Preservación de la información génica en bacterias; mecanismos y modulación molecular. Preservation of the genetic information in bacteria; mechanisms and molecular modulation.

El objetivo general del presente proyecto es contribuir a la caracterización genética y bioquímica molecular de mecanismos involucrados en el mantenimiento de la información génica, a través del estudio de sistemas fisiológicos involucrados en la prevención, reparación y tolerancia de mutaciones. Dichos sistemas se encuentran evolutivamente conservados y ampliamente distribuidos en los seres vivos. La importancia de los mismos se refleja en el hecho que su deficiencia genera en humanos, enfermedades genéticas, apoptosis y cáncer; y en especies procariotas, células denominadas "hipermutadoras". En los últimos años el estudio de la hipermutabilidad en bacterias ha cobrado gran interés ya que se le atribuye importancia en procesos infectivos y en aspectos básicos relacionados a evolución. Nuestro modelo de estudio son las bacterias Pseudomonas aeruginosa y Escherichia coli, siendo esta última especie no solo modelo de estudio sino también especie de referencia. P. aeruginosa es una bacteria ambiental gram negativa, e importante patógeno oportunista de humanos. Específicamente nos proponemos estudiar en P. aeruginosa algunos aspectos particulares del Sistema de Reparación de Bases Apareadas Incorrectamente (Mismatch Repair System, MRS), del Sistema de Prevención/Reparación de Lesiones Oxidativas generadas a través de 8-oxo-7,8-dihidroguanina (8-oxo-dG ó GO) y el papel de las ADN Polimerasas de baja fidelidad en la modulación de la tasa de mutación. Asimismo estamos interesados en estudiar en cepas de E. coli deficientes en el sistema Dam, la existencia de subpoblaciones de alta estabilidad genética debido a la eliminación de posibles mutantes por incremento de la expresión de los otros componentes del MRS. Metodológicamente la caracterización bioquímica de factores proteicos se llevará a cabo utilizando proteínas recombinantes purificadas, análisis de interacción proteína-proteína y proteína-ADN mediante electroforesis en geles y resonancia plasmónica de superficie (Biacore), mutagenésis dirigida in vitro, y estudios de complementación en cepas mutantes específicas. Aspectos fenotípicos y de regulación génica en cultivos de biofilm y células en suspensión serán estudiados mediante la construcción de cepas mutantes, fusiones transcripcionales, PCR en tiempo real, western blot y microscopia de fluorescencia confocal.

Partially supervised learning of fuzzy classification rules

Fuzzy classification, semi-supervised learning, data mining

Observations on a collection of Papuan crania / by George A. Dorsey ; with notes on preservation and decorative features by William H. Holmes.

v.2:no.1(1897)

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Learning the ropes and embracing the rules: CFSP institutions as arenas for learning and strategic socialisation

The aim of this article is to analyse those situations in which learning and socialisation take place within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular, at the level of experts in the Council Working Groups. Learning can explain the institutional development of CFSP and changes in the foreign policies of the Member States. Some scope conditions for learning and channels of institutionalisation are identified. Socialisation, resulting from learning within a group, is perceived as a strategic action by reflective actors. National diplomats, once they arrive in Brussels, learn the new code of conduct of their Working Groups. They are embedded in two environments and faced with two logics: the European one in the Council and the national one in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The empirical evidence supports the argument that neither rational nor sociological approaches alone can account for these processes.

Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15

Optimal feedback control rules sensitive to controlled endogenous risk-aversion

The objective of this paper is to correct and improve the results obtained by Van der Ploeg (1984a, 1984b) and utilized in the theoretical literature related to feedback stochastic optimal control sensitive to constant exogenous risk-aversion (see, Jacobson, 1973, Karp, 1987 and Whittle, 1981, 1989, 1990, among others) or to the classic context of risk-neutral decision-makers (see, Chow, 1973, 1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1993). More realistic and attractive, this new approach is placed in the context of a time-varying endogenous risk-aversion which is under the control of the decision-maker. It has strong qualitative implications on the agent's optimal policy during the entire planning horizon.