Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

Transfer pricing rules and competing governments

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. The present paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non‐cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above‐optimal levels of effective taxation. We then derive conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement, and show that harmonization according to the ‘arm's length’ principle—the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD—may not be Pareto improving.

An auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel in a heterogenous wireless network

In this paper, we develop a novel auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel by a wireless node in a heterogeneous wireless network. We assume that the service providers of the heterogeneous wireless network are selfish and non-cooperative in the sense that they are only interested in maximizing their own utilities. The wireless user needs to procure wireless channels to execute multiple tasks. To solve the problem of the wireless user, we propose a reverse optimal (REVOPT) auction and derive an expression for the expected payment by the wireless user. The proposed auction mechanism REVOPT satisfies important game theoretic properties such as Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

Spectral Sensing of Adaptive Frequency Hopping Signal for Cognitive Radio

The issue of dynamic spectrum scene analysis in any cognitive radio network becomes extremely complex when low probability of intercept, spread spectrum systems are present in environment. The detection and estimation become more complex if frequency hopping spread spectrum is adaptive in nature. In this paper, we propose two phase approach for detection and estimation of frequency hoping signals. Polyphase filter bank has been proposed as the architecture of choice for detection phase to efficiently detect the presence of frequency hopping signal. Based on the modeling of frequency hopping signal it can be shown that parametric methods of line spectral analysis are well suited for estimation of frequency hopping signals if the issues of order estimation and time localization are resolved. An algorithm using line spectra parameter estimation and wavelet based transient detection has been proposed which resolves above issues in computationally efficient manner suitable for implementation in cognitive radio. The simulations show promising results proving that adaptive frequency hopping signals can be detected and demodulated in a non cooperative context, even at a very low signal to noise ratio in real time.

Intercepting maneuvering target with specified impact angle by modified SDRE technique

A guidance law derived by modifying state dependent Riccati equation technique, to enable the imposition of a predetermined terminal intercept angle to a maneuvering target, is presented in this paper. The interceptor is assumed to have no knowledge about the type of maneuver the target is executing. The problem is cast in a non-cooperative game theoretic form. The guidance law obtained is dependent on the LOS angular rotational rate and on the impact angle error. Theoretical conditions which guarantee existence of solutions under this method have been derived. It is shown that imposing the impact angle constraint calls for an increase in the gains of the guidance law considerably, subsequently requiring a higher maneuverability advantage of the interceptor. The performance of the proposed guidance law is studied using a non-linear two dimensional simulation of the relative kinematics, assuming first order dynamics for the interceptor and target.

Disorder, oscillatory dynamics and state switching: the role of c-Myc

In this paper, using the intrinsically disordered oncoprotein Myc as an example, we present a mathematical model to help explain how protein oscillatory dynamics can influence state switching. Earlier studies have demonstrated that, while Myc overexpression can facilitate state switching and transform a normal cell into a cancer phenotype, its downregulation can reverse state-switching. A fundamental aspect of the model is that a Myc threshold determines cell fate in cells expressing p53. We demonstrate that a non-cooperative positive feedback loop coupled with Myc sequestration at multiple binding sites can generate bistable Myc levels. Normal quiescent cells with Myc levels below the threshold can respond to mitogenic signals to activate the cyclin/cdk oscillator for limited cell divisions but the p53/Mdm2 oscillator remains nonfunctional. In response to stress, the p53/Mdm2 oscillator is activated in pulses that are critical to DNA repair. But if stress causes Myc levels to cross the threshold, Myc inactivates the p53/Mdm2 oscillator, abrogates p53 pulses, and pushes the cyclin/cdk oscillator into overdrive sustaining unchecked proliferation seen in cancer. However, if Myc is downregulated, the cyclin/cdk oscillator is inactivated and the p53/Mdm2 oscillator is reset and the cancer phenotype is reversed. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Asymmetric flow networks

This paper provides a new model of network formation that bridges the gap between the two benchmark models by Bala and Goyal, the one-way flow model, and the two-way flow model, and includes both as particular extreme cases. As in both benchmark models, in what we call an "asymmetric flow" network a link can be initiated unilaterally by any player with any other, and the flow through a link towards the player who supports it is perfect. Unlike those models, in the opposite direction there is friction or decay. When this decay is complete there is no flow and this corresponds to the one-way flow model. The limit case when the decay in the opposite direction (and asymmetry) disappears, corresponds to the two-way flow model. We characterize stable and strictly stable architectures for the whole range of parameters of this "intermediate" and more general model. We also prove the convergence of Bala and Goyal's dynamic model in this context.

