. 68, February 2016

In 2012, negotiations over an EU–China bilateral investment agreement were launched to fully tap into the potential of bilateral investments. This policy brief gives an overview of the current negotiation process and argues that the high hopes advanced politically and economically in the agreement must be weighed against the many challenges and obstacles the negotiations face, regarding current events in EU–China relations, in global trade and investment regimes, and the limits of EU competencies. Strategically, the agreement could be important, as it offers the potential to strengthen the EU’s global economic relevance. This brief concludes that there is much to gain if the EU follows a coordinated approach and remains mindful of these (potential) obstacles.

The Global Strategy – reinvigorating the EU’s multilateral agenda?. Security Policy Brief No. 69, March 2016

The EU’s effective multilateralism doctrine is hardly a defining characteristic of the international system of today. While established multilateral structures are far from reflective of the realities of the twenty-first century, multilateral practices remain dominant in most parts of the world. Multilateralism, however, carries a different meaning to different actors. Emerging powers have become increasingly assertive in promoting their own multilateral approach and now set the pace in international affairs. The EU remains, nonetheless, well-placed to respond to this challenge through a revision of its multilateral agenda.

Why Belgium Needs a Special Operations Command. Security Policy Brief No. 70, April 2016

The setting up of a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) constitutes a key element of the ongoing Belgian defence reforms. This Policy Brief aims to put the present demand for special operations forces in its historical context and engage in the discussion on how to structure and employ this special instrument of policy. Building on the legacy of the paracommando regiment, the future Belgian SOCOM constitutes a critical capability within an adaptive force structure. This new entity must be able to deliver results in a variety of unconventional missions that require high readiness, intellectual flexibility and maximum discretion or surprise. At the same time, special operations forces do not constitute a substitute for having a comprehensive security policy. They function best when used as force multipliers alongside other instruments of power towards joint effect. As the proverbial tip of the spear, they must lead the way for Belgian defence regeneration in general.

Information Guide: Common Foreign and Security Policy

A guide to the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with hyperlinks to sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites

Simulating the long-run aggregate economic and intergenerational redistributive effects of social security policy /

"August 1992."

The information security policy unpacked:a critical study of the content of university policies

Ensuring the security of corporate information, that is increasingly stored, processed and disseminated using information and communications technologies [ICTs], has become an extremely complex and challenging activity. This is a particularly important concern for knowledge-intensive organisations, such as universities, as the effective conduct of their core teaching and research activities is becoming ever more reliant on the availability, integrity and accuracy of computer-based information resources. One increasingly important mechanism for reducing the occurrence of security breaches, and in so doing, protecting corporate information, is through the formulation and application of a formal information security policy (InSPy). Whilst a great deal has now been written about the importance and role of the information security policy, and approaches to its formulation and dissemination, there is relatively little empirical material that explicitly addresses the structure or content of security policies. The broad aim of the study, reported in this paper, is to fill this gap in the literature by critically examining the structure and content of authentic information security policies, rather than simply making general prescriptions about what they ought to contain. Having established the structure and key features of the reviewed policies, the paper critically explores the underlying conceptualisation of information security embedded in the policies. There are two important conclusions to be drawn from this study: (1) the wide diversity of disparate policies and standards in use is unlikely to foster a coherent approach to security management; and (2) the range of specific issues explicitly covered in university policies is surprisingly low, and reflects a highly techno-centric view of information security management.

Climate change and EU security policy : an unmet challenge

A Cimeira europeia de Dezembro 2013 deu à União Europeia um mandato para uma nova estratégia de segurança. As alterações climáticas têm desempenhado um papel cada vez mais importante nos debates sobre segurança europeia. A União tem sido uma das organizações a melhor identificar as alterações climáticas como um “multiplicador de ameaça” e a desenvolver todo um conjunto de iniciativas políticas, destinadas a relacionar fatores aliados às alterações climáticas com as políticas externas e de segurança. A UE tem pressionado para um ambicioso acordo internacional sobre clima até 2015 pelo que importa considerar a relação entre duas agendas: a da política externa e da segurança. O autor examina problemas resultantes da fragmentação de responsabilidades entre vários atores institucionais europeus aos quais falta um enfoque sobre questões climáticas. O artigo explora ainda a relação entre alterações climáticas e políticas de emigração da UE; a relação entre clima, segurança energética e política de defesa e a dimensão geoeconómica das respostas políticas da União. Conclui com uma reflexão sobre se o fenómeno das alterações climáticas terá um efeito positivo sobre a cooperação europeia, em particular no domínio da gestão de crises com origem climática ou se ao invés incentivará os Estados a uma postura de isolamento.

Health, security and foreign policy

McInnes, C., Lee, K. (2006). Health, security and foreign policy. Review of International Studies, 32 (1), 5-23. RAE2008

The neoliberal way of war: a critical analysis of contemporary British security in policy and practice.

Dominant paradigms of causal explanation for why and how Western liberal-democracies go to war in the post-Cold War era remain versions of the 'liberal peace' or 'democratic peace' thesis. Yet such explanations have been shown to rest upon deeply problematic epistemological and methodological assumptions. Of equal importance, however, is the failure of these dominant paradigms to account for the 'neoliberal revolution' that has gripped Western liberal-democracies since the 1970s. The transition from liberalism to neoliberalism remains neglected in analyses of the contemporary Western security constellation. Arguing that neoliberalism can be understood simultaneously through the Marxian concept of ideology and the Foucauldian concept of governmentality – that is, as a complementary set of 'ways of seeing' and 'ways of being' – the thesis goes on to analyse British security in policy and practice, considering it as an instantiation of a wider neoliberal way of war. In so doing, the thesis draws upon, but also challenges and develops, established critical discourse analytic methods, incorporating within its purview not only the textual data that is usually considered by discourse analysts, but also material practices of security. This analysis finds that contemporary British security policy is predicated on a neoliberal social ontology, morphology and morality – an ideology or 'way of seeing' – focused on the notion of a globalised 'network-market', and is aimed at rendering circulations through this network-market amenable to neoliberal techniques of government. It is further argued that security practices shaped by this ideology imperfectly and unevenly achieve the realisation of neoliberal 'ways of being' – especially modes of governing self and other or the 'conduct of conduct' – and the re-articulation of subjectivities in line with neoliberal principles of individualism, risk, responsibility and flexibility. The policy and practice of contemporary British 'security' is thus recontextualised as a component of a broader 'neoliberal way of war'.

Castles in the sand: Mali and the demise of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. CEPS Commentary, 28 January 2013

The threat posed by the crisis in Mali is direct, multidimensional and without regard to geographical proximity or historical and colonial heritage, writes Giovanni Faleg. France’s solitary intervention in Mali and the EU’s absence there raise two important questions for the future of the EU’s supposedly ‘Common’ Security and Defence Policy. The first has to do with the crisis itself; its nature and the threat posed by the terrorist groups and militias that are being countered by French armed forces. The second concerns the causes and implications of yet another example of the EU’s inability to take responsibility for security matters in its neighbourhood and beyond.

The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence. CEPS Policy Brief No. 310, 19 December 2013

The true causes of the EU’s inertia as a security actor in its neighbourhood and beyond are not a lack of capability or even austerity measures, but the absence of a core group of states committed to driving integration forward, argues Giovanni Faleg. Member states are reluctant to set clear common strategic priorities and struggle to agree on a revision of the institutional rules. Their strategic cultures and interests differ significantly; they hold different visions of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and are unwilling to use the CSDP instruments at their disposal.