854 resultados para Public venture capital
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A tanulmányban a szerzők arra a kérdésre keresik a választ, hogy az aszimmetrikus információk hatására a vállalkozók és a befektetők között kialakuló megbízó-ügynök viszonynak melyek a speciális vetületei a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás vonatkozásában. A szerzők arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a hiányos információk, a megbízó-ügynök viszony, illetve az ügyletek speciális jellege miatt fokozottan jelentkező ügynökprobléma kezelésére a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás szereplői speciális kockázatkezelési technikákat alkalmaznak. Ilyenek a magas elvárt hozamok, a szigorú kiválasztási kritériumok, a speciális befektetési vagy szindikátusi szerződések, a befektetést követő monitoring tevékenység, a több lépcsőben történő finanszírozás és a portfólióvállalatok hálózatba szervezése. A speciális kockázati megközelítés következtében a befektetéseket opciós szemlélet is áthatja. _____ This paper focuses on the special aspects of imperfect information in case of venture capital financing including principal-agent relationship between entrepreneurs and investors as well as adverse selection that evolves as a result of information asymmetries. The authors’ finding is that venture capital is able to manage the problems caused by imperfect information via applying divers risk management techniques such as high profit expectations, scrutiny of portfolio-companies, the use of special contracting stipulations and syndicate agreements, the monitoring of investments, multi-staged financing of companies and the integration of portfolio-companies into networks. In addition to the risk management techniques the authors also give the interpretation of the unique attitude of venture capital toward uncertainty and its special real option-like risk valuation approach that makes venture capitalists capable of handling high uncertainty under imperfect information.
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Venture capitalists can be regarded as financers of young, high-risk enterprises, seeking investments with a high growth potential and offering professional support above and beyond their capital investment. The aim of this study is to analyse the occurrence of information asymmetry between venture capital investors and entrepreneurs, with special regard to the problem of adverse selection. In the course of my empirical research, I conducted in-depth interviews with 10 venture capital investors. The aim of the research was to elicit their opinions about the situation regarding information asymmetry, how they deal with problems arising from adverse selection, and what measures they take to manage these within the investment process. In the interviews we also touched upon how investors evaluate state intervention, and how much they believe company managers are influenced by state support.
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A hazai kis- és középvállalkozások (kkv-k) tőkeellátottságának javítása meghatározó szerepet játszik fejlődésük előmozdításában. Jelen tanulmány az Új Széchenyi Terv (ÚSZT) keretében a vállalkozások rendelkezésére álló pénzügyi eszközök közül a kockázati tőke működését mutatja be. A fejlődésük növekedési ciklusában járó cégek mellett a korai életszakaszukban járó, innovatív tevékenységet folytató, gyors növekedésre képes, de forráshiányos vállalkozások finanszírozásában nyújthat segítséget Magyarországon a 2010-ben elindult JEREMIE Kockázati Tőkeprogram. Az állami és a privát tulajdonban levő piaci szereplők hazánkban újnak mondható együttműködése révén megvalósuló program a magyar kockázatitőke-piac kínálati oldalának bővítését szolgálja, abban az alsó (döntően az 1-1,5 millió EUR/tranzakció alatti) szegmensben, ahol a tisztán piaci alapon működő befektetők korlátozottabb szerepvállalása figyelhető meg, és így a piacon hiány jelentkezik. Az EU-s támogatások ezen új típusú felhasználási formája színesíti és kibővíti a vállalkozások számára elérhető pénzügyi eszközök körét és volumenét, fokozottabb mértékben érvényesül a piaci szemlélet, hiszen verseny van a forrásokért, és verseny van a források kihelyezését végző pénzügyi közvetítő szervezetek között is, mindezek mellett további magánforrások bevonását biztosítja, ösztönzőleg hat a cégek működésére, és a visszaforgó rendszer biztosítja a fenntarthatóságot, a források későbbi újbóli felhasználását is. _______ To improve the capitalization of the domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has a decisive role in promoting development. This study presents the operation of venture capital from the available business financial instruments of the New Széchenyi Plan. In Hungary the JEREMIE Venture Capital Program, which launched in 2010, can help in financing of the rapidly growth, innovative, early life stage companies besides the development cycle of growth companies. This program with new cooperation between the stateowned and private companies enlarge the supply-side of the Hungarian venture capital market, at that the bottom (mostly in the 1 to 1.5 million EUR / transaction below) segment, where can be observed the limited role of the purely market-based investors, and thus there is a shortage in the market. These new type application form of the EU supports enriches and expands the scope and volume of the available financial instruments for the enterprises, the market orientation prevails more broadly, because there is a competition for resources and there is a competition between the resources allocation financial intermediaries,in addition ensures further private resources.
