899 resultados para Political corruption.
Resumo:
In the last few decades, the world has witnessed an enormous growth in the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI). The global stock of FDI reached US$ 7.5 trillion in 2003 and accounted for 11% of world Gross Domestic Product, up from 7% in 1990. The sales of multinational enterprises at around US$ 19 trillion were more than double the level of world exports. Substantial FDI inflows went into transition countries. Inflows into one of the region's largest recipient, the Russian Federation, almost doubled, enabling Russia to become one of the five top FDI destinations in 2005-2006. FDI inflows in Russia have increased almost threefold from 13.6% in 2003 to 35% in 2007. In 2003, these flows were twice greater than those into China; whilst in 2007 they were six times larger. Russia's FDI inflows were also about 2.5 times greater than those of Brazil. Efficient government institutions are argued by many economists to foster FDI and growth as a result. However, the magnitude of this effect has yet to be measured. This thesis takes a Political Economy approach to explore, empirically, the potential impact of malfunctioning governmental institutions, proxied by three indices of perceived corruption, on FDI stocks accumulation/distribution within Russia over the period of 2002-2004. Using a regional data-set it concentrates on three areas relating to FDI. Firstly, it considers the significance, the size and the sign of the impact of perceived corruption on accumulation of FDI stocks within Russia. Secondly, it quantifies the impact of perceived corruption on the volume of FDI stocks simultaneously estimating the impact of the investment in public capital such as telecommunications and transportation networks on FDI in the presence of corruption. In particular, it addresses the question whether more corrupt regions in Russia are also those that could have accumulated more of FDI stocks, and investigates whether those 'more corrupt' regions would have had lower level of public capital investment. Finally, it examines whether decentralisation increases or decreases corruption and whether a larger extent of decentralisation has a positive or negative impact on FDI (stocks). The results of three studies are as follows. Firstly, along with market potential, corruption is found to be one of the key factors in explaining FDI distribution within Russia between 2002 and 2004. Secondly, corruption on average is found to be related to FDI positively suggesting that it may act as speed money: to save their time foreign direct investors might be willing to bribe the regional authorities so to move in front of the bureaucratic lines. Thirdly, although when corruption is controlled for, the impact of the latter on unobservable FDI is found to be on average positive, no association between FDI and public investment is observed with the only exception of transportation infrastructure (i.e., railway). The results might suggest therefore that it is possible that not only regions with high levels of perceived corruption attract more FDI but also that expansions in public capital investments are not accompanied by an increase of the volume of FDI (stocks) in regions with high levels of corruption. This casts some doubt on the productivity of the investment in public capital in these regions as it might be that bureaucrats may prefer to use these infrastructural projects for rent extraction. Finally, we find decentralisation to have a significant and positive impact on both FDI stock accumulation and corruption, suggesting that local governments may spend more on public goods to make the area more attractive to foreign investors but at the same time they may be interested into extracting rents from foreign investors. These results support the idea that the regulation of FDI is associated with and facilitated by a larger public sector, which distorts competition and introduces opportunities for rent-seeking by particular economic and political factors.
Resumo:
This paper analyses the effect of corruption on Multinational Enterprises' (MNEs) incentives to undertake FDI in a particular country. We contribute to the existing literature by modelling the relationship between corruption and FDI using both parametric and non-parametric methods. We report that the impact of corruption on FDI stock is different for the different quantiles of the FDI stock distribution. This is a characteristic that could not be captured in previous studies which used only parametric methods. After controlling for the location selection process of MNEs and other host country characteristics, the result from both parametric and non-parametric analyses offer some support for the ‘helping-hand’ role of corruption.
