The impact of privatisation and regulation on the water and sewerage industry in England and Wales:a translog cost function approach

After the ten Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) of England and Wales were privatized in November 1989, the successor Water and Sewerage Companies (WASCs) faced a new regulatory regime that was designed to promote economic efficiency while simultaneously improving drinking water and environmental quality. As legally mandated quality improvements necessitated a costly capital investment programme, the industry's economic regulator, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), implemented a retail price index (RPI)+K pricing system, which was designed to compensate the WASCs for their capital investment programme while also encouraging gains in economic efficiency. In order to analyse jointly the impact of privatization, as well as the impact of increasingly stringent economic and environmental regulation on the WASCs' economic performance, this paper estimates a translog multiple output cost function model for the period 1985–1999. Given the significant costs associated with water quality improvements, the model is augmented to include the impact of drinking water quality and environmental quality on total costs. The model is then employed to determine the extent of scale and scope economies in the water and sewerage industry, as well as the impact of privatization and economic regulation on economic efficiency.

Branching Stochastic Processes: Regulation, Regeneration, Estimation, Applications

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 60J80.

Az átalakuló globális pénzügyi szabályozórendszer kérdései = Dilemmas of the changing global financial regulation system

Erősődő igény van a jelenlegi sokoldalú nemzetközi felügyeleti rendszer reformjára úgy, hogy az a nemzeti gazdaságpolitikák nemzetközi hatásait is figyelembe vegye. Ehhez át kell reformálni a jelenlegi globális pénzügyi szabályozási rendszert, de ki kell alakítani a nemzeti gazdaságpolitikák egymásra hatásának koordinációját is. Ide tartozik a globális külső sokkok csillapítására szolgáló anti-ciklikus finanszírozás, a nemzetközi adózási együttműködés fokozása, a nemzetközi adósságfinanszírozás tökéletesítése, vagy a globális fizetésieszköz-tartalékok és a fizetési rendszer viszonya. Ez utóbbi területen az SDR kiterjedtebb használatának feltételeit kell kimunkálni. A jelenlegi globális intézmények – WTO, Nemzetközi Valutaalap, Világbank – alapos megújítása elkerülhetetlen. A globális gazdasági koordináció intézményi kereteinek kidolgozása viszont még várat magára. A G20-ak csoportja – bár fontos reformokat kezdeményezett –, nem tekinthető a világgazdasági egyensúlytalanságok megoldása letéteményesének. A cél csak olyan globális intézményi struktúra lehet, amely egyaránt képes a világ nagy számú gazdaságai közötti koordinációs feladatok megoldására, s a döntések végrehajtásának kikényszerítésére. / === / The present multilateral international surveillance system needs to be reformed with an eye on international repercussions of national economic policies. The present global financial architecture, the coordination of interplays of national economic policies must be modified. An anti-cyclical financing capable of absorbing global external shocks, strengthening of international tax cooperation, improving international debt financing or the relations between global financial reserves and the global payment system might be part and parcel of this process. A more extended use of SDR could be worked out. Reforms of the present global institutions – the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank – cannot be avoided any further. Institutional frameworks of global economic coordination mechanism have still not been worked out. The Group of 20 (G-20) cannot be seen as the sole player in fighting world economic disequlibria. A global institutional system is envisaged, which is able to implement economic coordination among national economic units and to enforce the implementation of decisions taken. At present there is no global institution dealing with coherence and consistency of global issues. Reforming present institutions and/or designing new ones are possible options. The basis for such an international coordination must involve general acceptance of principles, transparent implementation, and enforcement of decisions taken.