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This paper establishes the life-cycle dynamics of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) to explore the information acquisition role of CVC investment in the process of corporate innovation. I exploit an identification strategy that allows me to isolate exogenous shocks to a firm's ability to innovate. Using this strategy, I first find that the CVC life cycle typically begins following a period of deteriorated corporate innovation and increasingly valuable external information, lending support to the hypothesis that firms conduct CVC investment to acquire information and innovation knowledge from startups. Building on this analysis, I show that CVCs acquire information by investing in companies with similar technological focus but have a different knowledge base. Following CVC investment, parent firms internalize the newly acquired knowledge into internal R&D and external acquisition decisions. Human capital renewal, such as hiring inventors who can integrate new innovation knowledge, is integral in this step. The CVC life cycle lasts about four years, terminating as innovation in the parent firm rebounds. These findings shed new light on discussions about firm boundaries, managing innovation, and corporate information choices.
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This paper has two main objectives. Firstly, to identify the role of the university-focused intermediaries, specifically UVCs, in order to explain how they interact at the early stage of USO creation, particularly regarding knowledge sharing. Secondly, to analyse whether they change their position once the USO is developed. This gives rise to two Research Questions: How does knowledge sharing occur in the dynamics of a university-based entrepreneurial ecosystem? And Do particular participants, such as UTTOs or UVCs, always occupy the same role and position within the university-based entrepreneurial ecosystem?
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The objectives are, firstly, to identify the role of the university-focused intermediaries, specifically University-focused Venture Capital Firms (UVCs), in order to explain how they interact at the early stage of University Spin-out Companies (USOs) creation, particularly regarding knowledge sharing. Secondly, to analyse whether they change their position once the USO is developed, in the context of the dynamics of a university-based entrepreneurial ecosystem.
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The purpose of this article is to investigate how ownership structure, especially family and/or venture-capital involvement, as well as entrepreneurial activities, defined as strategic change and renewal, help explain the involvement of independent members on boards of directors. The CEOs of 2,455 small and medium-sized, private enterprises from practically all industries were contacted in a telephone survey, resulting in an exceptionally high response rate. The findings reveal that family firms are more reluctant to involve independent directors on their boards than non-family firms that presence of venture capitalists increases the frequency of independent board members and that ownership has an impact on board roles. The results do not support the hypothesised relationship that independent directors enhance entrepreneurial activities. One implication of our study is that the often-argued-for strategic contribution of outsiders to the boards in family firms may be overemphasised. Another implication is that family firms that choose to acquire additional capital should be aware that this could result in a change in the board composition and the loss of control of the business. However, new and external owners’ inclusion on the board seems to be negotiable since there are also venture capitalists that do not insist on board representation.
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in this anicle we measure the impact of public sector capital and investment on economic growth. Initially, traditional growth accounting regressions are run for a cross-country data set. A simple endogenous growth model is then constructed in order to take into account the determinants of labor, private capital and public capital. In both cases, public capital is a separate argument of the production function. An additional data-set constructed with quarterly American data was used in the estimations of the growth mode!. The results indicate lhat public capital and public investment play a significant role in determining growth rates and have a significant impact on capital and labor returns. Furthermore, the impact of public investment on productivity growth was found to be positive and always significant for bolh samples. Hence. in a fully optimizing modelo we confmn previous results in the literature that lhe failure of public investment to keep pace with output growlh during the Seventies and Eighties may have played a major role in the slowdown of lhe productivity growth in the period. Anolher main outcome concems the output elasticity wilh respect to public capital. The coefficiem estimates are always positive and significant but magnitudes depend on each of lhe two data set used.
