A ciência-ação: fundamentos filosóficos e relevância para a enfermagem

ENDERS,Bertha Cruz, FERREIRA,Priscila Brigolini Porfírio, MONTEIRO, Akemi Iwata.A ciencia-açao: fundamentos filosoficos e relevancia para a enfermagem. Revista Texto Contexto em Enfermagem, Florianópolis, v.19, n.1,p.161-7.Jan/Mar.2010.

A ciência-ação: fundamentos filosóficos e relevância para a enfermagem

A prática de enfermagem envolve o enfermeiro da clínica como agente de deliberação e ação, confrontando situações do cotidiano e assumindo, através de conhecimento científico, experiências anteriores ou por conceitos próprios e intuitivos, formas específicas de ver e agir na prática. O agir constitui fonte de conhecimento passível de acesso por métodos de investigação interpretativos. O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar, analiticamente, a filosofia da Ciência-Ação em sua relação com a construção do conhecimento na enfermagem. Explica-se a Ciência-Ação como método inovador de inquérito e a sua tradição filosófica na abordagem nas ciências sociais, e se discute a sua articulação com a proposta epistemológica da enfermagem. Sugere-se a adoção dessa vertente em estudos de enfermagem, pelo seu enfoque na reflexão sobre as ações do enfermeiro e na prática como fonte de conhecimento. Conclui-se que a Ciência-Ação possui potencial para o avanço da teoria específica da prática da enfermagem, do conhecimento próprio da enfermagem

A ciência-ação: fundamentos filosóficos e relevância para a enfermagem

ENDERS,Bertha Cruz, FERREIRA,Priscila Brigolini Porfírio, MONTEIRO, Akemi Iwata.A ciencia-açao: fundamentos filosoficos e relevancia para a enfermagem. Revista Texto Contexto em Enfermagem, Florianópolis, v.19, n.1,p.161-7.Jan/Mar.2010.

A ciência-ação: fundamentos filosóficos e relevância para a enfermagem

A prática de enfermagem envolve o enfermeiro da clínica como agente de deliberação e ação, confrontando situações do cotidiano e assumindo, através de conhecimento científico, experiências anteriores ou por conceitos próprios e intuitivos, formas específicas de ver e agir na prática. O agir constitui fonte de conhecimento passível de acesso por métodos de investigação interpretativos. O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar, analiticamente, a filosofia da Ciência-Ação em sua relação com a construção do conhecimento na enfermagem. Explica-se a Ciência-Ação como método inovador de inquérito e a sua tradição filosófica na abordagem nas ciências sociais, e se discute a sua articulação com a proposta epistemológica da enfermagem. Sugere-se a adoção dessa vertente em estudos de enfermagem, pelo seu enfoque na reflexão sobre as ações do enfermeiro e na prática como fonte de conhecimento. Conclui-se que a Ciência-Ação possui potencial para o avanço da teoria específica da prática da enfermagem, do conhecimento próprio da enfermagem

Information and the evolution of codon bias

The informational properties of biological systems are the subject of much debate and research. I present a general argument in favor of the existence and central importance of information in organisms, followed by a case study of the genetic code (specifically, codon bias) and the translation system from the perspective of information. The codon biases of 831 Bacteria and Archeae are analyzed and modeled as points in a 64-dimensional statistical space. The major results are that (1) codon bias evolution does not follow canonical patterns, and (2) the use of coding space in organsims is a subset of the total possible coding space. These findings imply that codon bias is a unique adaptive mechanism that owes its existence to organisms' use of information in representing genes, and that there is a particularly biological character to the resulting biased coding and information use.

Causalité et explication causale chez James Woodward

Certains philosophes affirment que les relations causales sont fondées sur les lois de la nature. Cette conception cadre mal avec la réalité des sciences biomédicales et des sciences humaines. Pour se rapprocher de la pratique réelle des diverses sciences, James Woodward propose une conception de la causalité et de l’explication causale fondée sur une relation beaucoup moins exigeante que celle de loi de la nature, qu’il appelle l’invariance. Le but de ce mémoire est de présenter le concept d’invariance et les autres concepts causaux qui s’y rattachent et, d’identifier certaines difficultés, dans le but de cerner l’usage approprié de cette famille de concepts. La conception causale de Woodward suppose que le but de la recherche des causes est pratique plutôt que simplement épistémique : il s’agit pour les agents de s’appuyer sur les causes pour modifier les phénomènes. Cette conception est également non-réductive; elle utilise des contrefactuels et reflète les méthodes expérimentales des diverses sciences. La cohérence de cette conception avec les généralisations causales réelles des sciences fait en sorte qu’elle abandonne l’objectif d’universalité rattaché à la notion de loi de la nature, en faveur d’un objectif de fiabilité temporaire. De plus, comme le critère d’invariance est peu exigeant, d’autres critères doivent lui être ajoutés pour identifier, parmi les relations causales (c’est-à-dire invariantes), les relations les plus susceptibles d’être employées pour modifier les phénomènes de façon fiable.

Mário SAA (1893-1971): Um intelectual português na sociedade do século XX

Mário Saa (1893-1971) - um percurso de índole nacionalista, onde se cruzam a literatura, a ciência, a filosofia e a história. Pretende-se revelar o trajecto de um intelectual português da direita conservadora do início do século XX, numa perspectiva transnacional. Aborda-se o seu percurso intelectual, analisando os reflexos da identidade europeia na sua produção cultural. Através do seu legado depositado na Fundação Arquivo Paes Teles, no Ervedal, uma freguesia do concelho de Avis, acedemos ao tempo da sua formação académica e às temáticas que abordou na sua vasta e diferenciada produção cultural. Descobrem-se os seus círculos de sociabilidade literária e intelectual, e entende-se a construção da sua consagração através de um conjunto de dedicatórias gravadas nos livros da sua biblioteca. Um legado que permite aceder à sua «modernidade» decorrente da interacção com a Europa intelectual e do seu contexto de vivências variadas. /ABSTRACT: ln this paper we examine the career of the nationalist thinker, Mário Saa (1893-1971), whose achievements were in the fields of literature, science, philosophy and history, as a model of the right-wing conservative Portuguese intellectual at the beginning of the 20th century from a trans-national perspective. We trace his intellectual trajectory, analysing the influence of European identity on his cultural output. The complete works of Mário Saa, housed at the Paes Teles Archive Foundation in Ervedal, a parish in the district (concelho) of Avis, provide us with a window on the period during which he completed his academic training and the topics he examined in his extensive and varied cultural works. We profile the literary and intellectual social circles in which he moved, and seek to gain an understanding of how his reputation carne to be established by analysing the dedications contained in books from his library. Mário Saa's legacy enables us to understand the ‘modern’ nature of his work, deriving from his interaction with European intellectuals and the context of his varied experience.

Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science - And the Evolution of the Popperian Worlds

This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.

Audience members (including Max Rieser?); Second International Congress of the International Union for the Philosophy of Science; Zurich Portraits Groups Men

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The Problem of Implementation and its Relation to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.

Harminics of evolution : the philosophy of individual life basedupon natural science, as taught by modern masters of the law

UANL