A magyar minimálbér-szabályozás és hatása a foglalkoztatásra, különösen 2000-től napjainkig (Minimum-wage regulation in Hungary and its impact on employment, with particular respect to the 2000’s)

Noha az 1990-es évek első felében felbomlott az akadémiai közgazdászok sok évtizeden át örök érvényűnek hitt közmegegyezése a minimálbér szükségképpen negatív foglalkoztatási hatásáról, a túlságosan magas minimálbért minden közgazdász foglalkoztatáscsökkentő hatásúnak jósolja. Tanulmányunkban a magyar minimálbér-szabályozást e hatás szempontjából vizsgáljuk és értékeljük. / === / Although the long-held view of an unambiguously negative employment effect of a binding minimum wage was challenged by empirical findings in the early 1990’s, it is unanimously predicted that if the minimum wage is set too high it will bring about adverse employment effects. Accordingly, our study starts from an evaluation of the magnitude of the Hungarian minimum wage, i.e., of how it relates to minimum wage rates elsewhere, and of how it has developed through time. Next we inspect the main features that characterize the Hungarian system of minimum wage regulation. Theoretical views on the potential employment effect of minimum wage regulation are then surveyed and contrasted to empirical findings. The study concludes by policy recommendations. To sum up the main strand of arguments, we try to demonstrate that even though Hungary’s minimum wage, if assessed by its ratio to average and/or median full-time earnings, does not appear particularly high by international standards, it might rightly be regarded as unreasonably high in light of Hungary’s excessively low relative rate of employment among the least schooled. This diagnose should become particularly evident once one takes into account that, in sharp contrast to established rules elsewhere, a significantly higher wage floor is in effect for those with lower secondary schooling. Abolition of this legally guaranteed premium over the minimum wage as well as more moderation in minimum wage adjustments are thus highly recommended.

Auswirkungen von Eigenkapitalregulierung auf optimale Bankkreditzinsniveaus (Effect of capital regulation on optimal bank loan interest rate levels)

Die Vielfalt von möglichen wirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen von Banksolvenzproblemen trägt auch dazu bei, dass wissenschaftliche Fragen über die Eigenkapitalregulierung im Bankensektor schon seit einigen Jahren ziemlich intensiv diskutiert werden. Die Effekte von Eigenkapitalregulierung können sich auf zahlreiche Weise zeigen, zum Beispiel ist ein Effekt auf das Kreditzinsniveau auch nicht auszuschließen. Um diesen potenziellen Zusammenhang, an den die frühere Literatur noch nicht fokussierte, klarer analysieren zu können, wird in der vorliegenden Studie ein theoretisches Modell präsentiert, in der eine Verbindung zwischen einem optimalen Bankkreditzinsniveau und der Eigenkapitalregulierung existiert. Die Optimalität von Kreditzinsniveaus wird aus zwei Aspekten betrachtet: als Optimalitätskriterien werden Gewinnmaximierung und Maximierung von Solvenzwahrscheinlichkeit verglichen. Aufgrund der Ergebnisse kann darauf geschlossen werden, dass diese zwei optimale Kreditzinsniveaus nicht identisch sind und unterschiedlich von Eigenkapitalregulierung beeinflusst werden. Nach theoretischen Ergebnissen ist es möglich, dass im Falle einer Erhöhung des Eigenkapitals bei gleichbleibenden Bankeinlagen das gewinnmaximierende Optimum sich nicht ändert, während das zu der Maximierung der Solvenzwahrscheinlichkeit gehörende Optimum sich verringert.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.