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This paper presents the result of a qualitative empirical research about the “Criatec Fund”, a venture capital fund, privately managed and directed to innovative firms, that was created in 2007 by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). The paper discusses the role of law in the implementation of the Criatec Fund in three different legal dimensions: structural, regulatory and contractual. Based on interviews, this paper tries to test some hypothesis previously formulated by some scholars that studied new financial policies created by the BNDES. This study explains the institutional arrangements of this seed capital policy and the role of flexible legal instruments in the execution of this peculiar type of publicprivate partnership. It also poses some questions to the “law and development agenda” based on some insights from the economic sociology of law.
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Esta tese avalia o impacto dos principais atores recorrentes durante o processo de IPO, em particular, o venture capitalist, o underwriter, e o auditor, sobre as condições de comercialização das ações da empresa, capturado pelo bid-ask spread, a fração de investidores institucionais que investem na empresa, a dispersão de capital, entre outros. Além disso, este estudo também analisa alguns benefícios que os fundos de Venture Capital (VCs) fornecem às empresas que eles investem. Ele investiga o papel dos VCs em dificultar o gerenciamento de resultados em IPOs e quantifica o papel desempenhado por eles no desempenho operacional das empresas após sua oferta inicial de ações. No primeiro capítulo, os resultados indicam que as empresas inflam seus resultados principalmente nos períodos pré-IPO e do IPO. Quando nós controlamos para os quatro períodos diferentes do IPO, observamos que IPOs de empresas investidas por VCs apresentam significativamente menos gerenciamento de resultados no IPO e em períodos seguintes à orfeta inicial das ações, exatamente quando as empresas tendem a inflar mais seus lucros. Este resultado é robusto a diferentes métodos estatísticos e diferentes metodologias usadas para avaliar o gerenciamento de resultados. Além disso, ao dividir a amostra entre IPOs de empresas investidas e não investidas por VCs, observa-se que ambos os grupos apresentam gerenciamento de resultados. Ambas as subamostras apresentam níveis de gerenciamento de resultados de forma mais intensa em diferentes fases ao redor do IPO. Finalmente, observamos também que top underwriters apresentam menores níveis de gerenciamento de resultados na subamostra das empresas investidas por VCs. No segundo capítulo, verificou-se que a escolha do auditor, dos VCs, e underwriter pode indicar escolhas de longo prazo da empresa. Nós apresentamos evidências que as características do underwriter, auditor, e VC têm um impacto sobre as características das empresas e seu desempenho no mercado. Além disso, estes efeitos são persistentes por quase uma década. As empresas que têm um top underwriter e um auditor big-N no momento do IPO têm características de mercado que permanecem ao longo dos próximos 8 anos. Essas características são representadas por um número maior de analistas seguindo a empresa, uma grande dispersão da propriedade através de investidores institucionais, e maior liquidez através um bid-ask spread menor. Elas também são menos propensas a saírem do mercado, bem como mais propensas à emissão de uma orferta secundária. Finalmente, empresas investidas por VCs são positivamente afetadas, quando consideramos todas as medidas de liquidez de mercado, desde a abertura de capital até quase uma década depois. Tais efeitos não são devido ao viés de sobrevivência. Estes resultados não dependem da bolha dot-com, ou seja, os nossos resultados são qualitativamente similares, uma vez que excluímos o período da bolha de 1999-2000. No último capítulo foi evidenciado que empresas investidas por VCs incorrem em um nível mais elevado de saldo em tesouraria do que as empresas não investidas. Este efeito é persistente por pelo menos 8 anos após o IPO. Mostramos também que empresas investidas por VCs estão associadas a um nível menor de alavancagem e cobertura de juros ao longo dos primeiros oito anos após o IPO. Finalmente, não temos evidências estatisticamente significantes entre VCs e a razão dividendo lucro. Estes resultados também são robustos a diversos métodos estatísticos e diferentes metodologias.