Resumo:
This thesis examines the ways Indonesian politicians exploit the rhetorical power of metaphors in the Indonesian political discourse. The research applies the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Metaphorical Frame Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis to textual and oral data. The corpus comprises: 150 political news articles from two newspapers (Harian Kompas and Harian Waspada, 2010-2011 edition), 30 recordings of two television news and talk-show programmes (TV-One and Metro-TV), and 20 interviews with four legislators, two educated persons and two laymen. For this study, a corpus of written bahasa Indonesia was also compiled, which comprises 150 texts of approximately 439,472 tokens. The data analysis shows the potential power of metaphors in relation to how politicians communicate the results of their thinking, reasoning and meaning-making through language and discourse and its social consequences. The data analysis firstly revealed 1155 metaphors. These metaphors were then classified into the categories of conventional metaphor, cognitive function of metaphor, metaphorical mapping and metaphor variation. The degree of conventionality of metaphors is established based on the sum of expressions in each group of metaphors. Secondly, the analysis revealed that metaphor variation is influenced by the broader Indonesian cultural context and the natural and physical environment, such as the social dimension, the regional, style and the individual. The mapping system of metaphor is unidirectionality. Thirdly, the data show that metaphoric thought pervades political discourse in relation to its uses as: (1) a felicitous tool for the rhetoric of political leaders, (2) part of meaning-making that keeps the discourse contexts alive and active, and (3) the degree to which metaphor and discourse shape the conceptual structures of politicians‟ rhetoric. Fourthly, the analysis of data revealed that the Indonesian political discourse attempts to create both distance and solidarity towards general and specific social categories accomplished via metaphorical and frame references to the conceptualisations of us/them. The result of the analysis shows that metaphor and frame are excellent indicators of the us/them categories which work dialectically in the discourse. The acts of categorisation via metaphors and frames at both textual and conceptual level activate asymmetrical concepts and contribute to social and political hierarchical constructs, i.e. WEAKNESS vs.POWER, STUDENT vs. TEACHER, GHOST vs. CHOSEN WARRIOR, and so on. This analysis underscores the dynamic nature of categories by documenting metaphorical transfers between, i.e. ENEMY, DISEASE, BUSINESS, MYSTERIOUS OBJECT and CORRUPTION, LAW, POLITICS and CASE. The metaphorical transfers showed that politicians try to dictate how they categorise each other in order to mobilise audiences to act on behalf of their ideologies and to create distance and solidarity.
Resumo:
ONLY AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION AT ASTON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY WITH PRIOR ARRANGEMENT This thesis seeks to contribute to the socio-political literature. It comprises of three individual chapters examining the determinants and consequences of different social-political institutional factors. Specifically, the first study combines game theoretical and empirical techniques to examine how bureaucrats favour other agents within their social group and the effects this will have on the level of corruption in the economy. To this end, I develop a simple model of allocation of time between economic activities and leisure (time spent building social network ties), to illustrate the underlying causal mechanism between social network and corruption. It shows that large social networks and low levels of economic activities provides the condition for high levels of corruption. However, the ability of the government to punish corruption through well-established laws and property rights enforcement acts as a deterrent to corruption. he second work also combines game theoretical and empirical techniques. It aims to clarify the relationship between the degree of competition and political influence of firms, paying particular attention to the level of government regulations that exist in the countries in which the firms operates. The interplay between economic and political institutions is vital to any analysis on understanding the workings of political influence. The third study is purely empirical. It examines the role of two types of business network, namely, political connections and business group affiliations on a firm’s performance. Evidence was provided on Chinese firms’ performance during the 2008 financial crisis.
Resumo:
This study examines some concerns that derive from Suriname‘s May-July 2010 elections, which resulted in the re-emergence of erstwhile military ruler and convicted drug trafficker, Désiré (Desi) Bouterse, as President of the Republic. The victory reflects Bouterse‘s political acumen in aggregating disparate political interests and in establishing a viable coalition government. But because of his history and profile, this triumph has generated anxiety in some places internationally. In this respect, the study examines anxieties related to three matters: (a) relations with Guyana, where there is an existing territorial dispute and a recently resolved maritime dispute, (b) illegal drug trafficking operations, and (c) foreign policy engagement with Venezuela. There has been a flurry of bilateral activities—including several presidential summits—with Guyana since President Bouterse‘s inauguration, albeit seemingly more about symbolism than substance. Although the maritime dispute was settled by a Tribunal of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 2007, the 15,000 km2 New River Triangle is still unresolved. Indeed, in June 2011 President Bouterse reasserted Suriname‘s claim to the Triangle. Suriname has upped the ante in that dispute by portraying internationally the map of Suriname as inclusive of the disputed area. In all likelihood that self-redefinition slowly will become the country‘s cartographic definition in the eyes of the world if Guyana does not successfully rebuff that move or pursue the definitive settlement of the dispute. A geonarcotics assessment shows Suriname to be still heavily implicated in trafficking, because of geography, law enforcement limitations, corruption, and other factors. But despite Bouterse‘s drug-related history and that of former senior military officers, several reasons suggest the inexpediency of a narco-state being created by Bouterse. As well, as part of Suriname‘s pursuit of increased Caribbean and South American engagement, it has boosted relations with Venezuela, which has included it in PetroCaribe and provided housing and agricultural aid. However, the engagement appears to be driven more by pragmatism and less by any ideological affinity with Hugo Chavez.
