What Determines Stock Option Contract Design?

This paper analyzes factors driving the design of stock option plans for Finnish firms. We examine determinants of the scope of plans, exercise price, target group, and dividend protection. The scope is found to be negatively related to Tobin’s Q and positively related to proxies for monitoring costs. The scope is also greater in broad-based plans, and in plans with dividend protection. Prior stock return is found to be negatively related to the size of the premium (out-of-the-moneyness), whereas dividend protection increases the premium. The results also suggest that investment intensity, cash flow, and monitoring costs are associated with the likelihood of granting premium (out-of-the-money) stock options. Furthermore, the likelihood of granting broad-based plans is increasing in institutional ownership and cash flow constraints, and decreasing in firm size. Broad-based plans are also more likely among firms in growth industries. We find support that the likelihood of dividend protection is decreasing in foreign ownership. In addition, firms paying zero-dividends are less likely to include dividend protection, whereas higher unsystematic risk is associated with a greater likelihood of including dividend protection.

A relational contract for water demand management

For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.

Effects of the Maryland hydraulic clam dredge on populations of the soft-shell clam, Mya arenaria: final contract report

Final report on a three year study designed to investigate the effects of the Maryland hydraulic escalator clam dredge on populations and recruitment of the soft-shell clam, Mya arenaria. Experimental plots were established in the Potomac river, Maryland, and were dredged ina commerical manner by removing only legal size clams. quarterly samples were taken in the experimental and control plots by means of a van Veen grab for juvenile clams and the hydraulic dredge for older, deeper burrowing clams. Sediment samples were taken at selected periods for organic carbon and grain size analysis. Clams were separated into two size-groups. (PDF contains 38 pages)

The Impact of Contract Type on Service Provider Information Requirements

This paper is concerned with the role of information in the servitization of manufacturing which has led to “the innovation of an organisation’s capabilities and processes as equipment manufacturers seek to offer services around their products” (Neely 2009, Baines et al 2009). This evolution has resulted in an information requirement (IR) shift as companies move from discrete provision of equipment and spare parts to long-term service contracts guaranteeing prescribed performance levels. Organisations providing such services depend on a very high level of availability and quality of information throughout the service life-cycle (Menor et al 2002). This work focuses on whether, for a proposed contract based around complex equipment, the Information System is capable of providing information at an acceptable quality and requires the IRs to be examined in a formal manner. We apply a service information framework (Cuthbert et al 2008, McFarlane & Cuthbert 2012) to methodically assess IRs for different contract types to understand the information gap between them. Results from case examples indicate that this gap includes information required for the different contract types and a set of contract-specific IRs. Furthermore, the control, ownership and use of information differs across contract types as the boundary of operation and responsibility changes.