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This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the role of the public sector in stimulating greater use of private sector equity for business start-up and growth in two ways. First, to examine the extent to which the provision of public sector equity finance enables individual firms to raise additional funds in the private sector market place. Second, to consider the methodological implications for an economic impact assessment of industrial policy interventions (especially those which include an equity component) at the level of the individual firm. We assess the extent to which there may be indirect positive effects (externalities) associated with public sector financial assistance to individual firms and if so how they distort standard evaluation methodologies designed to estimate the level of additionality of that support. The paper draws upon the results of a recent study of the impact of Enterprise Ireland (EI) financial assistance to indigenous Irish industry in the period 2000 to 2002. The paper demonstrates that a process of re-calibration is necessary in estimates of economic impact in order to account for these positive externalities and the result in this study was a ‘boost’ to additionality. In operational and conceptual terms, the study underlines the importance of the relationship between private and public sector sources of equity finance as an important dynamic in the attempt by industrial and regional policy to stimulate the number of firms with viable investment proposals accessing external equity finance.
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Este estudo procura compreender a importância atribuída aos critérios utilizados pelas SCR portuguesas, na seleção e avaliação de projetos do tipo early-stage. Os dados utilizados foram recolhidos com recurso a questionário aplicado a 22 SCR portuguesas. Foram utilizadas técnicas de estatística descritiva, testes não paramétricos e análise de clusters. Concluiu-se que a personalidade e experiência do empreendedor e equipa de gestão são os critérios mais valorizados. As SCR com capital maioritariamente privado consideram mais importante o grupo de critérios relativo à personalidade do empreendedor e equipa de gestão do que as de capital maioritariamente público; e, as SCR que ainda não se internacionalizaram, consideram mais importantes o grupo de critérios relativos à personalidade do empreendedor e equipa de gestão e o grupo de critérios relativo aos aspetos financeiros, do que as SCR que se internacionalizaram. Na análise de clusters identificaram-se três grupos de SCR: Criadores de riqueza de forma sustentada; Monopolistas Impacientes; e, Ciumento. ABSTRACT: This study seeks to understand the relevance of the criteria used by the Portuguese VCs to select and assess early stage type projects. The data used for the study was collected through a questionnaire answered by 22 Portuguese VCs. We employed descriptive statistic techniques, non-parametric tests and cluster analysis. The conclusion of the study was that the personality and experience of an entrepreneur and of the management team are the most valued criteria. VCs with a majority of private share capital found the group of criteria related to the personality of the entrepreneur and of the management team to be more important than the companies with a majority of public share capital; additionally, the VCs that have not yet expanded internationally, consider the personality of the entrepreneur and management team and the group of criteria associated to financial aspects, to be more important than the VCs that have already expanded abroad. Throughout the study of the clusters we were able to identify three VCs groups: Creators of sustained wealth; Impatient Monopolists and Jealous.