Essays on Economics of Entrepreneurship

This dissertation examines three important issues. The first issue is about the human capital investment and entrepreneurship as a career choice. The standard human capital theory shows that firms (employees) never invest in general (firm-specific) human capital of the employee as they do not extract any return from it. However, when entrepreneurship is introduced as a career option for an innovative employee, both firm’s and employee’s human capital investments change. Employee starts investing in his firm-specific human capital to increase the probability to innovate (and to become an entrepreneur). However, the firm uses general human capital investment to reduce the risk of employee’s departure. The second issue is regarding the factors motivating entry regulations reforms and the possible nonlinear effects of entry regulation reforms. The current literature and the policy recommendations assume that these reforms have linear effects on entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, the anecdotal evidence shows that the outcomes of such reforms vary greatly from country to country. To investigate this issue, I collect a sample data on entry regulations and firm creation from World Bank. The empirical analysis indicates that the effect of entry regulation reforms depends on the pre-reform level of bureaucracy in the country. More specifically, while low-bureaucracy countries benefit from entry regulation reforms, high-bureaucracy countries do not benefit. Moreover, the probability of making a reform increases if the country has reformist neighbors, cumbersome entry regulations, high unemployment rate, or low corruption level. The last issue is related to the individual and joint effects of bureaucracy and corruption on different types of entrepreneurs. The current literature investigates these effects only on unified measures of entrepreneurship. However, entrepreneurs are very different in many senses. To address this issue, I collect the necessity-based and opportunity-based entrepreneurship data from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. The empirical analysis yield two important results: First, bureaucracy has a direct negative (positive) effect on necessity-based (opportunity-based) entrepreneurs. Second, corruption mitigates the effect of bureaucracy for both groups of entrepreneurs. All three chapters offer useful insights and important implications to academics and policymakers.

Essays on market design and regulation in electricity systems

This thesis discusses market design and regulation in electricity systems, focusing on the information exchange of the regulated grid firm and the generation firms as well as the regulation of the grid firm. In the first chapter, an economic framework is developed to consistently analyze different market designs and the information exchange between the grid firm and the generation firms. Perfect competition between the generation firms and perfect regulation of the grid firm is assumed. A numerical algorithm is developed and its feasibility demonstrated on a large-scale problem. The effects of different market designs for the Central Western European (CWE) region until 2030 are analyzed. In the second chapter, the consequences of restricted grid expansion within the current market design in the CWE region until 2030 are analyzed. In the third chapter the assumption of efficient markets is modified. The focus of the analysis is then, whether and how inefficiencies in information availability and processing affect different market designs. For different parameter settings, nodal and zonal pricing are compared regarding their welfare in the spot and forward market. In the fourth chapter, information asymmetries between the regulator and the regulated firm are analyzed. The optimal regulatory strategy for a firm, providing one output with two substitutable inputs, is defined. Thereby, one input and the absolute quantity of inputs is not observable for the regulator. The result is then compared to current regulatory approaches.

The Impact of Regulation on a Firm's Incentives to Invest in Emergent Smart Grid Technologies

This paper analyzes the implementation of new technologies in network industries through the development of a suitable regulatory scheme. The analysis focuses on Smart Grid (SG) technologies which, among others benefits, could save operational costs and reduce the need for further conventional investments in the grid. In spite of the benefits that may result from their implementation, the adoption of SGs by network operators can be hampered by the uncertainties surrounding actual performances. A decision model has been developed to assess the firms' incentives to invest in "smart" technologies under different regulatory schemes. The model also enables testing the impact of uncertainties on the reduction of operational costs, and of conventional investments. Under certain circumstances, it may be justified to support the development and early deployment of emerging innovations that have a high potential to ameliorate the efficiency of the electricity system, but whose adoption faces many uncertainties.

Exchange relationships in building services maintenance activity : a test of transaction cost economics and the resource dependency view

The firm is faced with a decision concerning the nature of intra-organizational exchange relationships with internal human resources and the nature or inter-organizational exchange relationships with market firms. In both situations, the firm can develop an exchange that ranges from a discrete exchange to a relational exchange. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource Dependency View (RDV) represent alternative efficiency-based explanations fo the nature of the exchange relationship. The aim of the paper is to test these two theories in respect of air conditioning maintenance in retail centres. Multiple sources of information are genereated from case studies of Australian retail centres to test these theories in respoect of internalized operations management (concerning strategic aspects of air conditioning maintenance) and externalized planned routine air conditioning maintenance. The analysis of the data centres on pattern matching. It is concluded that the data supports TCE - on the basis of a development in TCE's contractual schema. Further research is suggested towards taking a pluralistic stance and developing a combined efficiency and power hypothesis - upon which Williamson has speculated. For practice, the conclusions also offer a timely cautionary note concerning the adoption of one approach in all exchange relationships.