943 resultados para Punishment, Symbol, Authority
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This is the second in a series of reports describing cancer inequalities across South Central Strategic Health Authority. Focusing on the four most common cancers (lung, colorectal, breast and prostate), it examines inequalities in access to and quality of care, in relation to age, sex, deprivation and area of residence.
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1. Interpretation. The purpose of this provision is set out some commonly used terms to be used in the Bill. 2. Establishment day. The purpose of this provision is to require the Minister to specify a day as the establishment day for the purposes of the Bill. This will be the day on which the new authority, to be known as SOLAS, will come into existence. 3. Establishment of SOLAS. The purpose of this head is to provide for the formal establishment of SOLAS and to define its status as a corporate body with the usual consequent powers. 4. Functions of SOLAS. The purpose of this head is to set down the statutory functions of the new further education and training authority. SOLAS is to have overall strategic responsibility for the provision of further education and training in the country. It will be responsible for deciding what further education and training programmes are provided. A core part of its role will be to ensure the referral of jobseekers to appropriate courses which may be delivered by VECs or by other, including private, providers. It will provide the funding stream to VECS and those other bodies for the provision of this training.
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General Scheme of a Further Education and Training Authority (SOLAS) Bill 2012. Provided by the Department of Education and Skills, Ireland.
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This guideline relating to cover for the absence of the LSAMO for annual leave covers the period from 2012-2015.The policy sets out the arrangements to be put in place for cover for the LSAMO role and the contact details.
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Strong reciprocity, defined as a predisposition to help others and to punish those that are not helping, has been proposed as a potent force leading to the evolution of cooperation and altruism. However, the conditions under which strong reciprocity might be favored are not clear. Here we investigate the selective pressure on strong reciprocity by letting both limited dispersal (i.e., spatial structure) and recombination between helping and punishment jointly determine the evolutionary dynamics of strong reciprocity. Our analytical model suggests that when helping and punishment are perfectly linked traits (no recombination occurring between them), strong reciprocity can spread even when the initial frequency of strong reciprocators is close to 0 in the population (i.e., a rare mutant can invade). By contrast, our results indicate that when recombination can occur between helping and punishment (i.e., both traits coevolve) and is stronger than selection, punishment is likely to invade a population of defectors only when it gives a direct fitness benefit to the actor. Overall, our results delineate the conditions under which strong reciprocity is selected for in a spatially structured population and highlight that the forces behind its evolution involves kinship (be it genetic or cultural).
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Natural populations are of finite size and organisms carry multilocus genotypes. There are, nevertheless, few results on multilocus models when both random genetic drift and natural selection affect the evolutionary dynamics. In this paper we describe a formalism to calculate systematic perturbation expansions of moments of allelic states around neutrality in populations of constant size. This allows us to evaluate multilocus fixation probabilities (long-term limits of the moments) under arbitrary strength of selection and gene action. We show that such fixation probabilities can be expressed in terms of selection coefficients weighted by mean first passages times of ancestral gene lineages within a single ancestor. These passage times extend the coalescence times that weight selection coefficients in one-locus perturbation formulas for fixation probabilities. We then apply these results to investigate the Hill-Robertson effect and the coevolution of helping and punishment. Finally, we discuss limitations and strengths of the perturbation approach. In particular, it provides accurate approximations for fixation probabilities for weak selection regimes only (Ns < or = 1), but it provides generally good prediction for the direction of selection under frequency-dependent selection.
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The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.
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Agency Performance Plan
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Railway finance report for the Iowa Department of Transportation.
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Annual report for Iowa Railway Finance Authority. Annual Report produced by Iowa Department of Transportation.
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State Agency Audit Report
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State Agency Audit Report State Revolving Fund - Clean Water & Drinking Programs