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Principal Topic: There is increasing recognition that the organizational configurations of corporate venture units should depend on the types of ventures the unit seeks to develop (Burgelman, 1984; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). Distinction have been made between internal and external as well as exploitative versus explorative ventures (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008; Narayan et al., 2009; Schildt et al., 2005). Assuming that firms do not want to limit themselves to a single type of venture, but rather employ a portfolio of ventures, the logical consequence is that firms should employ multiple corporate venture units. Each venture unit tailor-made for the type of venture it seeks to develop. Surprisingly, there is limited attention in the literature for the challenges of managing multiple corporate venture units in a single firm. Maintaining multiple venture units within one firm provides easier access to funding for new ideas (Hamel, 1999). It allows for freedom and flexibility to tie the organizational systems (Rice et al., 2000), autonomy (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003), and involvement of management (Day, 1994; Wadwha and Kotha, 2006) to the requirements of the individual ventures. Yet, the strategic objectives of a venture may change when uncertainty around the venture is resolved (Burgelman, 1984). For example, firms may decide to spin-in external ventures (Chesbrough, 2002) or spun-out ventures that prove strategically unimportant (Burgelman, 1984). This suggests that ventures might need to be transferred between venture units, e.g. from a more internally-driven corporate venture division to a corporate venture capital unit. Several studies suggested that ventures require different managerial skills across their phase of development (Desouza et al., 2007; O'Connor and Ayers, 2005; Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990; Westerman et al., 2006). To facilitate effective transfer between venture units and manage the overall venturing process, it is important that firms set up and manage integrative linkages. Integrative linkages provide synergies and coordination between differentiated units (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Prior findings pointed to the important role of senior management (Westerman et al., 2006; Gilbert, 2006) and a shared organizational vision (Burgers et al., 2009) to coordinate venture units with mainstream businesses. We will draw on these literatures to investigate the key question of how to integratively manage multiple venture units. ---------- Methodology/Key Propositions: In order to seek an answer to the research question, we employ a case study approach that provides unique insights into how firms can break up their venturing process. We selected three Fortune 500 companies that employ multiple venturing units, IBM, Royal Dutch/ Shell and Nokia, and investigated and compared their approaches. It was important that the case companies somewhat differed in the type of venture units they employed as well as the way they integrate and coordinate their venture units. The data are based on extensive interviews and a variety of internal and external company documents to triangulate our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). The key proposition of the article is that firms can best manage their multiple venture units through an ambidextrous design of loosely coupled units. This provides venture units with sufficient flexibility to employ organizational configurations that best support the type of venture they seek to develop, as well as provides sufficient integration to facilitate smooth transfer of ventures between venture units. Based on the case findings, we develop a generic framework for a new way of managing the venturing process through multiple corporate venture units. ---------- Results and Implications: One of our main findings is that these firms tend to organize their venture units according to phases in the venture development process. That is, they tend to have venture units aimed at incubation of venture ideas as well as units aimed more at the commercialization of ventures into a new business unit for the firm or a start-up. The companies in our case studies tended to coordinate venture units through integrative management skills or a coordinative venture unit that spanned multiple phases. We believe this paper makes two significant contributions. First, we extend prior venturing literature by addressing how firms manage a portfolio of venture units, each achieving different strategic objectives. Second, our framework provides recommendations on how firms should manage such an approach towards venturing. This helps to increase the likelihood of success of their venturing programs.
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Este trabalho pretende verificar o alinhamento entre os indicadores de inovação utilizados pelos métodos Scorecard de mensuração dos ativos intangíveis e pelas agências governamentais nacionais e internacionais com aqueles utilizados pelos fundos de capital de risco na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, para investimento em empresas spin-offs acadêmicas incubadas. A metodologia constou de uma revisão bibliográfica sobre os métodos de mensuração e valoração dos ativos intangíveis, indicadores de inovação propostos por agências governamentais nacionais e internacionais e fundos de capital de risco que atuam na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Além de serem aplicados questionários nas empresas de fundos de capital de risco desta cidade. Foram levantados diversos métodos Scorecards na literatura com seus indicadores, além dos indicadores de inovação de agências governamentais nacionais e internacionais. Adicionando-se a isso, identificou-se o foco de investimento, o processo de seleção, o método utilizado de avaliação de oportunidades de investimento e indicadores relevantes para as empresas de capital de risco da cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Observou-se que os ativos intangíveis, entre eles os de inovação, não são avaliados individualmente. A informação obtida com as empresas que receberão investimentos dessas empresas de capital de risco é utilizada para se entender a origem dos fluxos de caixa projetados e os principais fatores de risco. E esses dados aplicados ao método do fluxo de caixa descontado permitem que se estime o valor da empresa. Pela vasta experiência dos gestores dos fundos de capital de risco com micro e pequenas empresas inovadoras, espera-se que o estudo das práticas deste segmento traga importantes reflexões para as discussões relativas aos ativos intangíveis e a inovação.