Resumo:
This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the roles that institutions play in economic development. How do institutions evolve? What mechanisms are responsible for their persistence? What effects do they have on economic development?
I address these questions using historical and contemporary data from Eastern Europe and Russia. This area is relatively understudied by development economists. It also has a very interesting history. For one thing, for several centuries it was divided between different empires. For another, it experienced wars and socialism in the 20th century. I use some of these exogenous shocks as quasi-natural social experiments to study the institutional transformations and its effects on economic development both in the short and long run.
This first chapter explores whether economic, social, and political institutions vary in their resistance to policies designed to remove them. The empirical context for the analysis is Romania from 1690 to the 2000s. Romania represents an excellent laboratory for studying the persistence of different types of historical institutional legacies. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Romania was split between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, where political and economic institutions differed. The Habsburgs imposed less extractive institutions relative to the Ottomans: stronger rule of law, a more stable and predictable state, a more developed civil society, and less corruption. In the 20th century, the Romanian Communist regime tried deliberately to homogenize the country along all relevant dimensions. It was only partially successful. Using a regression discontinuity design, I document the persistence of economic outcomes, social capital, and political attitudes. First, I document remarkable convergence in urbanization, education, unemployment, and income between the two former empires. Second, regarding social capital, no significant differences in organizational membership, trust in bureaucracy, and corruption persist today. Finally, even though the Communists tried to change all political attitudes, significant discontinuities exist in current voting behavior at the former Habsburg-Ottoman border. Using data from the parliamentary elections of 1996-2008, I find that former Habsburg rule decreases by around 6 percentage points the vote share of the major post-Communist left party and increases by around 2 and 5 percentage points the vote shares of the main anti-Communist and liberal parties, respectively.
The second chapter investigates the effects of Stalin’s mass deportations on distrust in central authority. Four deported ethnic groups were not rehabilitated after Stalin’s death; they remained in permanent exile until the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This allows one to distinguish between the effects of the groups that returned to their homelands and those of the groups that were not allowed to return. Using regional data from the 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, I find that deportations have a negative interim effect on trust in central authority in both the regions of destination and those of origin. The effect is stronger for ethnic groups that remained in permanent exile in the destination regions. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey, the chapter also documents a long-term effect of deportations in the destination regions.
The third chapter studies the short-term effect of Russian colonization of Central Asia on economic development. I use data on the regions of origin of Russian settlers and push factors to construct an instrument for Russian migration to Central Asia. This instrument allows me to interpret the outcomes causally. The main finding is that the massive influx of Russians into the region during the 1897-1926 period had a significant positive effect on indigenous literacy. The effect is stronger for men and in rural areas. Evidently, interactions between natives and Russians through the paid labor market was an important mechanism of human capital transmission in the context of colonization.
The findings of these chapters provide additional evidence that history and institutions do matter for economic development. Moreover, the dissertation also illuminates the relative persistence of institutions. In particular, political and social capital legacies of institutions might outlast economic legacies. I find that most economic differences between the former empires in Romania have disappeared. By the same token, there are significant discontinuities in political outcomes. People in former Habsburg Romania provide greater support for liberalization, privatization, and market economy, whereas voters in Ottoman Romania vote more for redistribution and government control over the economy.