目标反射特性对激光测距的影响

针对非合作小目标激光测距系统,目标表面的反射特征对激光回波信号有很大的影响。建立测量表面双向反射分布函数(BRDF)的装置,对常用的两种热控材料——白漆涂层和F36多包层,测量了其在1064 nm波长下的双向反射分布函数。得出了白漆涂层镜面反射很小,散射角较大,利于各方向接收回波信号;而F36多包层镜面反射很强,散射角-2°~2°,不利于探测。通过由表面BRDF与由朗伯散射计算得到的最小接收功率的比较,得出了入射角大于45°入射白漆涂层时,回波信号较小;大于2°入射F36多包层时,没有回波信号。

空间激光跟瞄中指向驱动电机运动特性研究

设计了一种深空非合作目标的激光扫描、捕获、跟踪地面实验装置,通过模拟深空同轨道运动的两颗卫星跟瞄过程,在理论上计算了跟瞄装置中光束指向驱动电机的最小加速度和其在跟踪过程中的运动特性。理论分析与仿真结果表明,当卫星偏离光斑中心一定距离时,指向驱动电机先加速后减速,补偿这个偏心,重新捕获跟踪卫星;重新捕获到跟踪所需时间受电机加速度和望远镜探测精度以及探测器响应处理时间影响,其中探测器精度对重新捕获到跟踪所需时间影响较大,探测器响应处理时间要减小到最小;为了使从捕获到跟踪过程中卫星始终在扫描光斑范围内,经纬仪驱动电机的最小角加速度为25.5°/s2。

Análise de desempenho de redes p2p com protocolo push/pull para distribuição de vídeo na presença de nós não-cooperativos.

O uso de Internet para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo tem se mostrado uma tendência atual e traz consigo grandes desafios. O alicerce sobre qual a Internet está fundamentada, comutação por pacotes e arquitetura cliente-servidor, não proporciona as melhores condições para este tipo de serviço. A arquitetura P2P (peer-to-peer) vem sendo considerada como infraestrutura para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo na Internet. A idéia básica da distribuição de vídeo com o suporte de P2P é a de que os vários nós integrantes da rede sobreposta distribuem e encaminham pedaços de vídeo de forma cooperativa, dividindo as tarefas, e colocando à disposição da rede seus recursos locais. Dentro deste contexto, é importante investigar o que ocorre com a qualidade do serviço de distribuição de vídeo quando a infraestrutura provida pelas redes P2P é contaminada por nós que não estejam dispostos a cooperar, já que a base desta arquitetura é a cooperação. Neste trabalho, inicialmente é feito um estudo para verificar o quanto a presença de nós não-cooperativos pode afetar a qualidade da aplicação de distribuição de fluxo de vídeo em uma rede P2P. Com base nos resultados obtidos, é proposto um mecanismo de incentivo à cooperação para que seja garantida uma boa qualidade de vídeo aos nós cooperativos e alguma punição aos nós não-cooperativos. Os testes e avaliações foram realizados utilizando-se o simulador PeerSim.

Realizing an Applied Gaming Ecosystem: Towards Supporting Service-based Innovation Knowledge Management and Transfer

The EU-based industry for non-leisure games is an emerging business. As such it is still fragmented and needs to achieve critical mass to compete globally. Nevertheless its growth potential is widely recognized. To become competitive the relevant applied gaming communities and SMEs require support by fostering the generation of innovation potential. The European project Realizing an Applied Gaming Ecosystem (RAGE) is aiming at supporting this challenge. RAGE will help by making available an interoperable set of advanced technology assets, tuned to applied gaming, as well as proven practices of using asset-based applied games in various real-world contexts, and finally a centralized access to a wide range of applied gaming software modules, services and related document, media, and educational resources within an online community portal called the RAGE Ecosystem. It is based on an integrational, user-centered approach of Knowledge Management and Innovation Processes in the shape of a service-based implementation.

Network formation under mutual consent and costly communication

We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson–Wolinsky’s concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, through a refinement of the Nash equilibria of Myerson’s consent game. This refinement, denoted as monadic stability, describes myopically forward looking behavior of the players. We show through an equivalence that the class of monadically stable networks is a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks that can be characterized fully by modifications of the properties defining pairwise stability.

Strategic behavior under partial cooperation

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash's best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return.

Identity and Link Reliability in Social Networks

This paper considers a non-cooperative network formation game where identity is introduced as a single dimension to capture the characteristics of a player in the network. Players access to the benefits from the link through direct and indirect connections. We consider cases where cost of link formation paid by the initiator. Each player is allowed to choose their commitment level to their identities. The cost of link formation decreases as the players forming the link share the same identity and higher commitment levels. We then introduce link imperfections to the model. We characterize the Nash networks and we find that the set of Nash networks are either singletons with no links formed or separated blocks or components with mixed blocks or connected.

Latent and Explicit Authority in Hierarchical Organizations

We consider the problem of the exercise of authority within social production organizations, embedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships. We distinguish two types of behavior. First, we introduce an equilibrium notion implementing latent authority under which subordinates submit themselves to authority even though such authority is not en- forced explicitly. Second, we compare this with a non-cooperative equilibrium concept describing explicit exercise of authority. We show that for low enough enforcement costs both forms of authority will be exercised in equilibrium, but for higher enforcement costs latent authority will be exercised while explicit authority will not.