Political Posturing or Real Powers: Control of Genetically Modified Crops by the Member States and their Regions

The cultivation of genetically modified (GM) crops in the EU is highly harmonised, involving a central authorisation procedure that aims to ensure a high level of environmental and human health protection. However conflicts over authority persist and the Commission has responded to a combination of internal and external pressures with a more flexible approach to coexistence, a proposed opt-out clause and recently a promise by the head of the Commission to review the existing EU GM legislative regime, providing an opportunity to consider and suggest paths of development. In light of the significance of multilevel governance and subsidiarity for GM cultivation, this paper considers the policy-making powers of the Member States and subnational regions in this regime, focussing upon post-authorisation options in particular. A number of core mechanisms exist, including voluntary measures, safeguard clauses, coexistence measures, a proposed express opt-out and Article 4(2) TEU on ‘national identity. These mechanisms are examined in light of the goals and challenges of multilevel governance, in order to consider whether the relevant powers are located at the appropriate level. Overall, it is apparent that the developments occurring at the EU level are strengthening multilevel governance, but with significant opportunities to improve it further through focussing on the supporting roles and the regional levels in particular.

A intervenção do tribunal judicial no processo de constituição do tribunal arbitral e o princípio do contraditório

Under specific circumstances, the arbitral tribunal constitution procedure may come to an impasse, due to divergences between the parties or to the mere innaction of one of them or even of a third party. Such is the case when one of the parties or a third party does not appoint the arbitrator it should appoint according to the law or to the arbitration agreement. In order to overcome these types of situations, the Voluntary Arbitration Law provides for the intervention of the President of the Tribunal da Relação in the arbitral tribunal constitution procedure, granting him the power to, by appplication of one of the parties, name or choose the arbitrator the appointment of which has been ommited by the other party or the third party. This paper adresses the question of whether the procedure aimed at the decision of the President of the Tribunal da Relação must incorporate the defendant’s right to contradictory. The answer to this question is based, mainly, on the determination of which is the procedural form applicable to the intervention of the President of the Tribunal da Relação and on analysis of both the structure and effects of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrator´s contract.

The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.

Rethinking the powers of truth commissions in light of the ICC statute

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is silent on the issue of national truth commissions. How the ICC might treat these bodies and the information they may hold is uncertain. The overlapping nature of the investigations likely to be carried out by the ICC and future truth-seeking bodies may, however, give rise to areas of tension, particularly where truth commissions hold confidential or self-incriminating information. This article questions whether the traditional truth-seeking powers to grant confidentiality and compel the provision of self-incriminating statements are compatible with the prosecutorial framework of the ICC. It considers how such information is likely to be dealt with by the ICC and analyses whether effective truth seeking can be carried out in the absence of such powers.

Comparison of the computational cost of a Monte Carlo and deterministic algorithm for computing bilinear forms of matrix powers

In this paper we consider bilinear forms of matrix polynomials and show that these polynomials can be used to construct solutions for the problems of solving systems of linear algebraic equations, matrix inversion and finding extremal eigenvalues. An almost Optimal Monte Carlo (MAO) algorithm for computing bilinear forms of matrix polynomials is presented. Results for the computational costs of a balanced algorithm for computing the bilinear form of a matrix power is presented, i.e., an algorithm for which probability and systematic errors are of the same order, and this is compared with the computational cost for a corresponding deterministic method.

Informe de la Reunión del Grupo de Expertos Asesor del Grupo Latinoamericano en la Comisión Preparatoria de la Autoridad Internacional de los Fondos Marinos y del Tribunal Internacional del Derecho del Mar = Report of the Meeting of the Ad-hoc Advisory Expert Group of the Latin American Group in the Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Contiene la asistencia, organización de los trabajos y resumen de los debates de la reunión convocada con el propósito de analizar fórmulas para el fortalecimiento de la capacidad negociadora de los grupos latinoamericanos en foros internacionales relacionados con el desarrollo de los recursos marinos.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.