In the former Soviet Union, Stalin’s deportations during World War II have a long-term negative effect on social capital. Today’s residents of the destination regions of deportations show significantly lower levels of trust in central authority. This is despite the fact that the Communist regime tried to eliminate any source of opposition and used propaganda to homogenize people’s political and social attitudes towards the authorities. In Central Asia, the influx of Russian settlers had a positive short-term effect on human capital of indigenous population by the 1920s, which also might have persisted over time.
From a development perspective, these findings stress the importance of institutions for future paths of development. Even if past institutional differences are not apparent for a certain period of time, as was the case with the former Communist countries, they can polarize society later on, hampering economic development in the long run. Different institutions in the past, which do not exist anymore, can thus contribute to current political instability and animosity.
Resumo:
In this paper the characteristics of the cyclical political polarization of the Spanish media system are defined. From this study, a prospective analysis raises doubts about this scenario remains unchanged because of the political and economic crisis. It seeks to define the role played by political and media actors in polarization focusing on the two legislatures where the tension reached higher levels (1993-1996 and 2004-2008) and compares it with the developments faced by them in the current economical and political context of crisis. To achieve these aims, it has been performed an analysis of media content (since 1993) and looked through primary sociological sources and the scientific literature about polarization. This is an exploratory, critical and descriptive case analysis.
Resumo:
Dans les dernières années, la corruption municipale a constitué un enjeu d’importance au Québec, posant des questions majeures sur la qualité de la gouvernance municipale. Ce mémoire vise à comprendre comment fonctionnait le système de corruption découvert au niveau des municipalités. En premier lieu, l’aspect historique de la corruption municipale sera examiné pour identifier l’héritage ayant influencé les pratiques actuelles. Surtout, ce phénomène sera abordé pour décrire la structure de gouvernance informelle qui s’est développée au sein des institutions municipales, plus spécifiquement dans les cas de Laval et Montréal. Le modèle théorique de Della Porta et Vannucci (2012) permettra d’illustrer la façon dont les acteurs internalisent les normes de la corruption, comment ils développent des relations de confiance entre eux et, enfin, comment l’action de régulateurs vient cimenter l’institutionnalisation de réseaux de corruption. Enfin, le mémoire vise à déceler quels aspects inhérents aux institutions municipales québécoises les ont rendues vulnérables à la corruption. La faiblesse et la capacité limitée des institutions formelles à structurer avec succès les incitatifs sera mise de l’avant. On examinera les limites des institutions visant à établir une surveillance externe des municipalités, pour ensuite se pencher sur les institutions internes pouvant prévenir la corruption, soit la bureaucratie et la démocratie municipale. En bref, le mémoire vise à identifier les structures de gouvernance des réseaux de corruption à Laval et Montréal, puis à en expliquer la provenance par la faiblesse d’institutions qui auraient pu l’endiguer.
Resumo:
Dans les dernières années, la corruption municipale a constitué un enjeu d’importance au Québec, posant des questions majeures sur la qualité de la gouvernance municipale. Ce mémoire vise à comprendre comment fonctionnait le système de corruption découvert au niveau des municipalités. En premier lieu, l’aspect historique de la corruption municipale sera examiné pour identifier l’héritage ayant influencé les pratiques actuelles. Surtout, ce phénomène sera abordé pour décrire la structure de gouvernance informelle qui s’est développée au sein des institutions municipales, plus spécifiquement dans les cas de Laval et Montréal. Le modèle théorique de Della Porta et Vannucci (2012) permettra d’illustrer la façon dont les acteurs internalisent les normes de la corruption, comment ils développent des relations de confiance entre eux et, enfin, comment l’action de régulateurs vient cimenter l’institutionnalisation de réseaux de corruption. Enfin, le mémoire vise à déceler quels aspects inhérents aux institutions municipales québécoises les ont rendues vulnérables à la corruption. La faiblesse et la capacité limitée des institutions formelles à structurer avec succès les incitatifs sera mise de l’avant. On examinera les limites des institutions visant à établir une surveillance externe des municipalités, pour ensuite se pencher sur les institutions internes pouvant prévenir la corruption, soit la bureaucratie et la démocratie municipale. En bref, le mémoire vise à identifier les structures de gouvernance des réseaux de corruption à Laval et Montréal, puis à en expliquer la provenance par la faiblesse d’institutions qui auraient pu l’endiguer.